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Chapter One
Re-membering Memory: Beyond Mere Storage
Forget about the memory you are used to.
This idea is not as radical as you might think. I’m not suggesting that you purge
your hard drives, forget the lifetime worth of memories you have in your mind, or even
weed through your photo albums and discard the images you haven’t looked at in years.
Instead, memory needs to be rethought. On the surface, digital memory resembles
ancient Greek mental storehouses of memory due to the remarkable potential for storing
everything. By looking a bit deeper, I suggest that digital memory is much more than
excess storage. Digital memory is a flexible memory—we can store what we want, in the
ways we want, the quantity we want, and the quality we want. Because of this flexibility,
it is my aim to suggest that memory, one of the five canons of rhetoric, needs to be
reworked in relation to interactive technologies. By reworked I do not mean restarted,
but rather graciously revamped. At the outset of the book Lingua Fracta: Towards a
Rhetoric of New Media, Collin Gifford Brooke anticipates a struggle between old(er)
constructions of rhetoric and new(er) forms of media. His solution is a compromise—
new media must react to and learn from rhetoric in a similar fashion that rhetoric must
respond to technologies.

Like Brooke, in this chapter I present some of the ways

rhetorical memory is responding to newer media. Contemporary rhetoric must refigure
the idea of memory away from storage (which might be difficult since the notion of
digital memory is so often storage based) and into one of production. To accomplish this
task, in this chapter I suggest some of the possibilities for rethinking digital, rhetorical
memory. Although massive server space is capable of storing literally everything we
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want, contemporary rhetoric should not limit the role of memory by viewing it as an
updated and unending ‘storehouse.’ Additionally, the concept of memory must also
escape the remembered-or-forgotten binary.

Rather, contemporary rhetoric needs to

rethink the new roles memory inhabits by looking at the ways digital memory is created,
shared, reproduced, and utilized. By moving digital memory away from the trope of
storage, I argue that digital memory must be reconceived as a creative and productive
concept instead.
In Lingua Fracta, Brooke draws on the concern about the limits of criticism and
suggests two pathways that English departments create when trying to understand texts.
Criticism, Brooke argues, entails “evaluating work that has been done, rather than
focusing on invention—on what might still be done with new media” (Brooke 10,
emphasis in original). The difference between “has been” and “might still” points to
what I am recognizing as the distinction between digital memory as storage and digital
memory as creation. On the one hand, digital memory as storage (“has been”) is limited
to a storehouse, a place-based memory structure whose main purpose is holding onto
what “has been done” in the past. On the other, digital memory as creation (“might still”)
transforms the flat, stored memories into round, lively memories re-created with each
use.
I am able to foster the connection between the “has been” and the “might still”
forms of memory by introducing the rhetorical term techne to illustrate the creative and
productive features of contemporary memory. Transforming “has been” to “might still”
embodies the shifting essence from statically stored memory and into fluid and creative
memory. Although I explore techne in great detail in chapter two, I find it useful to
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briefly overview how exactly I define this concept in order to make the argument that
contemporary memory is a creative formation a bit clearer. To make such a claim, I
suggest three interpretations of techne: as a process that is inherently productive; as a
force that renegotiates contemporary sources of power; and as a skill that balances expert
knowledge with instrumentality. Using techne to examine the role of contemporary
memory is a unique approach, one that has not been explicitly examined in much (if any)
of the literature I have encountered.

Throughout this dissertation, however, I will

demonstrate how techne is one of the most useful concepts through which we can
understand the new shapes of contemporary rhetorical memory.
Since our capacity to store information is unlimited, we often capriciously delete
files or pictures from our hard drive without a second thought. Speaking for myself, I
have declined photo ops knowing that I can find better, clearer, more interesting photos
of the same landmarks online.

In a sense, I can use someone else’s memory to

supplement my own. I argue that such popular consumerist appeal should be a prime
opportunity for several academic fields to take notice. In particular, the field of rhetoric
should seize this opportunity to revisit and reclaim one of its own canons. Cicero’s five
canons of rhetoric (invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery) were established
as a method by which orators could accomplish all of the tasks involved in speech
preparation. However, in the centuries since the canons were created, memory has
unfortunately been sloughed aside in favor of the other four.

For example, in the

sixteenth century, French rhetorician Peter Ramus argued that there are only two parts of
rhetoric (style and delivery), relegating the other three (invention, arrangement, and
memory) to the dialectic. Within the past decade, Kathleen Welch argues in Electric
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Rhetoric that current composition textbooks emphasize invention, arrangement, and style
while at the same time ignoring memory and delivery. Some other texts in rhetoric and
composition utilize phrases and theories that, without explicitly naming memory,
implicate the canon while mobilizing related terms instead. For instance, The New
London Group uses the term “designing” to signify a process through which “meaning
making” occurs, whereas “redesigning” is the creative result of interactions with
available designs in order to produce a new result (Cope and Kalantzia 23). Much like
“meaning making” as a design theory, I argue that “making memory” as a rhetorical
theory is ultimately concerned with the creative aspect in the production of memories.
Since information technologies easily allow users to make, create, reproduce, and
manipulate memory, my project is a fresh perspective on an obviously important, albeit
neglected, topic. My dissertation, therefore, revisits and interrogates these moments
where memory and techne have simply been implied in order to question the repeated
oversight of the canon of memory in the digital age.
Interestingly, while technological devices that offer expanded memories woo
consumers everyday, I wonder why contemporary rhetoric continues to ignore the one of
its foundational aspects.

My research, consequently, is prompted by instances of

‘forgotten’ memory in the field of rhetoric in relation to our culture’s growing desire to
increase external, digital memory in personal computing devices. This chapter explores
the presence of memory studies in academic circles, while also showing that the canon of
memory in rhetoric has, for some reason, been “forgotten.” Consequently, I aim to
present contemporary memory as a productive and creative concept, and not limit
memory to mere storage, the past, or forgetfulness. To riff on Aristotle’s distaste for

5
Gorgias’ use of “mere rhetoric” for a profit, I suggest that contemporary memory is more
than “mere storage” that is bought and sold as upgrades and to stockpile as much as
possible.
Also, by utilizing the term “contemporary memory,” I am moving away from the
concept of memory-as-storage while instead emphasizing memory in its digital form, a
form that allows for malleable reconstructions and shared responsibility. Such flexibility
also makes contemporary memory a rhetorical technology in that its creative
opportunities expand the available persuasive possibilities at one’s disposal. By looking
at digital archives, photo manipulation, and digital networks in the later chapters, I
demonstrate that the contemporary memory is a persuasive technology that we use to remake and manipulate memory. However, one of the larger issues with contemporary
memory, as Brooke has also noted, is that instead of adapting the canons alongside
changing media, rhetoricians continue to use the models that were designed for oral and
early print cultures, not the digital texts with which we deal today.

Rather than

dismissing the canons, I argue that rhetoric should focus on updating the canons for
contemporary audiences. If the canon of memory is to be resuscitated, then it must
respond to digital texts differently than it did previous media constructions. By utilizing
techne in order to rethink contemporary memory, I explore the creative potential that
interactive technologies pose to the canon of memory.
Fortunately, though, the canon of memory has not been entirely neglected, but I
do believe that rhetoricians have not aggressively looked beyond memory as anything
beyond remembered-or-forgotten.

The ways we think about memory creation,

reproduction, and utilization must all be reexamined, and I intend to explore in what ways
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memory itself needs to be refashioned with present day digital texts.

I choose to

“refashion” memory instead of redefine, rework, or even reassemble because of this
term’s reference to older media. Some of the texts I examine later in this dissertation,
like archives, are not new structures, but are instead refashioned along the lines of what
David Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin call “remediated.”

For Bolter and Grusin,

remediation is refashioning—it is the act of borrowing from or paying homage to an older
media form. For example, the photograph refashioned the oil painting; while the subject
might still be the same (say, someone sitting for a portrait), the medium itself has
changed (gelatin-silver paper instead of canvas). Similarly, although the subject memory
might remain constant (I will always have memories my thirtieth birthday), the ways I
choose to remember and replay those memories (I have my own photos and I have also
been “tagged” on Facebook in other’s) have the potential to be radically different because
of the technologies we use to shape the memory itself.
In what follows, I overview some of the ways memory has peeked through the
rhetorical curtain in several fields outside of English.

Afterwards, I follow the

development of contemporary memory by riding three distinct waves: natural and
artificial memory, externalized memory, and memory presence. I aim to leave this
chapter with a thorough understanding of how memory has evolved since antiquity and
by demonstrating the creative possibilities for contemporary memory.
Wait, Wait Don’t Tell Me: Finding Our Rhetorical Memory in Other Fields
Despite few attempts to move memory to the fore of the rhetorical canons,
memory has not been entirely neglected, surfacing sporadically within English
departments as well as in different academic circles throughout its long history. For
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instance, memory has been the focus of several significant recent publications. The book
series Cultural Memory in the Present has published several trans- and inter-disciplinary
humanities texts emphasizing “the close attention to the detail of the cultural object” to
highlight the interpretation and “the meaning of the object for a present that is not
amnesiac” (“Cultural Memory”).

Launched in 2008, the interdisciplinary journal

Memory Studies emphasizes the critical study of memory in the humanities and social
sciences, indicating the desire to ‘remember’ memory in this contemporary moment.
Even still, several aspects of memory studies have been emphasized in some important
recent texts. Svetlana Boym’s The Future of Nostalgia accentuates nostalgia as the
memory of a time or longing for home that no longer exists (xiii). In Jose van Dijck’s
Mediated Memories, she questions the stability of memories by interrogating the
technologies we employ in order to actually recall specific personal events. While
Bernard Stiegler’s recently translated Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation maintains
that memory is indeed a technological tool, Matthew Kirschenbaum’s Mechanisms
reminds readers that memory “storage today is both an accessory, something you hold in
your hand or slip into your pocket (your iPod or memory stick), but is also increasingly
disembodied and dematerialized” (4). Although these books are critical to my project
because they highlight the recent interest in digital memory studies, these texts all ignore
digital memory’s immense potential for rhetorical practice.

Because interactive

technologies greatly expand the “available means of persuasion” in the sense that they
can bend, mold, and make unique memories out of existing ones, I am interested in what
interactive technologies can actually ‘do’ to memory.
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Other disciplines, such as sociology and communication, have several wellknown studies of monuments and memorials as inscriptions of contemporary memory.
Take, for example, Ekaterina Haskins’ study of the United States Postal Service’s
collection “Celebrate the Century,” in which she recognizes the affectivity of several
national iconic “pop” images that were immortalized in the postage stamp series. Such
focus on the construction and interpretative value of various national events highlights
the tangibility as well as the flexibility of such memory markers. Haskins suggests that
“because contemporary icons serve an important emotional and political function,” the
possibility for “counter-hegemonic interpretations” of widely recognized historical events
is almost inevitable (2). Such personal renderings are all informed by unique memories,
causing conflicts between the national historic events that the stamps immortalize and the
individualized interpretations of the remembered occasions. Conversational inquiries
such as “where you when Kennedy was shot?” represent the tension between national
history and the personal memory studied in Haskins’ article. In chapter three, I return to
the idea of national memory by utilizing Alison Landsberg’s concept of “prosthetic
memory” to argue in favor of memory creation from a distance. As another example of
memorial studies, visitor contributions at national monuments, such as the Vietnam
Memorial Wall in Washington D.C., shift the rigidity of monuments into fluid structures
marked-up with material memories (e.g., notes to loved ones left at the wall and military
identification tags). Although monuments like the Vietnam Memorial Wall are meant to
encapsulate a memory of national importance, Carole Blair argues that the frequency
with which personal effects are left at/on the wall are alterations to the actual text of the
stone monument (272).

However, such contributions do not remain part of the
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memorial’s permanent “text,” since all the personal effects are removed regularly. The
digital archives I examine in chapter three suggest that the current shape of memorials is
dramatically different because users’ contributions actually create the permanent text of
the digital site. Also in chapter three, I distinguish between closed memory museums
(such as the Vietnam Memorial Wall the personal effects left at the site) and open
memory museums (the digital archives that thrive on users’ contributions for its
existence).
While each study is significant in its own ways, neither connects memory and
techne as the motivation behind the memorials’ flexibility. Although Haskins and Blair’s
arguments both note that the constantly shifting text of monuments make the historical
markers fluid memories, there are more relevant examples (like digital archives) of
“making memory” that need consideration. Personal devices like iPods, smart phones,
and digital cameras encourage their users to Tweet, blog, or shoot video in order to make
and share memories, but rhetoric has not yet critically engaged with these ubiquitous
forms of persuasive possibilities that new technologies inspire. As a result, I argue that
the ease of creating, reproducing, sharing and “making” digital memories should signal
an important moment to think about memory and techne together.
I also want to emphasize the importance of such an expanded notion of rhetorical
memory for understanding the interactions of subjectivity, sociality, and persuasion
today. I am particularly interested in thinking through contemporary rhetorical memory in
reference not only to the Greek tradition, but also to a much more recent segment of
Western intellectual history: the “big theory” era of the critical humanities in the 80’s and
90’s and the multiple claims in the past decade concerning the “death of theory” and the
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end of this era. Indeed, while the status of memory as a crucial concept in twentiethcentury rhetorical theory and pedagogy has been a degraded one, many of the pre-modern
vectors of memory returned both implicitly and explicitly in the initial days of
postmodern critical theory. Thus, even a quick review of some of postmodern theory’s
“greatest hits” reveals that the notion of “meaning making” (similar to The New London
Group’s claim mentioned earlier) was often mediated through a rethinking of memory.
For instance, in Derrida's influential “Plato’s Pharmacy” the importance of memory to
Greek thought and its role in the struggle over (Platonic) philosophy and (sophistic)
rhetoric is the lynchpin through which the now famous postmodern “critique of presence”
(to which I will return at the end of this chapter) and of the logocentrism of the Western
metaphysical tradition is articulated.
Similarly, although the most popular legacy of Lyotard’s The Postmodern
Condition is its prediction of the collapse of “grand narratives” and the parallel
resurgence of localized knowledges, Lyotard’s thematizing of sea-changes in
epistemology, politics, and pedagogy is undergirded by a more general argument about
the changing status of memory and information in postmodernism. On the one hand,
Lyotard writes of the increasing importance of “memory” as it is stored in nonhuman
realms: “the traditional teacher is replaceable by memory banks, didactics can be
entrusted to machines linking traditional memory banks (libraries, etc.) and computer
data banks” (50). On the other hand, as nonhuman memory sites become central to
human learning and social life (Lyotard calls technological memory “nature” for
postmodern man), there is a shift in what counts as intelligence and skill in humans.
Although the “modern” conception of genius may have been the individual who has
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recourse to personal, specialized knowledge, the “postmodern” genius is the individual
adept at exploiting and making innovative connections between the vast and accessible
“stored” knowledge located in networks of information technology (51-52).
Memory was also a crucial concept in Foucault’s “archaeological” method
through his focus on “the field of memory” woven by archival materials (64) and later in
his “genealogical” work wherein, as C. Colwell glosses, the “counter-memory” of
genealogy is used as a critical wedge against the “collective memory of a particular social
group” (2). To provide just one more example, memory was equally important to Fredric
Jameson in periodizing postmodern culture and aesthetics from that of the high modern,
the former having lost the sense of “deep memory” so pivotal to the sensibilities of the
latter (36). All of these works hailed both rhetorical memory’s earlier character as an
interface between the interior and exterior of human subjectivity, as well as, much like
the early Greek association of mnemosyne and lethe, the recognition that the present and
future of memory as a capacity is bound up with that of forgetting. More specifically,
they all focused on the fragility of traditional notions of memory and the need to create
new tools of critical sense-making (cognitive mapping, archaeology, language games,
deconstruction, genealogy) and the potentially liberatory power of such tools to challenge
the domain of collective or personal memory and, by proxy, totalizing systems of
knowledge.
Let’s return to finding memory in other disciplines. Memory has also been a
popular subject in some major Hollywood films such as The Bourne Trilogy, Eternal
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, Memento, and Slumdog Millionaire. While I am not a
film scholar (as a tired grad student, I fall asleep during too many movies anyway), I am
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interested in the popularity of these films because they emphasize the co-dependence of
memory creation and technology. Memento, for instance, follows the main character
Leonard Shelby (played by Guy Pierce), a man who is unable to create new memories
due to an injury incurred while fighting off his wife’s murderers. As a result of his
accident, Shelby can recall everything previous to the attack, but injuries sustained in his
assault prevent him from creating new memories.

Because he relies on physical

reminders, such as Polaroid pictures and tattoos, these material memories do not simply
supplement his personal memory, but they are his only form of memory. In Memento,
Shelby is relying upon the permanency of the memories he makes in order to function.
The correlation between biological memory (Shelby’s is damaged) and
externalized “made” memory (on which Shelby depends) is another example of the
tension in which I am interested throughout this dissertation. Much like Leonard Shelby,
individuals supplement their biological abilities by placing their memories in external
memory devices more regularly. Further, our growing reliance on externalized memory
simultaneously requires users to place trust in apparatuses that are not limited by selfcontrol as biological memory is thought to be. For instance, because Wikipedia entries
can be modified by anyone, the information contained on certain pages can be
intentionally falsified. During an episode of The Colbert Report, comedian host Steven
Colbert jokingly denounced Wikipedia and its users’ inability to distinguish between true
or misleading information. To demonstrate, Colbert encouraged his viewers to update the
Wikipedia entry on African elephants to note that its population had tripled in size in six
months (“Episode 128”). Because viewers were successful at updating the site’s content,
this modification suggests that the line between true and false information can be
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misleading. Similarly in Memento, characters purposely mess with Leonard’s inability to
remember—a hotel clerk charges him for two rooms, an informant hides pens so Leonard
cannot take notes (i.e., make memories). The Colbert Report and Memento both suggest
that externalized memory is vulnerable to malicious actions; furthermore, these instances
of manipulated memory represent the apprehension about total reliance on externalized
memory. Even though externalized memory still causes a certain amount of hesitation, I
intend to show that contemporary memory does not always end in deception, but instead
memory as a techne can be created and designed for productive ends.
All of the examples noted above accentuate the fact that memory is a continually
intriguing topic within academic and pop-culture circles, but it also highlights that
memory has unfortunately been of little interest to rhetoric studies in English departments
today. Because certain sites encourage users to contribute to universal knowledge, new
media outlets such as Twitter, (the now defunct) Google Wave, Wikipedia, and blogs
explicitly increase the possibility for persuasiveness by way of collective memory. While
these platforms have been engaged through pedagogical inquiry and questioned about
their social implications, rhetoric has not rigorously investigated these programs and their
persuasive content. In what follows, I highlight how memory has been a continual force
since its inception as a canon of rhetoric; however, by tracing memory’s history, I argue
that it has detoured from its original rhetorical aims by neglecting to critically engage
with the available means afforded by contemporary digital media. In order to engage
rhetoric, memory, and interactive technologies, I feel it is best introduce some critical
terms that I will be employing when discussing memory and rhetoric; these terms will be
utilized throughout this first chapter in order to strengthen the connections between
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memory, techne, and technology. The three terms that are most important to employ in
this chapter are: natural and artificial memory, externalization, and presence. These
terms trace the development of memory from its classical rhetorical origins to its
theoretical implications within recent contexts. I have selected these three terms because
of their correlation to the development of memory as a rhetorical structure and also
because they highlight memory’s drift away from rhetoric, signaling a dire need to return
to its roots. Because I am defining memory through the intersection of techne and
technology, these three terms also showcase the influence of technologies on the creation
of new memories.
The Practice of Storage: Natural and Artificial Memory
In the oral culture of the ancients, an expansive and trained memory indicated that
an individual had a great storehouse of knowledge; more importantly, a trained memory
was essential because print culture was underdeveloped and underemphasized, forcing
individuals to ready their memory with practice and storage techniques. Many ideas and
theories of memory have been informed by stories about individuals with large memory
capacities. For example, the tale of Simonides has been captured and retold by numerous
rhetoricians—Cicero and Quintilian’s accounts are among the most popular. In sum,
Simonides was the sole survivor of a ceiling collapse that killed everyone else attending a
dinner party, but he remembered each individual who was fatally wounded by recalling
where they sat (Yates 2). Simonides was able to remember all of the guests because he
recalled each of their places at the dinner table, a technique that later translated into using
“places” or loci to remember practically anything. In The Art of Memory, Frances A.
Yates’ extensive text on memory, she references many writers who have titled Simonides
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the “inventor of the art of memory,” a result of how the importance of place and a
heightened sense of sight influenced later rhetoricians’ theories of memory (82). More
recently known as mnemotechnics or “mnemonic devices,” this method of memory
storage linked words or ideas with visual representations designed to trigger the memory.
To explain, when I was memorizing a timeline for an exam in a high school history
course, I was able to remember that Marco Polo returned from his Asian voyage in 1295
because I created an image in my mind—a polo shirt with a price tag for $12.95. The
fact that I still remember it to this day speaks to the effectiveness of such mnemonic
techniques; but the ancient method of memorization went a bit further. In order to build a
strong memory, Quintilian believed that one should place different ideas or topics for a
speech in various places in an imaginary house, that way the orator could mentally walk
among the loci and retrieve information, with accuracy and without fail, in any order and
at any given time while delivering long speeches (11.2). Accordingly, I might have
visualized that Polo shirt hanging in a closet so that as I was “walking” through the
house, I could see the garment and remember the facts I attached to it.
Others in antiquity have also created elaborate memory systems in order to
organize thoughts; for instance, Quintilian refers to Metrodorus who created a memory
system based upon the zodiac, expanding the twelve signs into thirty-six, and eventually
finding “three hundred and sixty places in the twelve signs through which the sun moves”
(qtd. in Yates 40). Each of the three hundred and sixty loci could be used to store
information, allowing the orator to be prepared to speak on any topic and in any given
order. To name just one more example of memory places, in the Middle Ages, Guilio
Camillo created a theater initially centered upon seven planetary gods and expanding
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each segment seven-fold, noting that the intricate structure of this celestial system relied
on “the affective or emotional appeal of a good memory image” (Yates 144).
Because the loci emphasize visual, imaginary constructs, the ancients also
believed that the senses were vitally important to memory, causing significant rifts
between the memory theories of Aristotle and Plato. In the case of Aristotle, he argued
that the senses outside of the body created such strong impressions, that he likened their
mark on one’s memory to the imprint left by a wax seal (On Memory 170). Aristotle
placed such importance on the visual in relation to memory, he states in his treaty On
Memory and Recollection that, “it is not possible even to think without an image” (168).
Plato, on the contrary, believed that memory was inherent, and that senses only allowed
an individual to remember what had been dormant (“Theaetetus” 151d-e). For Plato, the
role of memory was merely to recall what was already known, or innate, in each
individual. Essentially, and unlike my definition of contemporary memory, Platonic
memory was not ‘in the business’ of making new memories.
The notion that memory is aided by the senses and improved through the creation
of images suggests that our biological brains, as they are, need some additional help from
outside sources. Recognizing this split in the Rhetorica Ad Herennium, Pseudo-Cicero
divided memory into two categories: natural and artificial. In the Ad Herennium, natural
memory is defined as “memory which is imbedded in our minds, born simultaneously
with thought” while artificial memory is characterized as “memory which is strengthened
by a kind of training and system of discipline” (207). This division was important for the
ancients because of their primarily oral culture, and thus a trained and readied memory
was crucial for an orator to appear polished and prepared for any situation. The stronger

17
the artificial memory, the more easily the rhetor could perform at any time, and speak on
any given topic. Much like Simonides in the earlier example, in order to bolster natural
memory, one fortified artificial memory by creating images of places and backgrounds
where one could place ideas to be remembered for later use. Pseudo-Cicero combines
natural and artificial memory by linking the words of a verse with related images. In the
following passage he explains, for example, the necessity of coupling words and images
in order to remember content more effectively: “But such an arrangement of images
succeeds only if we use our notation to stimulate the natural memory so that we first go
over a given verse twice or three times to ourselves and then represent the words by
means of images. In this way art will supplement nature” (217, emphasis added).
Artificial memory, therefore, mimics the inherent processes of natural memory and is
strengthened through repetition and image creation. Pseudo-Cicero asserts that replaying
an idea and also matching it to a related image in the mind is the ultimate mode of
memorization.
As the previous examples highlighted, an organized memory is the codevelopment of natural and artificial memory, a synchronized relationship between
biology and practice.

If natural and artificial memory becomes more powerful as

separate processes, then the combination of the two is a reliable and ironclad system, as
demonstrated in De Oratore, Cicero’s encompassing text on oratory and orators. In that
text, Cicero examines the individual’s capacity to speak well in any given situation. To
achieve this state, Cicero suggests that a full and organized memory is a useful tool in
proportion to the weight of the other four canons (40-41). In order to prepare one’s
memory for oration, Cicero acknowledges that practice and training is the most
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successful combination (43). As a result, a well-stocked storehouse of memory assists
the orator, allowing one to draw on numerous examples and ideas at a moment’s notice to
reinforce or refute an argument. In sum, Cicero emphasizes memorizing a great number
of others’ writings as well as creating your own syntheses between them.

By

encouraging our students to gather research in order to figuratively enter the
conversation, this practice is one we continue in college writing courses even today by
instructing our students to collect theories, ideas, and arguments in order to synthesize
them with their own informed opinion. For Cicero, gathering ideas aided the memory so
that orators could recognize the connections between those ideas, allowing one to commit
the connections to memory more easily. Cicero remarks that memory is strengthened
over time through experience; a prodigious memory is the result of practice and training,
trial and error.
Jump forward a few millennia and we can see that the coupling of natural and
artificial memory is still an active force in discussions about contemporary memory, but
any mention of rhetoric is now missing from the picture. Even though many of us cannot
remember our closest friends’ or relatives’ phone numbers, it does not mean that we are
incapable of ever phoning them. Instead, our memories are displaced into external,
artificial systems used to aid our natural processes of remembrance. In the next section
of this chapter, I review the shift from the internal juxtaposition of natural and artificial
memory towards a displacement of memory as a non-biological process altogether.
Because externalization symbolizes and acts on the desire to move memory outside of the
body and into other apparatuses, it is important to begin tracing that journey by first
examining Plato’s own hesitation about writing.
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Thinking Outside of the Brain: Externalization
The next phase of memory that I am exploring, externalization, is a natural
successor to the coupling of natural and artificial memory. Because natural memory is
limited by biology, and since age and disease can affect our ability to remember, artificial
systems must be developed to increase the efficacy of memory. The two systems I have
already explored are all designed to shape one’s ability to organize memory internally,
although the development of print literacy increased the possibilities to locate memory
outside of the body. Alongside the evolution of print culture, the growing number of
“available means” of persuasion also increased exponentially, drawing some rhetoricians
to question the ethics of externalized memory.

In what follows, I explore the

evolutionary co-development of rhetoric and externalized memory, recognizing that with
external sources, a growing distrust of externalized memory erupted.
In an age before print literacy, the emphasis on orality reinforced the power that
the remembered word held over the written; in fact, memorization was so favored that
even Plato and Quintilian have suggested that writing destroys the memory. In the
Phaedrus, Socrates winces at the suggestion that Phaedrus recite Lysias’ recent oration.
Socrates counters Phaedrus recommendation by stating that any copy of the speech is
unnecessary when they could simply go to Lysias himself for ‘an instant replay’ of his
oration.

Later in Institutio oratoria, Quintilian, acknowledging Plato’s influence,

demonstrates just how writing weakens personal memory: “Yet I find it said indeed by
Plato that the use of letters is a detriment to memory, because, as he intimates, what we
have committed to writing we cease, in some degree, to guard, and lose it through mere
neglect” (11.2). For Quintilian, memory does not always stay with us, but instead returns
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after being lost. In order to recapture “lost” memory, one should emphasize organization
techniques in order to help the brain process information more quickly. When the
memory is trained and efficient, there should be no lag time between inventing and
arranging the argument and delivering the speech clearly. Today, it seems easy to
remedy forgetfulness by writing down information, an act that Socrates and Quintilian
were both vehemently against. Siding with Plato, Quintilian argues that what we commit
to writing we lose to mere neglect, for it cripples our memory. Whereas the natural and
artificial memory focused on strengthening memory internally, new developments in
print and digital culture increase the possibility for additional externalized sources of
memory.
Even so, when Socrates first lashed out at Phaedrus, it was an important moment
for rhetoric. Socrates’ distaste of externalization represents a move away from the nature
of rhetoric, summed up later in Aristotle’s classic definition: “the faculty of observing in
any given case the available means of persuasion” (Rhetoric 6). This early shift towards
the externalization of memory recognizes some of the fears that arise from transferring
our biological processes into non-biological mechanisms, one that has not disappeared
even in this current digitally-dependent age. Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric is a good
place to begin recapturing the canon of memory in this contemporary moment, namely
because the notion of “available means” can be interpreted differently and more
encompassing since the onslaught of externalization.

For early rhetoricians, being

prepared for oration meant collecting and having argumentation organized and readied
for any given situation. One of the means to accomplish effective oration was to exercise
the memory so that during a speech, one could quickly employ a number of memorized
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techniques as evidence.

The ability to efficiently recall these effective approaches

allowed the orator to appear natural; rather than having to create appropriate evidence in
the moment, the orator would simply retrieve what he already held in his memory. This
‘storehouse’ of techniques is similar to today’s ideas of external memory storage—digital
spaces allow individuals to store an infinite amount of information, while mundane
activities, such as Googling, fill the gaps in one’s knowledge. With Google aiding our
memory to the point where no one needs to “forget” anything, the modern emphasis on
externalized memory sharpens our mental reflexes so that the information we need to
retrieve can occur more rapidly. Even though it is too reductive to claim that information
technologies simply offer ‘more’ in terms of storing available means, it is helpful to
characterize the available means as the method by which the information can be sorted,
tagged, and informed by the user in order to be recalled quickly and utilized effectively. I
am suggesting that the crucial issue with contemporary memory is not how much we can
store, but rather the structures and networks we develop in order to process and use that
information efficiently, an idea that I examine thoroughly in chapter five.
Digital memory is constantly scrutinized because there is such a hesitation to rely
on it completely. For example, we tend to see an age gap between those who bond with
technology and those who are hesitant to let it come into their lives. My parents’
generation, for one, is becoming more tech-oriented, although there is still a dramatic
learning curve. For a while, my dad’s favorite computer activity was reformatting his
computer’s hard drive when something went wrong (my brothers and I still believe he
just liked DOS too much to let it go, and we’re hoping those days are behind us). Even
though my parents are slowly learning about the computer, and they are more apt to e-
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mail or text one of us when they want something, they do not have Facebook pages or
blogs that might give them a little more “tech cred” among younger generations. So why
are they so slow to adopt new technologies into their lives? One reason might be drawn
from years of schooling that reinforced the importance of memorization techniques, and
perhaps they feel that using technology to supplement and replace the skills they have
learned over a lifetime is, in a sense, “cheating.” My peers (the last few years of the Gen
Xers) do not feel the resistance that our parents’ generation feels. Even though we were
not born into the world of ubiquitous computing like those of the Gen Yers (or whatever
people are calling them these days), my generation has fully accepted the additional
capabilities that external technologies afford the individual. Admittedly, many of my
peers do not have facts about each other memorized. Maybe I’m a bad friend, but
without my iCal, I would not remember my friends’ birthdays; further, if you ask me for
one of their phone numbers, I am at a blank. Conversely, my mom keeps track of these
details by writing them on the calendar in her kitchen and the phone numbers written in
her phone book. However, there is an important and significant difference between these
two types of storage.
When Socrates insisted that writing degraded the memory, a suggestion which
sparked the division between print literacy, rhetoric, and memory, the distinguishing
feature between the written memory of my mom’s calendar and her phone book and the
digital, externally stored memory of my iCal and cell phone database is the automaticity
of the latter. To explain, each January my mom rewrites everyone’s birthday on her new
calendar, forcing her to be reminded of each date. This reminder then serves as a
recollection, or re-memorized fact—she may have forgotten the date over the year, but by
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re-writing it at least once, she recalls the details in specific relation to a date. The
Spanish rhetorician Ramon Llull devised a memory technique that he called “chew it
over”—if there is a fact you would like to remember, you should keep it present in your
mind and keep “chewing” it until you have “digested” the important information
(“Memory Training”). The digested information could then be regurgitated as needed.
When my mom rewrites (externalizes) the important dates on each new calendar, she
chews on the facts as she rewrites them. More importantly, even though she might say
that her memory is slipping from age, she actually has all of the birthdays on the calendar
memorized (and with twenty siblings and in-laws, over forty nieces and nephews, and a
dozen or so friends, this is no small feat). Her constant return to the calendar and the
annual act of rewriting the birthdays represents that writing does strengthen the memory
when an individual returns to the original site in order to replicate the act.
Let’s turn to my system now, which I find easier and much less time consuming.
Once I learn of someone’s birthday, I open my iCal, create a new “event” for that
occasion and simply select “repeat every year” and, voila, my work is done—for good. I
do not have to sit down each January with a new, blank calendar and transfer the dates—
the dates are automatically transferred for me. I do not have to, as Llull argues, “chew on
it” to keep it in mind. Since my iCal is also linked to many of my devices, such as my
iPad and my e-mail, reminders are simply handed to me with a sound and a message
notifying me of the important event. Because the device “remembers” for me, once I
enter a new event, it no longer requires any ‘memorization’ on my part. I have delegated
my memory to a device that ‘does the dirty work for me.’

Even though some

technophobes argue that technological devices are destroying the memories of adults in
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my generation, I disagree with those sentiments. For instance, although my memory is
being shifted from my biological memory into technological devices, I am not necessarily
forgetting the events. Just as my mom’s calendar reminds her of family members’
birthdays, my iCal reminds me in the same way. The difference between the two types of
externalization lies in active and passive memory. My mom’s annual tradition of filling
in the dates requires a much more active memory, whereas my iCal, which automatically
repopulates itself each year, takes almost no action on my part and is a passive type of
memory.
The passivity (and some might even say “automaticity”) of digital organization
systems tends to be a major rift between those that endorse the benefits of technological
memory (like my peers) and those that shy away from it (my parents’ generation). The
work of Merlin Donald, a cognitive psychologist who has studied the intersection of life
systems and information systems from early hominid development to the current moment
of high technology, is particularly helpful in beginning to think through the relationship
that techne played in the role of organization and arrangement that is now most
associated with information technologies.

Donald is not the first to highlight the

influence of technology on biology. To name just two others, Eric Havelock and Walter
Ong have also suggested that technological advances are reflected in biological
developments. Havelock, for instance, notes that when writing and written texts gained
popularity, many were hesitant to rely on these written records, believing that they could
be easily altered – more so than biological memory (100-1). In Orality and Literacy,
Walter Ong points to a split in the oral tradition. By differentiating “primary orality” (a
culture untouched by knowledge of writing or text) and from “secondary orality” (our
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present-day high-technology culture which depends on writing and print for their
existence), Ong recognizes the dependence of written technology on our recent biological
progress (6, 11). However, Donald’s work is especially important to my argument
because the central focus of his most recent work is the co-implication of biological and
cultural evolutionary mechanisms, particularly how these processes intersect through
what he names ‘storage systems.’ We tend to think that human evolution primarily takes
place through biological responses to environmental changes and that culture or
technology intrudes in the process, but the shift towards externalized memory highlights
the fact that technology has co-opted biological memory. Donald suggests that cultural
changes have long been implicated in biological evolution and those cultural
developments, such as the advent of language and literacy, have directly impacted
biological evolution, rewiring not only the human mind but also the physiological brain.
The relation between the dual mechanisms of evolution fore grounded by Donald is most
apparent with the introduction of the external symbolic storage (ESS) system. Donald
defines ESS as the establishment of various organized spaces into which humans place
knowledge that can be accessed at any given time in the future (308). Coupled with the
ubiquitous utilization of devices such as smart phones, flash drives, and GPS navigation,
use of ESS infers that there is a decreased dependence on internal (natural) memory and
increased dependence on externalized (artificial) memory, emphasizing the fact that the
assimilation of these instruments into many daily activities has been practically
subliminal. Furthermore, the most important feature of ESS is that it proves that the
brain’s size and capacity are increasing, but that this expansion is actually occurring
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outside of the body. Further still, ESS represents that the accumulation of knowledge is
no longer restricted by the brain’s physical storage limitation.
It has been important to trace the resistance of externalization from Plato to
Donald in order to highlight the tension between rhetoric and memory, especially because
several aspects of the digital are wrapped-up in memory. In the final section of this
chapter, I explore how the idea of presence is an equally critical concept by which to
refashion memory. In what follows, I explore some of the difficulties that rhetorical
memory encounters in relation to presence. Keeping digital memories present (or at least
not forgetting memories by haphazardly deleting them) is one of the largest roadblocks
concerning contemporary memory. If we can easily store and remember every event,
then forgetting them is no less of a challenge. Presence, then, provides an insight into
how contemporary memory is complicated by the tension between memory and
forgetting.
Up Close and Personal: Presence
When I hear the term “presence,” a few ideas come to mind.

Most likely,

presence suggests the here-and-now, a sense of being in the moment, or a reappearing
(like a ghost or specter). For memory studies, presence is always a contested term. At
the start of Memory, History, Forgetting, French philosopher Paul Ricoeur questions
Aristotle’s connection between memory imprints on the body and the soul: “What is it
that we remember? Is it the affection or the thing that produced it? If it is the affection,
then it is not something absent one remembers; if it is the thing, then how, while
perceiving the impression, could we remember the absent thing that we are not at present
perceiving?” (Ricoeur 17). Like Ricoeur questions here, I, too, wonder what is recalled
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in the process of memory. For instance, the item that enables a spontaneous recollection
(think of the madeleine made famous in Proust’s Remembrance of Time Past) allows us
to recall an event in a certain contextualized package, but we are unable to recreate the
actual presence of the past event. As a result, absence becomes the crux of the “presence
problem”—memory does not (and cannot) recreate what “has been” or what has been
stored. Contemporary memory, on the contrary, is highly invested in the possibility of
the “might still,” or the creation of moments that spark spontaneous recollection. French
philosopher Jacques Derrida is an important contribution to my conception of presence.
By examining the unconscious in texts like Archive Fever, by coining the term différance
in Of Grammatology, and even considering the lingering effects of Marxism in Specters
of Marx, Derrida’s work is tightly bound up with the ideas of presence. In this section, I
will use Derrida’s theories to inform my own thinking about presence and memory.
However, even before Derrida wrote Archive Fever, other philosophers were
grappling with the suggestion that memory is a creative force, and that recollection is the
result of reinterpreting the unconscious.

Although the term “unconscious” was not

prevalent in the Enlightenment, John Locke argued that memory, which he argues is
inherent in all individuals, surfaced through sensory perceptions, a notion that is certainly
a precursor of Freud’s unconscious (67).

Locke’s process of creating and gaining

knowledge was the benchmark for most other Enlightenment thinkers. Because the
Enlightenment weighed empiricism and fact-based evidence so heavily, Locke
maintained that truth in the world was an attempt “to understand knowledge as a
psychological phenomenon,” a stark contrast to those who believed that knowledge could
be attained through perception alone (Bizzell and Herzberg 697). From this perspective,
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Locke’s theory of memory, or what he calls “retention,” is the storage of a sensation once
the object of that sensation is removed (96). Later, Proust’s madeleine is another good
example of this theory—once he encountered the treat, the madeleine caused the
individual to recall an event he once thought long lost, one that was buried so deeply that
he did not even know the memory had faded. Whether through the senses, the madeleine,
or a shuffled song on your iPod, recalling memories is always a process that involves
retracing old paths via new connections and, arguably, new technologies.
In the essay “The Technical Substrates of Unconscious Memory,” Patricia
Ticineto Clough interrogates the distanced relationship between Derrida and Freud
throughout Archive Fever. In Archive Fever, Derrida explores the role of unconscious
memory as a collection of events that an individual may have forgotten he forgot about.
Derrida argues that the way an event is stored changes the way it is remembered, thus the
technological developments that were not around in Freud’s lifetime (e.g., e-mail) would
have made a larger impact on his psychoanalyses (Archive 18). Clough introduces the
term “teletechnology” as a way to represent our current subjectivity in relation to
technologies. For Clough, teletechnology represents our vulnerability of exposure, and
ultimately our powerlessness, to decide whether to turn technology on or off (384).
There is an important distinction between public and private, and teletechnology does not
negate those spaces; rather than deterritorialize, teletechnology actually reterritorializes
social spaces.

Clough defines this new space of teletechnology as the “increased

possibility of the release of the human subject’s agency from non-reflexive relationships
to tradition, community, and large social structures” (384). What this means for human
agency, then, is that the reflexive power of non-human agents (i.e. teletechnologies) is
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forcing humans to act unconsciously in relation to them. Furthermore, these unconscious
reflexive acts represent the blurred lines between human and machine, the ontological
and the technological, fantasy and reality (Clough 385). These unconscious interchanges
between humans and machines are critical ideas for rethinking memory because they
represent the capacity to produce new memories while overcoming the limitations
biological memory.
Rather than opposing the unconscious and the machine, Derrida’s reading of
Freud in Archive Fever fills in the gaps with the technologies that were absent in Freud’s
lifetime. Clough states, “it is possible to understand Freud’s treatment of unconscious
memory as compensating for what could not be thought without the machine metaphors
yet to come in the future” (386). The unconscious does not simply record and replay
memories. Instead – and this is a crucial moment for my dissertation – the unconscious
makes new memories by forcing new paths of memory. As Derrida explains it, there is
always a trace of a memory but how we arrive back at that memory will always be
different—it will never be the same event we originally remembered because we are
recalling it from a privileged standpoint. A present memory, then, is never a recollection,
but is a recreation, a new memory altogether. It is impossible to recall an event exactly
as it occurred because many things have happened in the in-between, forcing our
perception to change, if even slightly.
Derrida’s term “différance” helps to explain this idea more thoroughly. Différance
is defined as the lag time between understanding the signified and its sign
(Grammatology 62).

If recollection is always new, we are experiencing the delay

between the past (remembered) and the present (recollecting) moment as an original
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event. Because there is always a delay between the two moments, the lag will always
cause the recollection to be the creation of something new. “In relation to unconscious
memory,” Clough argues that, “the text is always produced through a ‘supplementary
delay,’ a secondary revision of an event that has never been lived in the present” (391).
Furthermore, this supplementary delay is why Derrida argues that the memory archive is
always for the future, never for the past or the present. The archive is created in the past,
but can only be understood in the future.
To illustrate this idea, in Archive Fever, Derrida examines Freud’s “mystical
writing pad,” a child’s toy where you can write on the surface, pull back the film on the
top, and the writing disappears. Even though the writing on the top of the pad is erased,
the imprint of the original writing is still left in the wax beneath. Therefore, all the
writing and drawing ever done on the surface of the pad is permanently retained in the
wax underneath. Freud likens this toy to unconscious memory—we always have a copy
of our memories, but they might not be visible or readable. This copy is what Freud calls
“behind perception,” or the brain’s palimpsest of every event we have ever experienced.
The “mystical writing pad” also represents the different ways we recall events.
For example, if I write the word “memory” on the surface of the mystical writing pad, the
wax underneath will be a pure copy of the word on the surface. Once I lift the film to
erase the word from the viewing surface to write another word, the wax below will still
have the word “memory” written in it. Let’s say I write the word “unconscious” on the
blank surface; now, the wax will not only have the word “memory,” but it will have the
word “unconscious” carved in it as well. When we look at the wax with the two words, it
might look like a jumbled mess, but if we look closely enough, we could probably trace
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the original words. After repeated use, the wax will become increasingly more difficult
to decipher—using the mystical writing pad for a week, the wax might look like a bunch
of scribbles with no decipherable text. However, I know that the words “memory” and
“unconscious” are still imprinted in the wax, but the route to find them will be changed or
unclear with every new word written over them.
The example of Freud’s mystical writing pad illustrates just how memory is
creative—each new memory (or on the writing pad, each newly written word) creates a
new path by which to make older memories present. The exchange between memories is
a result of a creative co-production by which old memories are rewritten just as new ones
are written. For Derrida, Freud, and myself, unconscious memory is a creative, memorymaking apparatus, not a memory-keeping one (Clough 388). This is a critical distinction
for my dissertation, especially when thinking of techne as a creative and productive force
of contemporary memory.
Furthermore, Derrida acknowledges that even though there is repetition in
memory, he argues that it is not the memorized content that is repeated, stating:
“repetition is an ‘originary’ repetition; it is not the repetition of an original” (Clough
388). In other words, a memory is only stored once, but its recollection is always an
original event. During recollection, what was retained in the wax will always force an
original perception of the event that was stored because the path to arrive at that memory
will be different. Recollection is not repetition. Instead, recollection is creative, not
static, because the interactions between memories during the act of recollection force an
individual to recreate the event in relation to all of the accrued events that occurred
between the original memory and its recollection. This is an important idea to keep in
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mind for my project because many other theories of memory have argued on the contrary,
suggesting that recollection was simply the surfacing of an old, stored idea.
Making Memory, Using Techne: Conclusion
To wrap up this chapter, I want to share one more example of memory as a
productive concept rather than one of storage to highlight the importance of introducing
techne into the conversation. Even though I am not a gamer by any stretch of the
imagination, years ago I recall playing Kirby’s Dreamland for the Nintendo GameBoy for
days on end. Without counting the hours of Solitaire I have under my belt, Kirby is still
the only video game I have ever beaten. During my quest to conquer the game, I
distinctly remember dreaming about the music, the challenges, the enemies, and the
mistakes I made trying to “level-up.” Surprisingly, I beat Kirby’s Dreamland after a few
days of playing and as many days dreaming about it. While dreaming about the video
game, my brain retraced and replayed that day’s events not to provide me with a play-byplay, but to help me learn something new about the situation. Recent studies conducted
on video gaming and dreaming have suggested that when a gamer concentrates on a
certain game for long periods throughout the day and before bedtime, she awakens with a
renewed ability to complete the tasks more efficiently (Stickgold, et al). During sleep,
the brain revisits the pathways by which we attempted to complete the task, and while the
unconscious forms new connections that will help us the next morning when we pick up
the game again.
To illustrate, let’s say you are in your car and stuck on a snowy road, but you
desire to turn around and head home. You put the car in drive, maybe go a couple of feet,
get stuck and switch the car into reverse to try again. This event may occur a few times
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until you give-up, too exasperated to continue. A little while later, you decide to give it
another go, only this time you maneuver your car into the tracks of a car that has just
passed you—success! The final effort of waiting and tracing another’s path represents
what transpires in our brains when we are asleep. During sleep, our brain forms new
connections by reprocessing memories we made while we were awake to help us learn
new ways of completing a task even when we are not consciously participating in the
learning process.
Researchers who discovered the connection between sleep, learning, and memory
asked participants to play both Tetris and the downhill skiing simulation game Alpine
Racer II for hours during the day while researchers noted their (oftentimes poor)
performance (R. Stickgold, et al 1056). What is most interesting about this study is the
majority of participants dreamed about methods by which they could increase their
performance in the game (“The Sleep-Memory”).

The next morning when the

participants were asked to play Tetris and the ski simulator game once again, everyone’s
performance dramatically improved, suggesting that the brain creates new connections
and pathways based on the memories of lived events. If the possibility exists to create
mental connections based on unconscious memories that we made ourselves, then what
does this discovery suggest for research in rhetorical memory? Because advances in
information technologies allow us to create sharable “memory files,” how does a digital
archive function within a collection of memories over which the original user does not
have complete control? Finally, is the seemingly arbitrary tracing and resurfacing of the
unconscious similar to the undetermined ends of a digital memory?
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I will explore these questions along with others in the upcoming chapters. As a
creative and productive force, the coupling of memory and techne highlights the
necessity of refashioning memory for contemporary rhetoric. While the evolution of
memory has been witnessed through three specific waves (natural and artificial,
externalization, and presence), all three represent the gradual shift from memory as a
strict biological attribute into its contemporary place in technological apparatuses. The
importance of the latter offers an entrance into several reconceptualizations of
contemporary rhetorical memory; but the specific use of techne will allow me to focus on
how memory is being produced for future use.
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Chapter Two
Techne Three Ways
Each semester in my technical writing classes, my students are required to write
instructions, a standard assignment for practicing engineers. Because the students select
their own topics, I usually end up with an assortment of complex and sophisticated
subjects, ranging from detailed origami folds to in-depth instructions on various computer
programs. The students always find it difficult to teach someone what they know so
well—one of the most frequent complaints I hear is, “I just know how to do it, I don’t
know how it’s actually done.” When I hear this complaint (aside from thinking it is an
undergraduate cop-out), I realize that we feel this way at different levels of education and
our careers. Thinking back to my first semesters of teaching composition, I did not feel
competent teaching other students how to write—I did not know how the words appeared
on the page, they just, well, happened. In those first few semesters of teaching, I
identified more closely with those students qua student than with my role as their
instructor. In retrospect, my lack of solid teaching skills and confidence was certainly
because my own pedagogical abilities were in need of serious practice and understanding.
In fact, it turns out that the words do not magically “ just happen,” and I eventually
figured out not only my method of teaching writing but also the ways to circumvent
classroom mishaps, like failed classroom discussions or poorly designed writing
assignments. As Ryan Moeller and Ken McAllister have suggested, learning how to
overcome seemingly random classroom occurrences is not just “beginner’s luck,” but the
culmination of experiences is the “trick” to successful adaptive techniques (201). The
difficulties with the instruction assignment may have fallen into the “failed assignment”
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category in my earlier days of teaching, but with some decent classroom experience
under my belt now, when I hear my students moan over the pending deadline for their
instructions, I bring out the play-dough.
The audience of technical documents is oftentimes a phantom one—we do not
know whom, yet alone how many people, will read what we have written. In order to
help my students think critically about teaching a skill with which they are quite familiar
to a phantom audience, I find it helpful to level the playing field. So on that fateful Playdough day in the semester, I drag containers of the gooey, smelly, malleable childhood
putty across campus. Unless they have children of their own or are employed as a
childcare provider, the majority of the students have not played with Play-dough since
they were quite young. The students stare, flatten, and roll around the Play-dough until
(seemingly miraculously) a clay sculpture is created.

Afterwards, the students are

required to draft instructions so that another group can replicate their original design. As
straightforward as this seems, the results are often quite messy—literally. Here’s how it
usually plays out: in almost every group, the instructions tend to omit certain steps
because the designers thought the other group would “get it” or just know “what we
meant by X.” Groups leave out measurements, sizes, and directions for placement,
resulting in a confused mass of Play-dough only somewhat resembling the original idea.
Once each group completes writing their own and replicating another group’s
instructions, my students and I discuss the pitfalls of such an assignment—Why is it so
difficult to teach someone how to follow a process? Is it because the directions need to
be created and followed precisely? Is it a language “thing”? What strikes me, however,
is how difficult it is to teach a task and follow someone else’s instruction to a tee.
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Both the Play-dough exercise and the instruction assignment are not just some
coincidental nod shared between techne and technical writing.

In 2002, Technical

Communication Quarterly devoted its entire spring issue to techne, with particular focus
on how technical communication as a field might benefit from incorporating the practices
and techniques of techne into its theoretical applications and individual pedagogies.
Techne is a great fit the classroom, particularly in the technical writing classroom,
because of the ways we (as teachers) must encourage our students to see beyond the
constrictions of workplace document templates and instead view technical writing as a
mode of anticipation, one that thoroughly understands the readers’ perspective (Moeller
and McAllister). Much to my satisfaction, the Play-dough activity always reminds me
that the concept of techne is much more complex than simply repeatability or
teachability, and that to actually have a techne is even more difficult. One of the most
interesting, albeit frustrating, aspects of techne is its widely debated definition. Not only
do Plato, Aristotle, and even Isocrates have widely ranging interpretations and
applications of the term, but the debate rages on even in today’s rhetoric circles. As a
result, the definition of the Greek term techne has always been a critical debate, largely
the result of the inability to locate a precise word by which to translate it. Techne is
frequently translated as “skill” “craft” or “art” but more regularly techne has become
grouped along side – or even absorbed completely – by the use of the word technology.
Because their linguistic roots are nearly identical, it is not unusual to see the words
“techne” and “technology” used interchangeably, although sometimes incorrectly, for one
other.

For example, in his essay “The Question Concerning Technology,” Martin

Heidegger searches for the essence of technology, employing techne in order to
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differentiate between making and bringing-forth. Edwin T. Layton, Jr. opens his essay
“Technology as Knowledge” by borrowing two aspects Charles Singer’s classic
definition of technology: “how things are commonly done or made” and “what things are
done and made” to explore the epistemic implications of techne in recent technology
studies (31). Carl Mitcham reminds us in Thinking Through Technology that, “virtually
all historians use the word ‘technology’ to refer to both ancient and modern, primitive
and advanced making activities, or knowledge of how to make and use artifacts, or the
artifacts themselves” (116).

Additionally, Jan Edward Garrett also comments that,

“‘technology’ would not be a bad modern translation of ‘techne’” (Garrett 286).
Certainly the linguistic tendency to swap technology and techne is an easy one—they
both sound and look alike. In fact, this substitution now happens so naturally that those
of us in digital studies utilize “technology” as a blanket term to cover any process of
advancement, the tools used to move forward, and as a suggestion of the future itself. In
this chapter I will explore the relation between techne and technology in order to rethink
the canon of memory. I am arguing that the differences between techne and technology
lead directly to the contemporary questions we face when thinking about “making”
memories. Because my interest extends beyond thinking of memory as storage capacity,
I am interested in the ways users can create new memories from their interactions with
various technologies. As a result, the intersection between memory, techne, and
technology leads me to wonder if memory is now a technology, and if memory is now
“made” usable through its externalization, is memory a techne?
But before I can make such a claim, I must first explore what techne actually is.
Because of the recent combinations of techne and technology, this chapter is an attempt
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to explore techne by focusing on the most accurate translations and frequent usages of
techne in ancient and contemporary rhetorical scholarship. Even though such fertile
arguments about techne are helpful for my task, it also proves to be equally difficult to
sift through and determine which definitions of techne are the most effective to pair with
memory. In order to whittle my definition of techne from of the existing block of
critique, I define techne three ways: as creativity or production; as a renegotiation of
power; and as a balance of expert knowledge and instrumentality. This chapter will be
devoted to reviewing the most prevalent debates on the definition of techne by focusing
on Plato and Aristotle while at the same time incorporating some more recent
interpretations of techne suggested by David Roochnik, Joseph Dunne, Carl Mitcham,
Robert Johnson, Frances Ranney, Martin Heidegger, and Janet Atwill. The detailed work
of these scholars indicate that the wide range of interpretations of techne cannot be
subsumed under one single definition, so by offering a complete and complex look at
techne, I avoid reducing or ignoring the existing body of scholarship.
But why the turn to techne? For many philosophers, techne suggests a sense of
making, production, or use value. Although such terms are in themselves loaded, they
signify an insightful view into contemporary memory. We constantly store memories
outside of own neuronal capacity by posting personal photos to Flickr, upcoming events
and important dates to our iCals or smartphones, even saving our dissertations as a
Google Doc. As a result, the idea of “making” memory becomes more apparent when we
think about all the ways we actually produce and use memory for current and future
purposes. In what follows, I employ three categories that encompass much of the techne
scholarship: making, expert knowledge, and use. I argue that these three categories
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highlight the most important characteristics of techne, especially in relation to my notion
of contemporary memory.
As examined in chapter one, interest in memory in contemporary rhetoric is not
simply characterized as memorization techniques or retaining information in bulk, but is
instead focused on how efficiently we use the memories we make. In this dissertation, I
intend the term “making memories” to be used quite literally—our memories are not only
remembered by ourselves, but we transform them and make them useable by storing them
on flash drives or sharing them through online networking sites such as Twitter or
Facebook. By linking memory and techne, this chapter will ultimately consider two
specific questions: What is the tension throughout history between techne and
technology? How does the tension between these two influence, shape, and determine the
nature and relevance of the canon of memory?
As I argued in the previous chapter, since memory has been neglected in
rhetorical scholarship, I believe it is critical to resuscitate the canon of memory
immediately, particularly at a moment when digital technologies afford the individual
multiple occasions to literally remember everything. However, I am interested in pushing
the conversation forward; rather than thinking about memory as storage alone, I suggest
that combining memory with techne and technology will provide rhetoric with some fresh
perspectives on this canon. More specifically, by viewing memory as a producible
commodity, the relationship between interactive technologies and the users who
contribute to such spaces must be rethought. Because digital memory is indefatigable, a
look at how digital memories are being produced will of primary importance to this
dissertation. The making of memory today involves much more than rote memorization
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techniques; instead, memorization today is unlike techniques of the past. Our reliance on
digital technologies – from small personal devices like phone number databases on our
cell phones, to larger memory collectives like Wikis – all involve the individual in the
creation of memory. Perhaps contemporary views on memorization are not what we
typically think of as “storing for our own later use,” but instead “storing for shared later
use.” The importance of linking techne with memory is the notion of sharing and
collaboration—my memories no longer belong to just me, but they are shared and made
available for others’ use, too. In my research, I have discovered that a significant amount
of ink has been spilled in two areas related to my interests: 1) memory and technology, 2)
techne and technology. However, there is a scant amount of research that connects and
involves all three. As a result, my work looks at how technology, the common thread
between the two, invigorates memory and techne together by discovering memory’s
resurgence as an increasingly “made” product.
Making
Several scholars have suggested that one major way of defining techne is a
process involving the making of some sort of product. I begin with this category not only
because it appears most frequently in techne scholarship, but as my dissertation’s “title
track,” it is also pivotal to my central argument. Later, I will rely on ‘making’ to
elaborate on the differences between the storage techniques practiced in ancient rhetorical
memory and those used today, and also to strongly emphasize that the networks we create
and strategies we employ in contemporary memory are exemplary models of techne-asmaking. When I use the term making, I am employing it quite generously to cover all
materials and ideas that are reified rather than suppressed or kept to oneself. Opposed to
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an inward trait such as moral virtue, making produces a secondary product that is
independent of its agent. In other words, making always involves three separate entities:
someone who initiates the making, the product that is created, and the user who actually
utilizes that product. Making memory, then, implies the sending outwards, bringing
forth, or physical non-biological sharing of memory.
There are two prominent couplings of techne in Aristotle’s writing that I will use
to elucidate the importance of making. To commence this trek, I start with two of the
most often cited Aristotelian texts in techne scholarship: Physics and the Nicomachean
Ethics. In each of these texts, Aristotle narrows his definition of techne by balancing it
against another term, physis (nature) and poiesis (the act of making) respectively. By
looking at techne in comparison to the other two terms, it becomes easier to recognize
how differently techne functions in relation to nature and the act of making. The first
coupling appears in the Physics where techne (art) is contrasted with physis (nature) to
examine the actuality and potentiality of something coming to be, in particular how the
produced object retains or veers away from the natural. The second coupling appears in
the Nicomachean Ethics; in this text, techne (again translated as art) is compared to
poiesis (the act of making) to differentiate between action and making. Here, it is
important to note that techne is not itself “making,” but is instead the habit of mind or the
method associated with making. In the true Aristotelian sense, poiesis translates as
“making” whereas techne is the means of achieving that goal. In what follows, I will
unpack these two pairs in order to demonstrate how ‘making’ is a critical aspect of
techne.
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In the Physics, Aristotle is concerned with the process how something comes-tobe: does an object naturally exist or is it made? Aristotle distinguishes between the
natural and the artificial in the following way: “For the word ‘nature’ is applied to what is
according to nature and the natural in the same way as ‘art’ is applied to what is artistic or
a work of art” (Physics II.193a32-33). What classifies something as natural is when the
object is its own end result. It is, for Aristotle, a matter of determining actuality from
potentiality. To explain, animals exist and replicate themselves as they are—humans
create other humans, elephants lead to more elephants. “Of the things that exist, some
exist by nature, some from other causes. By nature the animals and their parts exist, and
the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)—for we say that these and the
like exist by nature” (Physics II.192b9-11). The natural represents what already exists in
the natural world around us. Trees, plants, water, insects, and animals: these all exist as
an end in themselves, and there is no automatic potential to become something else.
Although these natural items could become something else (i.e. a tree could become a
desk or firewood), it exists in its natural environment for natural purposes (i.e., the tree
absorbs harmful carbon dioxide while producing needed oxygen). Even though the
argument could be made that people have the potential to become someone else (for
instance, a former addict could clean himself up and become a well-to-do professional),
Aristotle is not interested in biological changes, but is interested in what something is in
its natural state and also what something can become when molded by another. He calls
the movement from actuality to potentiality “motion”— the process of something
coming-to-be as art (techne) and existing with the potential to become something else. As
Aristotle explains it:
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The form indeed is nature rather than the matter; for a thing is more properly said
to be what it is when it exists in actuality than when it exists potentially. Again
man is born from man but not bed from bed. That is why people say that the shape
is not the nature of the bed, but the wood is—if the bed sprouted, not a bed but
wood would come up. But even if the shape is art, then on the same principle the
shape of man is his nature (Physics II.193b.7-12).
Natural objects have the ability to replicate themselves as themselves; art does not since it
needs something additional as its catalyst. Techne is the method whereby something can
be made that would not otherwise exist naturally. For Aristotle, then, the outside agent is
the distinction between nature and art. There must be something or someone acting on
the object in order to make it into a different object. In the above passage, a bed is not
made automatically; there are no trees in the forest that grow in such a shape. However,
a tree has the potential to become a bed if and only if an outside agent acts upon it. A
tree, too, can always be a tree but it has the innate potential to become something else.
It is this moment of shifting from actual to potential that causes some debate in
the techne community. For example, some say that the mere existence of an object (let’s
say the tree), represents an always-ready potential. But how do we know for which ends
this object should or can be used? Certainly the tree can be used just as well in a dresser
or in a fence, but what is the object’s “natural” use-value? Although I discuss “use” a bit
later in this chapter, it is worth commenting on briefly here. Some techne scholars
suggest that the maker or the object itself cannot determine use, and the real value of an
object must ‘wait’ to be determined until a user utilizes the object. David Roochnik
argues that since the value of techne is established after the fact, there is no way of
inscribing techne as value-laden (71). Roochnik’s interpretation suggests that techne is
always a value-neutral process because its end is never pre-determined—the use-value of
techne must be decided afterwards. It is important to recognize Roochnik’s suggestion
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because he implies that there is no “natural” or “given” use associated with any techne
since its value cannot be established in advance. In that sense, techne can never have
contrary use because there was no intentional use in the first place. For instance, if I
gather all the ingredients to a birthday cake, all the components exists as separate ends:
the eggs, sugar, milk, etc. When we see them on the shelf, we do not see them as a
potential cake, but rather as eggs, sugar, and milk. The eggs could potentially be used in
an omelet, the sugar and milk as coffee sweetener. When I bring these items together
with the purpose of creating something new, it is at that moment that their potentiality is
realized, not when they are just sitting around in the cupboard or fridge. Their existence
as individual ingredients is also represented as a coming-to-be: they can be manipulated
and made into another object simply by being activated by an outside agent. While the
milk, sugar, and eggs are still sitting in the fridge and the cupboard, these ingredients are
and are-not because they are in the process of becoming something; the eggs are no
longer simply eggs but an important element of the cake. Those particular eggs become
part of the cake at the same time the eggs are not (and will never be) a part of an omelet.
As this cake example illustrates, techne always has a clear finishing point whereas its
counterpoint, physis, does not (Glazebrook 104). As the cake-maker, I am the catalyst for
the cake, or the end point. The ingredients by themselves are actualized as individual,
natural products; but it is not until I combine them into batter that they are potentially
something else. Combined, the ingredients end as a cake, but we do not know their
endings separately.

As Heidegger points out, “Techne has a special kind of

rest…characterized as having-been completed, having-been-produced, and, on the basis
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of these determinations, as standing-‘forth’ and lying present before us” (qtd. in
Glazebrook 104).
In another example, Walter Brogan’s essay “The Intractable Interrelationship of
Physis and Techne” examines Heidegger’s use of techne as a balance for physis in order
to better illustrate this process of something coming-to-be.

Brogan emphasizes

Heidegger’s stance that techne does not represent making of any particular kind while
also maintaining Heidegger’s philosophy that “not” is actually a characteristic of being.
For example, we often classify an object by describing what it is (e.g., my new curtains
are dark blue) and also what it is not (e.g., but the curtains are not as dark as blueberries).
The characterization of “not” suggests that the object is one thing and is something else
simultaneously; the essence of the object can be determined by differences.

The

relationship between techne and physis highlights the differences between artificial and
natural, between something made and something organic. While techne and physis are
not identical, they should not be thought of separately either; instead they are what
Brogan calls “mutual favorings,” a term he uses to suggest their interrelationality (44).
For Heidegger, this mutual favoring is so strong, that “there can be no techne, not even
the absolute reign of techne without nature, outside of the relationship of techne to physis.
But for Heidegger, […] the opposite is equally true. That is, there can be no revealing of
physis without techne” (Brogan 44). Following this logic, if we return to the example
about the tree’s potential, Heidegger (and I think Brogan, too) would say that it is the
mutual favoring between techne and physis that highlights how the natural and artificial
cannot be separated. If, as Heidegger suggests, an object always has the potential to
become something else, then the object can be and not be at the same time; the tree can
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be a tree but it can also not be a bed or not be a dresser, too. Techne and physis are
entangled with each other in such a way that, for Heidegger, the relationship transforms
techne from something that signals making into a process that, “concerned with the realm
of coming-to-be” (47). Techne is the process that indicates something new, the becoming
of an alternate object, and the motion of one object into something else. As Brogan’s
reading of Heidegger indicates, “techne approaches and relates to natural beings by also
seeing them as they are coming to be, and thus not in their being” (50). For Heidegger,
techne is the whole process, from inception to completion, leading to the creation of an
object.
Coming-to-be is also considered by Jan Edward Garrett, who distinguishes two
prongs of the art of making: and object’s presence and its yet-to-emerge aspects. When
we are in the middle of a project, we do not ‘count’ the unfinished product as an absence;
instead, it is still “in progress.” For instance, when I am baking that cake I mentioned
earlier, I do not view the batter as the final cake itself, but I do see it as a part of the
process leading towards the end product. The batter does not mean the cake will not
exist, but it does mean that the cake does not exist yet. In the following quote, Jan
Edward Garrett explains the process of making from its initial stages, through the middle
that is anticipating the final product, and ultimately the finished art:
Consider a block of stone found lying about, ready for the sculptor’s chisel. Art is
not responsible for any of its initial attributes A, B, and C. Now consider the same
stone half way through the sculpting process. It will contain new attributes D, E,
and F. Anticipating completion, we can say that the finished sculpture will also
contain attributes G, H, and I. At the midway point, art is responsible for the
presence of D, E, and F, but not for the absence of G, H, and I. However, any
description of the making process now under way must mention both the presence
and the absence; for so long as the making is under way, the sculpture is not
characterized by full actuality (291).
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In this example, Garrett shows that the potential of the block of stone to become
something else relies exclusively on the sculptor; the stone could not become the
sculpture on its own. The outside agent is the critical difference between physis and
techne. Whereas physis always produces itself, techne never does, but instead something
else must produce it (Glazebrook 106).
The capacity of someone to make a new object leads directly into the next pairing:
techne and poiesis. Like techne and physis, techne and poiesis are tied very closely, but it
is important to realize their differences. It is generally accepted that in the Nicomachean
Ethics (NE) techne is translated as ‘art’ and it is one of the five states of virtue by which
the soul possess truth (knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophical wisdom, and
comprehension are the other four). Several scholars turn to Book VI of the NE for
Aristotle’s most explicit statements about the nature of techne, and it is here that we can
begin to see how techne and poiesis (making) partner up to define each other. The
relation between techne and poiesis is an especially demanding one. Although the poiesis
explicitly translates as ‘making,’ Aristotle distinguishes techne by defining it as the habit
of mind that making requires. For Aristotle, the relationship between phronesis (practical
thought) and praxis (acting) is identical to the relationship between techne (art) and
poiesis (making): the former is the habit of mind that enables the latter. Praxis and
poiesis are each set in motion by the initial actions of phronesis and techne respectively.
Joseph Dunne helps to clarify these differences in the following: “Techne is not itself a
useful thing but rather a generative source (arche) of useful things, a habitual ability
(dunamis) of the maker through which he can reliably produce and reproduce them”
(249). As a result, techne is not the act of making, but it is the ability of the maker to
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produce. In relation to memory, techne is highlighted within the interactions between the
user and the technology, an interaction that allows the user to produce a memory with
certain tools. To explain, Aristotle states that, “Making (poiesis) and acting (praxis) are
different […]; so that the reasoned state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned
stated of capacity to make. Nor are they included one in the other; for neither is acting
making nor is making acting” (NE VI.4.1140a1-5). For instance, I am an honest person
and when I know that the milk in my fridge is beyond its expiration day, I will tell my
partner not to drink it. The capacity to act (being honest about the milk) is enough—it
does not matter whether or not he drinks the spoiled milk because being honest is the
complete action in itself. The capacity to make, however, is different because I must
actually produce something else to ‘prove’ my abilities: “techne has a useful, a visible
product, which is produced through the application of rational and clearly communicable
means” (Roochnik 24). In terms of techne, because I say I can do something I must also
be able to make good on that assertion. Roochnik and others call this capacity to make
“hanging a shingle”—I am advertising my capacity to make something specific, and to
make it well. To say it another way, techne is the capacity to make or produce (poiesis)
something. In order for me to have a techne of fashion design, I must actually have the
capacity to make clothes; in other words, I can talk a big game, but I must be able to
execute, too. For Aristotle, the capacity to make indicates the capability to produce an
object that is independent from the one who made it. He maintains that techne always
results in an end product that is a separate object from its maker; techne is a means
leading towards a distinct end product. Techne “is characterized by production in that the
artist’s aim is to produce” (Latchford 1). Contemporary memory, for example, is a
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product that is separate from the person who stores it—the digitally stored memory is a
new, external, separate end. What is even more exciting (or complicated, depending on
your view) is that the end product of contemporary memory is unknown at the time of
storage—we do not know how, or who, will use our memories in the future. While my
digital memories might serve a specific purpose for my own recollections, someone else
could just as easily use them for another purpose.
On the contrary, praxis indicates a specific action of whose end is contained
within itself and, therefore, does not have a separate end: “For while making [techne] has
an end other than itself, action [praxis] cannot; for good action itself is its end (NE
VI.1140b.6-8, translations added). Poiesis is not activity, but is an ethical action that
results in the production of itself (e.g., moral virtue). On the other hand, “Techne brings
something into existence through the course of production. […] the good product, as the
end result of an activity performed on material that, in turn, brings something into
existence, is techne” (Latchford 2).
To summarize this section, techne-as-making is an activity involving an outside
agent who actually has the capacity to make a new product. Compared with physis,
someone else must always produce techne—it is not its own end. Both comparisons
highlight techne as a process of “making” albeit from slightly different angles. As I will
explore in the next section, the stability of that new product that techne produces is
equally important as the one who made it, for the maker must be an expert and able to
teach that skill.
Expert Knowledge
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In Of Art and Wisdom, David Roochnik effectively summarizes this next category
of techne as someone who is knowledgeable enough to be able to “hang a shingle,” or
advertise his expertise (25). Clearly, when one has attained expertise of a trade, the
benefit of such knowledge is the recognition of being a master in a given field. Even in
academia we are recognized through levels of expertise; completing the dissertation, for
example, is the initiation into a career where our areas of “expertise” are determined by
our focused research. I would not go to a butcher to have my clothes tailored, but I
would certainly visit the meat vendor if I needed a few steaks for a barbeque. Techne
represents a specific and limited level of expertise—one has become a master in one area,
and one area only. Renaissance men are not covered by techne; jacks of all trades, and
masters of none are best ignored, too. Instead, to have a techne is to show expert
knowledge at a focused level of mastery in a single field to the extent that one is so
recognized by and capable of demonstrating that in-depth knowledge, the individual is
also able to teach it to others. Think back to the Play-dough example that opened this
chapter; because my students are not experts in clay-modeling, they displayed difficulty
when attempting to deconstruct, teach, and provide directions for others to recreate their
design. In what follows, I argue that this category of possessing a techne is a tried-andtrue mastery of a single process, but one so precise that it has the ability to be repeated
without fail.
In order to explain the development of expert knowledge, David Roochnik notes
that techne can be characterized at two different levels: “Techne 1” and “Techne 2.” The
former, T1, is a determinate knowledge where “end is identical to function” whereas the
latter, T2, is stochastic, messy, less determinate, and its end is distinct from its function
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(54, 52). Stochastic is derived from the Greek verb meaning “to aim”; T2, therefore,
merely aims at an end point but can arrive there differently every time (Allen 86). T1
represents situations where the outcome will always be the same, much like mathematical
equations whose endings are never vary, given they are performed correctly. T2, on the
other hand, is used in situations where chance (tyche) interferes with the process, forcing
someone with expert knowledge to take a different path to access an end. For example, if
a cruise ship is scheduled to leave its port in Florida and dock several hours later in the
Caribbean, but a storm (a natural, albeit chance, occurrence) interferes with the planned
journey, then the ship’s Captain must use his expertise to side-step the storm but still
arrive at the same end point. What is at play in this example is the Captain’s use of
expert knowledge even in the event of natural forces acting against the original plan. The
Captain’s abilities to overcome chance by employing his expert knowledge averted a
potential catastrophe between the ship and the storm. Later, T1 will take center stage
when I discuss the teleological effects on use and T2 will also resurface during an
exploration of the role of “error.”
To begin detailing the significance of expert knowledge in techne, I turn first to
the Socratic dialogue the Laches where the “techne-analogy” is first introduced. The
techne-analogy is used to explain how specific expertise results in a specific, identifiable
end product. Socrates insists that we know when someone is an expert in his field when
he can successfully demonstrate his skill: “You would not want to trust [expert teachers]
when they said they were good craftsmen unless they should have some well-executed
product of their art to show you—and not just one but more than one” (Laches 185e9186a2). Complications arise, however, when Socrates questions the ability in Melesais
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and Lysimachus to recognize virtuous teachers since virtue is a bit more difficult to spot.
Socrates then questions how Melesias and Lysimachus might seek out an expert to teach
their sons certain qualities such as courage and virtue. They all decide that if their sons
needed to learn gymnastics, for example, they could easily seek a good physical trainer
(184e1-5).

The expert in physical activities is easier to recognize because he can

demonstrate his skills by actually performing physical actions or by showcasing some of
his students as “success stories.” On the contrary, Socrates says that the expert in
courage or virtue is more difficult to spot because these traits are more situation-oriented
and involve several other factors (e.g., nature of the act in relation to one’s occupation).
In conversation with each other, Melesais and Lysimachus are torn about whether certain
virtuous acts have value or not, and decide to ask Socrates to cast the deciding vote.
Insulted, Socrates remarks that since he is not an expert in that field, and subsequently
lacks the in-depth knowledge to assess it properly, he is in no position to make such a
judgment. Moreover, Socrates insists that Melesais and Lysimachus would be foolish to
decide by casting votes, and suggests that Melesais and Lysimachus should instead
consult someone who is an expert in the specific arts in which they are interested. Here is
where the real issue arises: we can recognize a good craftsperson when he displays his
products and we can also test the products’ effectiveness by using them. We have
trouble, however, assessing virtues like courage because we, too, must posses them to
identify them. Thus, virtues are not as easily recognized because they are actions in
themselves; crafts represent the skill and expertise of the craftsperson, but are separate
from their maker.
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As a result of this exchange, many scholars have referred to this passage in the
Laches as the “techne-analogy,” summarized nicely by Roochnik in the following: “as
the expert, or technical trainer, is to the excellence of the body, so X, a technites is to the
excellence of the ‘soul’” (2). We can plug in a number of situations to explain the
analogy: a butcher is to the excellence of carving proper cuts of meat, a doctor is to the
excellence of providing a means toward health, and an auto mechanic is to the excellence
of an efficiently running car. The techne-analogy represents two aspects of art: the highlevel of mastery attained by an individual and the end result of that applied knowledge.
Techne always incorporates these two details because it is always action initiated by an
outside agent in order to produce a new product.
The important distinction, here, is the way one arrives at the end product. Techne
is a way of renegotiating the power orientation between art and physis (nature), as the T2
cruise ship example showed earlier. Janet Atwill maintains that, “art intervenes when a
boundary or limitation is recognized, and it creates a path that both transgresses and
redefines that boundary. Fate and necessity may set temporary limits for invention, but
their boundaries are perpetually redrawn by techne” (48). In other words, techne is a
means of reorganizing and manipulating the limitations of nature in order to overcome
the very restrictions nature imposes.

Following this definition, I suggest that

contemporary memory is T2 because of its flexibility and ability to overcome the natural
limitations of biological memory. Even when natural forces attempt to steer techne offtrack, T2 renegotiates the relationship between art and nature. Once again, the “mutual
favoring” between physis and techne highlight the constant struggle between nature and
art—techne always “creates a different order of power” (Atwill 7).
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Like Prometheus stealing fire from the gods for human use, we, too, manipulate
the elements of nature by taming its essence and reordering its original purposes. When
techne is used to restructure physis, that same action becomes the catalyst for nature’s
rebuttal; nature will not disappear, but will return in another form that techne will again
master. The complication of power, as seen in the relationship between techne and
physis, is what David Edward Tabachnick calls the “tragic double-bind of techne”:
humans will continually mold and form the world around us to fit our needs and purposes
only to be repeatedly subjected to nature’s wrath. “Rather than allowing us to escape
from the painful limitations of nature,” Tabachnick maintains that, “techne is an
invitation to nature’s destructive power” (97). The constant cycle of techne overcoming
physis, physis regrouping, and techne gaining control again is never ending; techne and
physis will always try to overcome each other ad infinitum. Because “the technical
imposition of human order is the spur for the violent renewal of the natural order,” the
relationship between physis and techne is aggressive and constant (Tabachnick 98).
However, overcoming nature does not happen by accident, but indicates a high
level of mastery that overpowers natural restrictions. In Rhetoric Reclaimed, Janet Atwill
explores the power relationship between techne and tyche.

While techne can be

characterized as a human’s manipulation of nature, chance (tyche) is defined as “an agent
or cause beyond human control” (Atwill 93). When someone possesses techne, she has
complete control over the situation because of her in-depth knowledge, so much so that
she knows multiple paths that will take her to the same end. The difference, here, rests in
a distinction between episteme (scientific knowledge) and techne: “scientific knowledge
aims at knowing the world, technological knowledge [techne] at controlling or
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manipulating it” (Mitcham 198). The difference between the goals of episteme and
techne are critical for understanding how art redraws the power structures of the world
around us. As stated in the Metaphysics,
But yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to
experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience […]; and
this because the former know the cause, but the latter do not. For men of
experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know
the ‘why’ and the cause (I.980b.24-30).
To utilize techne to overcome chance is a matter of “knowing-how” to accomplish a task
even in the midst of nature’s rebuttal. Epistemic knowledge does not extend as far as
techne’s reach, for it only knows the “how-to” but not the “why.” Rather than going
straight from the Florida dock to the Caribbean port in the midst of the storm, for
instance, the Captain veered off the original route, yet still arrived at the same end point.
The Captain’s techne is recognized by its “rational prediction and control” in contrast to
tyche that “lies outside of that domain because it is ‘contrary to calculation’” (Atwill 96).
Techne’s aim is to defeat tyche through a renegotiation of power, with aims to
subordinate nature once again (Atwill 96).
Overcoming tyche, consequently, is not an easy or automatic task. The level of
expert knowledge that is required for various power renegotiations can be seen in what
James M. Dubinsky characterizes as the difference between “know-how” and knowing
“how-to.” The former is “a rhetorical knowledge, contingent and governed by rules of art
rather than rules” while the latter is merely just doing something without actually
understanding the process (Dubinsky 131). The difference between “know-how” and
“how-to” is the level of competency in the acting agent. A person who has the “knowhow” has the ability to react properly by shifting gears according to the situation, while
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the person with episteme’s “how-to” does not possess the competence to respond to
nature or chance. We can parallel the ability to react properly to jazz musicianship;
because jazz musicians understand their instruments and others’ musicality so well, they
are able to improvise at a moment’s notice. Therefore, being a jazz musician is not
governed by rules, but instead is governed by reaction. Jazz musicianship is not just a
matter of “practice makes perfect” but also “practice makes possibilities”—even if the
jazz musician does not know the next riff, he reacts and plays in accordance to the
moment. Sure, the jazz musician knows “how-to” play his sax, but the true jazz musician
has the “know-how” to react to others’ beats and rhythms. In other words, a classical
musician (while equally talented) is directed towards a specific end and is not encouraged
to veer off the path of the sheet music. If an orchestra is performing Beethoven’s 5th
Symphony, each musician is expected to participate only in the capacity of the part
written for him or her. Classical musicians replicate the same tune from beginning to
end—there is little room for individual improvisation. The jazz trio, on the contrary,
might begin playing “Autumn Leaves,” but will most likely introduce new solos or jams
to the mix. Because the structure of the song remains the same, the audience will still
recognize the tune; however, the additional riffs or extended solos occur because the
musicians are reacting to the situation. They arrive at the same end, but rarely the same
way twice.
Arriving at some end on purpose is not a matter of happenstance, and so “knowhow” encompasses the high-level of competency that is necessary for techne. When a
maker understands the topic with such depth, he knows where the task will end even if
chance interferes along the way. The jazz trumpeter will know when to back down for
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his partner’s drum solo in the same way the ship captain steered around the storm. The
competency of the jazz musician and the captain exudes a level of know-how that is not
automatic, but comes with a great deal of experience. In Back to the Rough Ground,
Joseph Dunne summarizes “know-how” as expertise, actually quite similar to Dubinsky’s
claims: “Techne then is the kind of knowledge possessed by an expert maker; it gives him
a clear conception of the why and wherefore, the how and with-what of the making
process and enables him, though the capacity to offer a rational account of it, to preside
over his activity with secure mastery” (Dunne 9). It is because of the Captain’s “how and
with-what” that the cruise ship still arrived safely in the Caribbean even in the face of a
dangerous storm. Through experience, the Captain possessed the “know-how” to control
the vessel by veering around the bad weather system. Such artistic “know-how” is what
Aristotle calls “knowing the cause”: “[Aristotle] accords those who ‘know the “why”
greater respect, saying that they are “wiser” and possess both ‘knowledge and
understanding’” (Dubinsky 132). For Aristotle, the artist is wiser than the man of
experience because of the combination of knowledge and understanding; such wisdom
can then be applied in order to overcome encounters with chance.

With techne,

understanding the “why” of the situation fares better than experiences alone. Jazz, like
teaching or captaining a ship or any other T2, “is an art that requires flexible attentiveness
to the situation and audience” (Dubinsky 138). Per Roochnik, “The rhetorician, then, is
one who is flexible, able to sniff out what is appropriate and respond accordingly” (80).
Because the jazz saxophone player understands the instrument so thoroughly, he can
recognize the prime moments that are ripe for improvisation by renegotiating the power
structure between the original song and the additional riffs. The jazz musician’s power re-
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structuring is also what Martha Nussbaum calls the “systematic grasp.” Like Atwill,
Nussbaum notes that control over tyche is one of the defining features of techne because
the “systematic grasp” of techne provides the artist with “some way of ordering the
subject matter, that will take him to the new situation well prepared, removed from blind
dependence on what happens” (qtd. in Gordon 148). Even though “Autumn Leaves” is a
distinctly recognizable tune, the jazz musician can redraw the boundaries of the original
song by introducing new rhythms and solos.
Yet “knowing the cause” introduces another level of mastery to the techne
conversation—the role of error and failure. Techne scholars Frances Ranney and David
Roochnik place significant emphasis on the importance of error in relation to techne.
Because the expert has such a thorough understanding of his field, he knows when and
how to manipulate the situation favorably. Error is only acceptable because a technites
(one who has/practices techne) understands the complete picture; he has the foresight and
the understanding to provide a complete account of the intended action. Again we come
to the distinctions between T1 and T2; T1 is never susceptible to error or failure because
it is so stringent. Contrary to T1, T2 then is the only place where error and techne are
compatible because it provides “rules of thumb” rather than strict guidelines.

T2

“requires appropriate responses to particular occasions, and is compatible with failure”
(Roochnik 52). By linking techne and failure, expert knowledge is not only “knowinghow” but also “knowing-when”: when to retreat, relax, or err in specific situations.
“Knowing-when” is often used to explain kairos; in “Toward a Sophistic Definition of
Rhetoric” John Poulakos defines the kairotic rhetorical moment as “the opportune
moment,” a temporal choice that considers not whether to speak but whether to speak
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now (56, 60). In his essay “The Ancient Conception of and Art,” James Allen notes that
kairos and techne are directly connected and that, “stochastic artists needed to do more
than acquire a mastery of the formal precepts of their art; they also needed to develop a
sensitivity to the peculiar features of a particular situations, sense of the opportune
moment” (88).

Intentional error, thus, magnifies the influence of kairos on techne

because the expert must not only know how to deploy his skills, but he should also know
the precise opportune moment to eschew them. By “knowing-how” to execute error, the
expert is once again overcoming tyche by mastering the situation. Take, for example, the
field of medicine, one of the most frequent examples cited to explain the role of error in
techne. Because it is prone to failure, medicine can only ever be a T2—it “cannot
achieve the high level of precision or rate of success expected of a T1” (Roochnik 61).
To explain, sometimes an ill person heals herself without the help of a doctor; by resting
or self-medicating, she could be back on her feet in a few days. It is likely, however, that
the patient changed her routine—it was not simply random good luck that healed her, but
the amateur happened to stumble upon the correct treatment that worked for her
individual case (Roochnik 46). Just because a doctor had no role in her returned health, it
does not diminish the fact that the medical field is effective. Similarly, sometimes a
doctor cannot cure one of her patients regardless of the tests and treatments she
prescribes. Although such a failure might lead to death, it does not discredit her standing
as a doctor. Failure, here, is a result of trial-and-error; even though the doctor used all of
her expertise and skills with the intention of healing, the end result (good health) did not
materialize.

61
At issue here is how a technites is able to retain her status while at the same time
being prone to failure. In her reading of Aristotle, Frances Ranney argues that voluntary
error is commendable in techne but is faulty in phronesis (practical wisdom), episteme
(scientific knowledge) and praxis (action). Ranney suggests that techne, unlike the other
three, can intentionally fail without losing its ‘cred’ (51). In this sense, even after the
patient failed to respond to the doctor’s treatment, the doctor did not lose any respect
among the medical community, or with current and future patients. Failure, here, lies in
the patient’s inability to respond to the treatments and not in the doctor’s inability to treat
her—the doctor still used her knowledge with the hope of curing the ailing even though
the skills were unsuccessful in this instance.
To say it another way, T2 is still considered techne because the expert can provide
an account of his foreseeable action while at the same time responding to tyche and
kairos. A technites is not incompetent simply because he did not arrive at the ending the
same way as before (think again of the jazz musician). In fact, Aristotle claims that the
reason techne can have ‘excellence’ is because it is prone to failure (Ranney 51). There
is an exception, though, where failure is unacceptable. Let’s say someone “hangs a
shingle” advertising his skills as roofer. Based on the shingle, we can assume the
following: the roofer has previous experience roofing houses, he is skilled at such a trade,
and he will be able to perform that trade again in the future (i.e., the roofer is seeking new
or repeated customers and is not just advertising a task he completed in the past). If the
roofer does not live up to these assumptions and fails to construct a functioning roof, then
he is stripped of his title because he does not perform what he set out to accomplish. His
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lack of expert knowledge is manifested in his inability to perform his advertised duties.
The roofer’s failure lies in his lackluster skills.
The doctor, on the other hand, has the skills to perform but still failed at healing
her patient; but according to T2, she did not fail as a doctor. But what is the difference
between the types of failure seen in these two examples? The contrast can be seen in
how well the technites executed his/her task; because the roofer does not have the skills
to begin with, he was unable to construct a proper roof. The roofer, moreover, is dealing
with materials (e.g., wood, roofing tiles, nails) that are consistent and are “easy to shape
aright” (qtd. in Roochnik 51). The doctor, conversely, is constantly battling variety—no
two human bodies will be quite alike, especially their healing properties. Even though
the field of medicine strives to compartmentalize ailments by providing certain
medications for all cases of certain diseases, the human body does not always react in the
same ways. The theme of TV show House, for instance, is a prime example. The title
character, Dr. House, leads a team at a university hospital that specializes in “diagnosing
the undiagnosable” (“House – TV Series”). The twist of each episode revolves around
the team’s attempt to diagnose patients’ strange and uncommon symptoms and their
reactions to strange and unconventional treatments. In each episode, the patients are
often non-responsive to traditional medicine and tests, forcing the doctors to respond
creatively to each case. The team, however, often fails to discover a cure and several
episodes end with a patient’s death or diminished quality of life.
Like roofing, the materials used in medicine are the same: the pills, tests, and
surgeries do not vary from one case to the next. The variable, here, is the patient.
Because “diseases run various and sometimes unpredictable courses” (like the patients in
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House), doctors “must exhibit ‘a sensitivity to the peculiar features of particular
situations’” (Roochnik 51). The roofer failed because he could not use his materials
correctly; the doctor succeeded because she did.

The doctor is equipped to react

effectively even if that reaction does not materialize in good health for the patient.
Because the doctor has the ability to act properly but the end result is still negative, the
doctor ultimately comes out on top because she is best equipped to perform.
The distinction between voluntary and involuntary use of knowledge is, for
Socrates, a critical juncture for the technites. As David Roochnik explains, “In running,
speed is good, slowness bad. But if someone is fast, he can run slowly, whereas the slow
runner cannot run fast. The good runner who voluntarily runs badly (slowly) is thus
superior to the bad/slow runner who does so involuntarily” (137). With his current skills,
the ill-equipped roofer could not build a good roof even if he desired. On the contrary,
the proficient doctor could voluntarily choose to not administer certain drugs (Dr. House,
again, is a prime example here since many cases are ‘cracked’ because he knows when to
administer and withhold drugs from certain patients). Because it is backed by expert
knowledge, voluntary “failure” is supremely better to that which is involuntary.
As I argue in the next section, how one uses tools and knowledge is another
crucial aspect in the definition of techne. The relationship between techne, physis, tyche,
and kairos have all played significant roles in the explication of “expert knowledge,” but
the following section will question how we actually “use” techne. What happens, in
other words, when making and expert knowledge collide?
Use
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In this section, I show how “making” and “expert knowledge” are woven together
by looking at “use.” “Use” signifies the instrumentality of techne: use suggests both
human action (i.e. to use a tool) and human know-how (i.e. to make use of a skill I know
well). It is important to reiterate that techne does not simply exist on its own, but that
techne must be enacted to be effective—someone cannot just say she has a techne
without actually using and proving her talents. Because techne relies on application, such
talents must be constantly practiced and utilized. Put simply, if you don’t use it, you lose
it. By using one’s techne, one avoids the unfortunate possibility of forgetting the skill.
For instance, even though I waited tables as an undergrad and in the years before
graduate school, that experience does not automatically qualify me to jump back into a
full rotation on a busy Saturday evening dinner rush; but instead I would need several
days (weeks, maybe) of training and practice to regain the competency I once had.
Techne, in other words, must be used in order to be validated. In Truth and Method,
Hans-Georg Gadamer states that the difference between techne and moral knowledge is
how we acquire our skills and in what ways we apply them: “We learn a techne and can
also forget it. But we do not learn moral knowledge, nor can we forget it” (317). For
Gadamer, then, techne is the application of the skills we have acquired—techne means
that we are using our expert knowledge and also that someone is using our product.
Moral knowledge, on the other hand, is not acquisitive, and therefore cannot be lost
either. Having moral knowledge is enough, but having techne and not applying it is not
sufficient.
When we think of “use” and techne, I find it helpful to consider a few questions:
How do we use the tools we make to extend our human abilities? What happens if we
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use those tools “incorrectly”? How can these tools be used repeatedly to produce a
certain outcome with some sense of reliability? While there have been several scholars
before me who have asked similar questions (Johnson; Mitcham; Ellul; Winner), it is
important to recognize that their contributions have steered the path for these inquiries
while also helping to clarify the impact of the use/techne combo.
First, it is helpful to consider what “use” actually means. In Thinking Through
Technology, Carl Mitcham defines use in the following way:
The verb ‘to use’ commonly denotes ‘to bring or to put into service’ and ‘to
employ for some purpose’ – hence the ‘useful’ arts and crafts, in the sense of
making things to be employed. […] Furthermore, because of its connotations of
regularity or commonness ‘use’ seems associated more appropriately with
repetitive, not to say mechanical, processes than with creative or original ones,
that is, putting into practice as opposed to bringing into existence (230-1).
This comprehensive definition takes aim at what I hope to accomplish in this section—to
show how use is an action demonstrated by an expert as well as an action that is exerted
on a made product. Mitcham’s definition along with the questions I raised above will
inform my definition “use” by referring to a few larger concepts: tools and tool-making;
object-orientation; and repeatability and reproduction. These concepts help elucidate the
importance and depth of “use” and techne.
To begin thinking about use more practically, I begin with several anecdotes
describing some experiences as a user. The first one highlights the troubles and the
disconnect between a maker, his/her product, and the end user. The second illustrates the
knowledge we assume we (supposedly) have as an “expert user,” but how quickly that
knowledge can be dismissed or comes into question when we try to apply it to new
technology. The final is a humorous tale about using a tool in a different way than
intended.
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Use Example #1: The Label Maker
This past year, I received a label maker as a gift. Its design seems straightforward
enough—a full QWERTY keyboard along with standard punctuation and some random
label embellishing designs and emoticons. Unfortunately, in order access any of these
“extras,” the user has to press an arrow key and scroll (with another arrow key) through
the entire list of punctuation. While it sounds rather simple on paper, I am (admittedly)
not that coordinated and have printed several misspelled and incorrectly spaced and
punctuated labels. I always think to myself, “why couldn’t the designers just program a
‘function’ key?” My frustrations with my label maker illuminate the distance between
the makers and the users. Sure, once I got the hang of the machine (honestly, and
embarrassingly, it took several tries), my dissatisfaction was a thing of the past; but, it
still makes me wonder if the designers ever thought about how the product they were
creating was going to be used. In much the same way that my technical writing students
ignored their readers when writing instructions to recreate their Play-dough designs, I feel
the label maker designers also neglected the end users.
Use Example #2: New Technology
Now a days, how often do we replace our existing tools with similar, but newer,
models? My current cell phone contract states that I am eligible for a new phone every
two years, and so I take advantage of the situation and select one of the upgrades offered
by my phone company. Usually, I have no problem becoming accustomed to the new
phone’s features—sure it might take a minute to learn how to flip through my texting
options, but I get the hang of it pretty quickly. Now, alongside the label maker story, I
am fully aware that it sounds like I am completely inept with new tools, but these two
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situations (albeit embarrassing) highlight the problems with “use” quite clearly. I was
attracted to my newest phone because its sliding interface—the keyboard is hidden and
you must slide the screen of the phone up to access the number pad underneath. In my
mind, this phone is very sleek and James Bond-esque…although he would know how to
answer the phone when it rings. That’s where the problems kicked in: something as
simple as answering the phone and hanging up after completing a call caused me
significant problems as a user. (I am not alone in this, as I frantically Googled for others
with this same phone and similar problems.) The problem, I eventually discovered,
rested in the slide feature, the exact feature that attracted me to this phone in the first
place. In order to answer the phone, the user must program the settings to answer an
incoming call without sliding the interface and revealing the keys. Presumably, the user
could click a button on the interface and answer the phone. So far, so good. I changed
my settings, enabling me to answer calls without sliding up the screen. However, there is
no way to turn off the “auto-lock” feature when the interface is covering the number
pad—even if I wished to answer the phone without sliding the interface up, I have to
“unlock” the phone first by pressing three different buttons. Eventually, constantly
unlocking the interface became too much of a hassle, and I turned off the feature that
allowed me to answer incoming calls without sliding the interface up, and now only slide
the phone open when it is ringing.
Use Example #3: Basket hat
Many Christmases ago, one of my aunts made what my family jokingly
nicknamed “basket hats.”

These were not initially designed to be head coverings;

instead, they were supposed to be liners for baskets or serving bowls made in a festive
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(ugly, actually) holiday print and elastic around the sides to hold them it place. When my
grandma opened hers, she innocently thought it was a hat and proceeded to wear it. The
rest of my aunts then followed suit, not wanting to offend their sister-in-law. However,
even though the basket liners functioned just fine as (really unattractive) hats, its actual
purpose was sidestepped for this new family fashion statement.
What these stories represent is the confusion between the tool and its user, and in
what follows, I investigate that middle ground: the object, or tool, that is being used by
different people for different ends. I will borrow the term “object-oriented” to indicate
this middle-ground, and show that another characteristic of techne is its inherent
neutrality and that the tool itself can be utilized in ways that differ from its original
intention. Later, I look at the complications of use in terms of repeatability, replication,
and reproduction and how information technologies, specifically digital external memory,
spring techne into the limelight in this current digital moment.
Tools and Object-Orientation
With techne, there are two distinct agents: the maker and the user. The maker
initiates the process of creation, makes an object, and the user then puts that object to
work. The relationship can be illustrated simply: maker  object  user. In other
words, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the maker creates a tool or some product that
is separate from and outside of himself—this made product is not, in other words, mental
growth or moral righteousness.

The shared tool, then, stands between these two

independent agents. As a result the shared tool, or the made product, becomes the
“middle-man”—it is the object that links the maker to the user. Now, even though the
maker is deemed an expert because of his proven capabilities in a specific area of work,
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he never verifies his own work. Thinking back, remember that the roofer failed because
his product did not withstand the normal expectations of the user. In order for techne to
be viable, it must be up to the standards of the user herself. The relationship between the
maker, object, and user is interrelated and unbreakable because the user must verify the
quality of the object itself, while simultaneously verifying the quality of the maker.
Thus, the object is the tie-that-binds the maker to the user—their relationship must be
harmonious for techne to be achieved.
Let’s think of the object, now. The symbiosis between maker and user relies
entirely on the effectiveness of the object in question. But here, the object is enacting its
essence on the two separate forces equally: maker  object  user.

The object is a

direct reflection of the viability of the maker only when the user has validated its quality.
The arrows show that the object (the “middle-man”) is actually the primary source of this
validation, informing the quality of the maker and ensuring the satisfaction of the user.
In the end, the level of effectiveness of the object returns back from the user to the maker
himself. If the quality of the object is legitimately endorsed a number of times, the maker
then can honestly “hang a shingle.” (This cycle might be represented by a return arrow
reaching all the way from the user, arching over the object, and pointing back to the
maker.)
There has been a lot of interest in recent years about the influence of the object on
individual agency. Philosophers of speculative realism, such as Ian Bogost and Graham
Harman, have been using the term “object-oriented ontology” to indicate the equally
important role of the object in an agent-object relationship. Simply put, object-oriented
ontology (OOO) is another way of saying that agency is invoked not only by the acting
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agent, but also, or primarily, by the object itself. Typically, the agency comes from
someone enacting a particular action: one friend influencing another to see a specific
film, a group of people resisting governmental mandates.

With OOO, ‘things’

themselves have agency: just as I am deploying my agency on this laptop, the laptop is
simultaneously acting on me, too. Leading theorists of OOO, like Bogost and Harman,
have interpreted Heidegger’s claims about the use and essence of tools, emphasizing, or
even transferring, the power from the user to the tool instead. In other words, the tool
itself acts upon its user just as much as the user acts upon the tool. In the following,
Bogost defines OOO simply:
Ontology is the philosophical study of existence. Object-oriented ontology
(“OOO” for short) puts things at the center of this study. Its proponents contend
that nothing has special status, but that everything exists equally—plumbers,
cotton, bonobos, DVD players, and sandstone, for example. In contemporary
thought, things are usually taken either as the aggregation of ever smaller bits
(scientific naturalism) or as constructions of human behavior and society (social
relativism). OOO steers a path between the two, drawing attention to things at all
scales (from atoms to alpacas, bits to blinis), and pondering their nature and
relations with one another as much with ourselves (Bogost).
What Bogost suggests is that we attend to the object as much as we do to their relations
with outside agents (i.e., the ones who use these objects). With OOO, the hierarchy is
reversed—the object becomes slightly more prominent in its relation with the user or the
maker. At very least, the object rests on the same plane as these two entities.
Such a suggestion might sound familiar to those who study techne, and thus OOO
is an interesting way of looking at techne for a few reasons. First, techne is objectoriented, it is not a value-laden or self-reflexive process, but the value lies in the use of
the object that is created (Roochnik 111).

Roochnik argues that object-orientation

“implies [techne] is neutral on the question of use or value, for to understand use requires
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reflection, not on the object conceived as distinct from the subject, but on the object as
part of an expanded context including the object and the subject” (111). Roochnik and
the proponents of OOO agree that the object should be given more attention, particularly
since it is the point of validation for the user and the maker.
Next, it is essential to keep in mind that even though the object itself is valueneutral, such neutrality does not diminish the importance of the object. When Roochnik
claims that the object is value-neutral, he is not saying that the object is not important to
the creation of techne, but quite the opposite. Roochnik argues that, “‘Use’ is the critical
term because it refers to the process of bringing possessions into the human sphere of
action, that is, of applying them in a value-laden manner” (164). Here’s where the line
that separates OOO from Roochnik becomes a little clearer. For OOO, the object has its
own value—that value is the object relating to or reacting against the agent. The object
changes the relationship between itself and its user. On the contrary, Roochnik suggests
that the user can only determine the object’s value. Because the maker cannot determine
the value of the object he created, the user must determine its efficacy instead.
Essentially, the object acts as two different products—one for its creator (as an indicator
that he can live up to his “shingle”) and another for the end-user (who serves as the
check-and-balance to verify that shingle).
Consequently, the maker and the user offer two different interpretations of the
object that are not always compatible: the maker understands the craft of creating a
product for its ultimate use, but the user is the judge of the product’s viability. Just like
the label maker, the engineers who created the product likely ignored the end-user,
indicated by my lackluster experience with the product. How often have we used a
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product and wondered if the designer actually used it himself? How often have we
switched phones or computers and wished for days that the new product had certain
features or shortcuts of the previous model (or, at least a convenient way to answer
incoming calls)? In his book User-Centered Technology, Robert R. Johnson emphasizes
the differences between making and doing, emphasizing their interrelationship in a way
that is quite similar to my frustrations with the label-maker and my new cell phone. For
Johnson, the user’s satisfaction should always be the primary goal of the makers,
although this is not always the case. To bring it back to the Greeks, Johnson reminds
readers that the ancients “saw the practice and production characteristics of users as
being important” (57). The production of the object, therefore, is bound to its practice—
the producer cannot be validated outside of his object’s practical viability. While OOO is
an interesting balance for techne studies, in the end OOO does not emphasize the user’s
role in determining the fitness of the object in question.
So far, I have suggested that by looking at the object directly, we can reconstruct
the techne hierarchy (maker  object  user) so that the object becomes the central
force instead, acting on both outer agents equally (maker  object  user). However,
this relationship sidesteps the instrumentality of the object itself.

With the current

relationship, the object serves as the middle-man informing the characteristics of the
maker and the user. As a result, some techne scholars such as J.E. Tiles emphasize
“instrumentality”; by instrumentality, Tiles is referring to the intended use of a product in
the future (55). Similar to Johnson, Tiles argues that the instrumentality of the object is
so critical, that the maker must always keep in mind the end user: “techne thus affords a
model of a person exercising critical judgment” (Tiles 55). Such critical judgment is a
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reflection on the instrumentality of the object itself—both the maker and the user are
implicitly reflecting on the quality of the object while at the same time explicitly
analyzing each other. In other words, when I found it tricky to answer my phone, I
misdirected my frustrations toward the phone itself when I should have been more
aggravated with the designers (I could have equally been disgruntled with myself, but
who wants to blame herself for being unable to answer her own phone!?). I was implicitly
analyzing the inability of the makers to design a phone with easily usable features.
For Tiles, instrumentality is key in the larger discussion of techne because it
implies a certain teleological characteristic in the object itself.

While the creator

supposes that his creation might succeed, he is not the appraiser of its efficacy. To
illustrate, Tiles uses an armor maker to explain this idea—even though an armor maker
fully grasps which materials seem to provide the most protection in battle, it will the one
wearing the armor ‘under fire’ who will be the best judge of how well it actually
performs. In the following quote, Tiles explores the maker-user relationship:
This consumer’s guide to body armour [sic] illustrates aptly the kind of practical
thought which a man with a techne had to exercise. He had to keep a clear and
precise idea before him of the requirements of the user (maximum protection with
minimum hindrance and restriction of movement, for a man proportioned thus and
so) and relate his procedure to that goal. He had constantly to consider whether
this or that modification would make his product better or worse and not pay
attention to the trappings and ornaments which would appeal to those who had not
given much thought to the user of the product. In sum, a man with a techne
grasps the principles which govern the goal of his activity and relates his
procedure to those principles (Tiles 55).
Any consideration of techne is always a reevaluation of the relationship between the user
and the necessary tools involved in that process. These tools – be they roofing nails and
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shingles or external memory – will consistently involve a reciprocal association with the
one setting it into action.
The relationship between the user and the tool is an important one for techne.
Alone, the tool means nothing—it must be activated by the user for it to be effective in
any way. In his seminal text on Aristotelian techne, Back to the Rough Ground, Joseph
Dunne explains the significance of techne as a tool that aids the body:
And since the soul […] cannot exist at all except through the body, is it not
likewise the case, therefore, that a techne cannot exist except through its tools?
We would not be able to even conceive, we might say, of technai such as surgery,
sailing, or snaring if we did not know what scalpels, sails, and nets are; these
technai have no other way of being exercised except through these tools, and so
what constitutes a person as a technites in these areas is precisely a proficiency
with these tools (349).
Just as the maker must produce something to validate his skills, the tool must be used to
verify the skills of the craftsperson. What happens, however, in this technological age
when we create tools that “do the work for us”? This question is pivotal when relating
techne and memory, especially since, as seen in chapter one, there are many people from
Socrates to the present day who discredit the benefits of externalized memory, fearing
that externalization diminishes, or relinquishes control over, “real” memory in favor of
the “fake” digital kind.
Losing control is an important distinction for techne, since users must always be
in charge but can lose that control, however momentarily, via tyche (as explored earlier in
this chapter).

Complications arise when we make an object and it is utilized for

alternative purposes. These alternative purposes could be silly (the basket hat) or more
complicated (externalized memory). The distinction for techne arises in the notion of
reproduction—a product of techne must be able to be repeatable and reproducible. An

75
individual who “hangs a shingle” does not deserve that honor if he only roofs one house.
This skill must be repeatedly used. Repeatability and reproducibility, consequently, shift
the emphasis of techne away from the object and back onto the maker.
Repeatability and Reproducibility
In order for a techne to be considered repeatable, it should be replicable without
fail, although that is not always the case. As examined earlier, the differences between
T1 (exact techne) and T2 (stochastic techne) can be recognized by how reliably they are
performed. T2 is the only form of techne that is susceptible to and thrives on chance
(tyche) and failure. T2’s encounters with tyche do not diminish the quality of the maker,
the skill, or the product; instead, tyche shows that T2 can stumble on the road to
achieving an end goal, yet still succeed because it arrives at that end by a different route.
T1, on the other hand, is so precise that any veering off the path immediately discredits
the techne. In order to succeed with a T1, the technites must be able to provide a logos of
techne—that is, provide a logical explanation as to why a certain process works and can
be repeated. T1, unlike T2, always culminates with the same result (i.e., a math problem
will yield the same outcome each time it is performed). Think back to those lab reports
we were required to write-up in Biology and Chemistry 101 courses—we had to prove
that our experiments could be verified through replication. If the experiment could not be
repeated, its credibility could not be confirmed. For T1, like the math problem or the lab
reports, there must be some tried-and-true verification process. This verification process
is the logos—T1 must be so repeatable, that the technites and those who attempt to repeat
or follow the process are able to do so because there is accountability. T1 must have a
logos in order to “qualify” as a techne. Thus T1 is often used to describe both a situation
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with specific teleological purpose determined in advance as well as the steps
accompanying that process.
In the essay “Techne and Teleology in Plato’s Gorgias,” Lee Franklin reminds
readers that in the Gorigias, Socrates does not “call anything a craft which is lacking an
account” (230). Instead, Socrates rallies against any activity lacking an account calling
them mere guesswork, proceeding by knack instead of true skills (Gorgias 462b1-c4).
Here, Socrates will not grant anything the status of techne (T1) that cannot provide a
“know-how.” Now, this version of “know-how” is slightly different than when it was
mentioned earlier. Here, “know-how” is the exact account of what is occurring, and it is
different from “knowing-how” to arrive at an end through different means. There are no
alternate paths with T1—there is one route (logos), and one route only.
In his essay “Plato’s Theory of Texnh a Phenomenological Interpretation,” John
Wild highlights the significance of viewing techne teleologically while at the same time
acknowledging the influence of both T1 and T2.

Wild defines techne as “a pure

knowledge of form or standard,” or what he names “structural knowledge,” a complete
understanding of an action (257). Structural knowledge sutures the means and the ends
of a process, providing a full view of an activity from inception to completion.
Furthermore, Wild states that, “each art gives something (form) to something (matter)”;
thus in order to produce something useful, one must have a detailed working knowledge
of how to arrive at the end product.

This working knowledge is what Wild calls

“forness”: the notion that actions are completed “for the sake of one another” (259).
Even though each action is completed with “forness” in mind, Wild reminds us that no
matter how we originally intend to apply a specific action, there are moments that we
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cannot control: “Where events are within our power, nothing must be left to chance;
where they are not, we must work out the various possibilities, and take account of them”
(263). Without control, some argue that techne cannot be repeatable, hence the on going
debates on whether rhetoric itself can be considered a techne.
Even though I will not discuss it in too much detail here, it is important to note
that the lack of accountability is the problem most ancients and scholars have in
attempting to label rhetoric a techne. For instance, Socrates insists that rhetoric is not a
techne because “the activity, its procedures, must have or be amenable to, the
underpinning of an explanatory framework to count as a genuine skill” (Woolf 120). Lee
Franklin also emphasizes that for Socrates, the success of rhetoric occurs because the
“orators proceed by routine and the ‘memory of what usually happens’” (Franklin 231).
Because the end result of rhetoric lies in the audience’s reception, and because there is no
comprehensive method for understanding or judging an audience in advance, rhetoric’s
effectiveness is thus entirely unpredictable.

The lack of accountability is what

differentiates T1 from T2, and so rhetoric is most often categorized as a T2 (if it is
characterized as a techne at all).
To return back to the discussion of T1, “use” indicates its inherent stability in a
process or a made object. In other words, I can use my skills to repeat a process of
creation (the process that has granted me the title of an expert in the first place), and also
someone can purchase and use that created product without hesitation because he or she
knows its worthiness is reliable. The creator, though, is not responsible for the incorrect
use of their product. The basket hat, for instance, worked well as a hat even if the hat
was outside of its intended purposes. The ethical responsibility of maker stops if the tool
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is used incorrectly—even if that unintended use is successful. For instance, we have
probably all shooed a fly or squashed a bug with a rolled up newspaper. Even though the
original intention of the newspaper is not a fly-swatter, it does work well as one. If I aim
to squash a bug on the wall and fail because the quality of the paper is too thin, the
newspaper printers are not responsible for the poor quality of the paper or the inability to
squash the insect. The printers are, however, responsible for the quality of the printed
page: the superiority of images’ color ratio, ensuring that the text is not blurry,
guaranteeing that all pages are intact and in the correct order. If these aspects of the
newspaper fail consistently, the company will likely lose subscribers, but not because
their paper fails at bug-squashing.
Repeatability and reliability are very important terms for linking techne with
digital studies because information technologies provide users with a myriad of options to
repeat and reproduce objects, texts, and images quickly and reliably.

Repeatability

signifies the likelihood of replicating an action or process that is nearly identical to the
original, eliminating modifications in the final product. Repeatability, thus, implies the
action of reproduction—for instance, by making a duplicate of a photograph of the
Washington Monument that I snapped on a recent trip to Washington D.C., I am
repeating the original action by making another photograph. I can produce that photo as
many times as I wish, whether I e-mail it to different people, upload it to Flickr or
Facebook, or print off a copy or two for framing. The end result, the photo, will retain its
original features; on the contrary, the photo will never be the actual Washington
Monument since it is only a representation of structure. Because the reproduced photos
are not the originals, philosophers such as Jean Baudrillard would argue against the
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constancy of the copies arguing that, “it is not a question of imitation, nor duplication,
nor even parody. It is a question of substituting the signs of the real for the real”
(Simulacra 2). For Baudrillard, the real is dismissed the instant I snapped the photo of
the Washington Monument—the photographs mediate future experiences.

Walter

Benjamin, too, would suggest that technological reproducibility destroys the aura of the
original and the reproductions allow individuals to create their own perceptions in their
own space (Reproduction 256). For Benjamin, the photograph destroys the aesthetic
value of the original, reducing the photo of the Washington Monument to utilitarian use
or mere instrumentality.
However, compared with the easily degradable quality of analog reproductions,
digital reproductions ensure perfect replications of the original. The digital file of my
dissertation can be replicated as many times as I choose without losing any quality of the
document itself. The difference is easily demonstrated with a throwback example: before
iTunes or CDs, it was not uncommon to create mix-tapes for friends or flings by taping
songs directly from the radio or recording a song from one tape onto another with a dualtape deck system. The quality of the end product never sounded as good as the original,
especially after multiple copies of the same song: “copying the copy of a copy of a really
nice music tape yielded not another tape with great sound, but a mediocre one,” a
phenomenon that Viktor Mayer-Schonberger calls the “noise” of analog reproduction
(53). With digital reproductions, the “noise” is fortunately eliminated since the copies
are identical, resulting in the ability to repeat and reproduce quality and content.
Contemporary memory works in the same way by allowing users to make and
create memories by storing them in various locations, or also by copying the memories
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limitlessly. Just as someone who has the skill to build a table can reproduce that same
table based his expert knowledge, or like my students who should have been able to recreate a Play-dough design by following another group’s directions, information
technology supports the ability to make any digitally stored product reproducible, and
almost flawlessly so. Here, I emphasize that “repeatability” signifies the process of
ensuring identical replication. Moreover, repeatability provides techne, or specifically
T1, with a stable structure that attempts to eliminate random outcomes and overcome
nature.
With repeatability, the connection between techne and technology becomes a bit
more apparent, as suggested by digital philosopher R. L. Rutsky. In the book High
Techne, Rutsky argues (like others before him) that reproduction takes the aesthetic
quality out of an object, reducing the object to a mere instrument.

Unlike others,

however, Rutsky suggests that techne is the force behind this instrumentality noting that,
“If the machine aesthetic’s reproduction of technological style splits style from function,
with the rise of technological reproducibility, the function of technology itself begins to
become a matter of reproduction, of simulation” (Rutsky 12). In what Rutsky names the
“technological turn,” digital technologies combined with the (re)productive forces of
techne represents “modernity’s tendency to technologize or instrumentalize the world, to
abstract and reduce it into ever more minimal, more controllable forms” (13). Thus, the
technological turn points to the power of techne to take control of non-technological
processes (here, digital memory’s preeminence over biological memory). To provide just
one more example, Rutsky maintains:
Although computers offer various kinds of hardware for the storage of data, from
chips to hard drives to CD-ROMs and DVDs, this storage space cannot be
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accurately described as a hardware space. It might, in fact, better be called a
media-space, as suggested by the fact that these forms of storage are known as
‘storage media.’ The space of this data is, then, a multi-media space, constituted
through simulation, though technological reproduction and reproducibility. The
name generally given to this simulacra virtual space is, of course, memory
(Rutsky 15).
These smaller multi-media spaces provide users greater control over their end functions.
It is much easier, for instance, to open my Google Reader to access my favorite websites.
Google Reader allows users to bookmark (“subscribe to”) frequently visited websites and
will alert the user when there is an update on that particular page. Rather than opening
several dozen pages in my browser, Google Reader is a “one-stop-shop” for my
information needs. If I had bookmarked each page separately, I would have to flip
through each site to see if a new post had been added. With Google Reader, I have much
more control over a smaller platform. Google Reader “remembers” all my favorite sites
for me, and notifies me (reminds me, even) when new material is available for viewing.
It is much easier to view one site instead of sifting through several dozen individual ones.
By subscribing to all of my favorite sites in one location, I have much more control over
my time as an information-consumer than I would if I merely flipped through each one
hoping for new content. We can see here that techne is resurfacing under the purview of
digital technologies and digital reproducible memory has become one opening through
which techne and memory can both gain ground in this contemporary moment.
Conclusion: Beginning to Link Techne and Memory
One of the more interesting, and perhaps even the most significant, correlations
between memory and techne is the suggestion that memory is no longer afflicted by time
orientation. When we think of memory, we are most certainly conjuring up thoughts of
the past—we “remember” what happened to us on various occasions, we “memorize”
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facts in order to “recall” them to prove something in an argument or pass an exam.
Memory is conceived as the storage of an event in the past—not the present and certainly
not the future. The mere suggestion of memory invokes the idea that one is ‘looking back
at’ an event, conjuring up an emotion which has passed, and even becoming nostalgic for
a place or a time in one’s life when all was different, better, or even worse. Thus,
memory is rarely conceived as a structure that is outside of time; instead, memory is the
representation of all that encompasses the past. However, as suggested in the previous
chapter, new technological forms of storage are shifting memory outside of its time
constraints and into a time-less cycle. In other words, the memories that are stored on
externalized devices or placed for use on various web collectives (e.g., Wikipedia) now
function outside the constraints of time and are actually being transformed into structures
for use in the future.
As a result, the connection I am drawing between techne and memory must focus
a significant amount of attention to the re-districting of time, specifically how the past is
becoming, well, a thing of the past itself. Contemporary memory is not limited to or
created for nostalgic remembrance or mere recall, but rather it is constructed specifically
for use in the future. Furthermore, whereas biological memory can be severely limited by
personal lapses (e.g., a few too many beers can impair one’s memory of an entire
evening’s conversation), contemporary digital memory is focused on use in both personal
situations and in collectives.
And while critics like Jaron Lanier whose recent manifesto, You Are Not A
Gadget, is highly skeptical of “hive mind thinking” and the noosphere in general, the
combination techne and memory speak to the benefits of such collectivities. Recent
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upsurges in “cloud computing” indicate that individuals and corporations alike are
shifting the control of their personal “memory” (or server space) into the larger cloud.
During a presentation at the 2010 Digital Conference of Humanities, Arts, Science and
Technology Advanced Collaboratory (HASTAC), four presenters representing the blog
HTC In the Cloud explored new possibilities for cloud computing. As described by Steve
Campbell, a simple way to think of cloud computing is a “pay-per-drink” system: you
only pay for as much storage as you need. If you want to drink a pint, you only pay for a
pint. Just like personal energy use, you only pay for what you need and use. If we are on
vacation, our electric bill shrinks because we are not flipping on the lights or running our
laptops well into the night. Cloud computing works the same way, but instead deals with
storage and server power. Rather than companies constructing large servers for their
personal use, cloud computing allows business to offload their server needs to “the
cloud.”
But what is “the cloud”? According to the presenters, clouds are a huge data
storage centers that serve as the offsite computing power for corporations. For individual
purposes, think of Google Docs. For instance, even though I have several copies of my
dissertation stored on different flash drives, I have uploaded each revision to Google
Docs just in case something damages the drives. I have stored my dissertation in the
cloud—I have used Google’s storage capacity for my personal use and reduced the
possibility of losing access to my files. Similarly, companies can create mirror images of
their servers or locate their entire network elsewhere by purchasing cloud space (think of
the recent upsurge of “mirror sites” for the Wikileaks’ cables); therefore, in the event of a
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flood or other catastrophe, their server space will not be damaged (as it often was in the
pre-cloud days).
Further still if, as Roochnik and others have suggested, techne overcomes the
chance floods that could destroy all the server space, then perhaps we can read this as
another representation of memory, too. On the one hand, the chance of “forgetting” any
random fact stored in our biological memory is high. Very few of us have perfect
autobiographical memories like “S,” whose written account appears in A.R. Luria’s Mind
of a Mnemonist, or more recently Jill Price, the woman whose perfect memory, or
hyperthymestic syndrome, has been both chronicled (Woman Who Can’t Forget) and
criticized (“Total Recall”) for its rareness. On the other, displacing memory outside of
the biological constructs reduces the chance of one forgetting anything, and thus we can
regain control of our personal memory.

85
Chapter 3
Techne-monics and Digital Archives
One of the most important aspects of archives and memory is organization.
Archivists will note that an archive without a clear-cut system in place is not worth
calling anything (well, except a mess). Even as I began this chapter, I struggled with
ways to organize my archival work—how do I archive the archives? What qualities am I
looking for? Is it awkward to begin looking at archives, or to do any quantitative work,
with a theory and boundaries already established? Many will say it is best to let the
material speak for itself. Others insist you need a focus or the data collection will
become too unwieldy. Regardless of the collection process, archives have taken many
shapes over the years, ranging from specific library and museum collections to memorials
and places of storage for shared cultural events. Not only is it paramount to note what is
included in an archive, but it is equally important to recognize what is omitted and how
someone (usually a curator) decides what does “not get remembered” by denying
inclusion in the archive. In this chapter, I look at three specific digital archives: The
Wayback Machine, The September 11 Digital Archive, and The Soweto ’76 Archive.
These archives are different from “traditional” brick-and-mortar museums or memorials
because they encourage, in fact thrive on, user input. Rather than a static space, these
digital memorials are constantly in flux—one visit will never be like the previous one.
Furthermore, these three archives all have different end goals. The Wayback Machine is
the only one of its kind and is attempting to collect the entire history of the Internet. In
addition to the team of researchers who are responsible for the archive’s content, The
Wayback Machine “takes requests” from its users to determine which sites have not been
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crawled yet, searches for them, and then reactivates and stores the Web sites. Both The
September 11 Digital Archive and The Soweto ’76 Archive seek to collect the stories and
memories of events of national importance. The difference between the two, however, is
that The Soweto ’76 Archive is formulated like a real museum, allowing visitors to
“walk” between buildings and visit spaces right on their screens. (I should note, too, that
The Soweto ’76 Archive is still in Beta testing and is yet to be completed. The project,
which began in 2007, will take about five years to complete; however, the Beta site is an
impressive example of the usability of the final site.) The September 11 Digital Archive
is different because there is no place to return to, only the space of what used to be the
World Trade Center Towers, the empty field in Pennsylvania, and the side of the FBI
Headquarters, the J. Edgar Hoover Building (which was largely inaccessible before
September 11). The aim of both event-based archives, however, is to collect stories, emails, sound files, and images from anyone, expanding the notion of inclusivity and
encouraging contributions from people who would not normally have the opportunity to
participate in and contribute to national memory. In this chapter, I look at these three
digital archives in order to question what it means to have a memory in the digital age,
and what these three spaces of memory say about the limits (or limit-less) means of
memory space.
By encouraging participation from users, digital archives utilize the creative and
productive aspects of techne as a mode of successful memory making. In relation to
techne, it becomes important to reconceptualize how we perceive memory and how the
boundaries of natural memory shift when we invite everyone to write memory together.
If techne is about making and use, then these three archives encourage visitors to make
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and use their memories quite differently by asking for deliberate participation and
production rather than mere observation and consumption. The creative aspect of these
archives is where I suggest memory and techne meet once again. By exploring these
archives individually, I argue that their participatory nature exhibits how memory and
techne are collective forces.

To capture the combination of memory and techne, I

introduce a new term: technemonic. This term is different than “mnemotechnics” which
has been used elsewhere to designate memory loci and the process of recollecting those
memories during a speech. In The Art of Memory, Frances Yates denounces the term
“mnemotechnics” in favor of “art of memory”; for Yates, “mnemotechnics” reduces the
high-sensory process of artificial memory and “makes this very mysterious subject seem
simpler than it is” (4). Mnemotechnics is a term that also emphasizes the process of
recollecting, not the actual creation of memory on which I am focused in this chapter. By
recognizing the complexity of techne and memory devices, technemonic foregrounds
techne in order to emphasize the creative nature of contemporary memory. Thus, the
combination of “techne” and “mnemonic” suggests the devices, spaces, or tokens (digital
or otherwise) that we make or collect to remember a particular event. Since the digital
archives consist of individually crafted memories, technemonic will be used to signify
memories that are available for use in each archive.
By also viewing archives as a point of productive memory, I reconsider what it
means to consume and produce memory. As consumers of memory, we need to evaluate
the product that is being consumed. When the event has passed, what qualifies as a
consumable remnant of memory?

What happens when the tide shifts away from

consuming memory and “we” become the point of producing memory? Throughout this
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chapter, I also consider whether these digital archives undo the ideological consumerist
trends and capitalistic mechanisms of memory culture. When the consumer chooses how
to use the product, what does this mean for the productive ends of technemonics? Or
more specifically, is there an intended use for digital archives?
Clay Shirky has recently introduced a new term to recognize the shift towards
online productivity: cognitive surplus.

Rather than using our free time watching

television, Shirky argues that we are now spending at least one percent of that time
contributing to social networks such as Wikipedia. He states: “One thing that makes the
current age remarkable is that we can now treat free time as a general social asset that can
be harnessed for large, communally created projects, rather than a set of individual
minutes whiled away one person at a time” (Shirky 10). “That doesn’t mean we’ll stop
mindlessly watching TV” Shirky argues, “it just means that consumption will no longer
be the only way we use media. And any shift, however minor, in the way we use a
trillion hours of free time a year is likely to be a big deal” (23). If there was a question
about the value or meaning of contributing to the digital archives, then cognitive surplus
might just be the answer. Such a small percentage of our free time truly adds up to large
social movements, whether this time is used towards contributions to The September 11
Digital Archive or making small edits to Wikipedia pages. The shift from consumer to
producer might have always been in our nature, but the platforms were never as readily
available as they are today. Shirky then questions, “What if we’ve always wanted to
produce as well as consume, but no one offered us that opportunity? The pleasure in You
can play this game too isn’t just in the making, it’s also in the sharing” (19). The shift
from what Jay Rosen names “The People Formerly Known as the Audience” into the
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producing agents of technemonics symbolizes the growing desire that individuals have to
become active citizens in the writing of memory and history (Shirky 36). Because the
spaces in which we can contribute and craft the memories of events are expanding, I
reconsider “why” individuals are compelled to participate rather than merely observe.
The shift away from mere consumer or spectator and into the realm of producers
of memory lies in the available means themselves, a move I suggest is a critical one for
rhetoric to notice. Because individuals have new outlets for sharing and creating selfvalue, Shirky argues such social spaces create more intrinsic value than ever before:
“Personal value is the kind of value we receive from being active instead of passive,
creative instead of consumptive. […] Social motivations can drive far more participation
than can personal motivations alone” (172-3).

Shirky also points out that digital

production is symmetrical: “When someone buys a TV, the number of consumers goes up
by one, but the number of producers stays the same. On the other hand, when someone
buys a computer or a mobile phone, the number of consumers and producers both
increase by one” (55). An increase in the number of available means should prompt
rhetoric to return to one of its own canons and reclaim this digital moment as its own.
Information technologies not only offer limitless means to store digital memories,
but these same technologies must also be viewed as a route towards increased
participation in rhetorical practices. Because information technologies, or as I prefer to
call them “interactive” technologies, increase the possibilities for users to “write
memory,” participating in accessible memory forums, like digital archives, permits
individuals to contribute to collective memory as never before. In terms of access, these
archives enable the possibility for individuals to contribute to national memory in such a
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way that is unlike many other sites of remembrance. Even though people leave tokens at
permanent memorials like the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington D.C., and although
those tokens are collected and stored, the actual space and shape of the monument never
changes. The content of the digital archives I explore in this chapter relies on user
input—they would be significantly bland without it. As a result, the type of memory that
is applied in the digital archives must be differentiated. I will refer to memory of these
digital archives as “open memory” while typical museums or other selective archives will
be noted as “closed memory.” To explain, any archive that allows, encourages, and
thrives on user input via stories, audio or video files, or Web links will be noted as “open
memory.” The three archives I look at here are all “open” because users have the
capability to add their own content as well as comment on existing elements. On the
other hand, “closed memory” archives do not allow users to contribute to the batch of
material that has been pre-selected for display.

For example, displays at the

Smithsonian’s National Museum of American History do not ask visitors to leave
mementos during their visit—the exhibits only invite spectatorship and reflection.
On the outset of such a quest, it is vital to establish how the digital archives
construct “memory” versus “history.” To help distinguish “memory” from its close
relative “history,” I will lean very briefly on Pierre Nora. Although such a slight nod to
Nora might be an injustice to his voluminous study of French history, his distinction
between “history” and “memory” is helpful at this juncture to re-characterize the ways
we collect, and ultimately write, experiences. On the one hand, history for Nora is a
representation of the past, calling for “analysis and critical discourse”; memory, on the
other, “thrives on vague, telescoping reminiscences, on hazy generalizations” and is
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vulnerable to all kinds of “projections” and “censoring” (3). Memory, as we know it, is
always subjected to “forgetting”—our personal affective responses will limit, or censor,
what we can recall. However, digital archiving does not speak to the limits of time—
whether censored by time or fresh in our thoughts, a visitor to the archives can add
memories to these sites at any point in the future. Because the archives are not limited to
immediate responses, they also represent the possibility of shifting spaces of
remembrance rather than being mere solidified historiographies of national importance.
In another example, in the introduction to Save As…:Digital Memories, Joanne
Garde-Hansen, Andrew Hoskins, and Anna Reading note that “history” is a projection
from “one to many” whereas “memory,” and specifically “digital memory,” is more
localized and can be thought of as “peer-to-peer” (8). By invoking the term “peer-topeer” (P2P), I touch on some of the essential aspects of the digital archive—file sharing,
collectivity, and distribution. For example, in an open memory digital archive, memories
are written by individuals to be shared with all visitors. P2P memory does not preference
one memory over another—each memory receives equal weight. On the contrary, a
closed memory brick-and-mortar museum works differently. Closed memory systems
are hierarchical—a group of curators select what is archived, displayed, and remembered.
P2P digital memory encourages memory-making from below, so that digital archives
collect stories that may not be historically significant, but instead are personally
meaningful (Garde-Hansen, et al 12). One of the aims of all three digital archives is to
make memories of, or “write,” events in different ways, through different means, and
from different voices. The ability of users to upload their stories does not neglect the
historical importance of the events, but rather personalizes and expands the traditional
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boundaries of both “history” and “memory.” By using digital terminology such as “peerto-peer,” it becomes easier to show how these three archives share memory among users
instead of simply displaying memory for spectatorship.
Because the digital archives are, by definition, collaborative collectivities rather
than displays, it is helpful to turn to sociologist Maurice Halbwachs to explore the
distinction between individual memory and collective memory.

In The Collective

Memory, Halbwachs defines collective memory by drawing the distinction between the
collective as a whole and the individual who contributes to the memory: “While the
collective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent body of people,
it is individuals as group members who remember” (48).

For the digital archive,

Halbwachs’ definition of “collective” is crucial. Because history tends to privilege only
one account of an event, many important details are side swept in favor of the dominant
version. The digital archive is not one individualized perspective persuading many.
Rather, the collective P2P digital archive is the collaborative effort of individuals sharing
many memories, who in turn offer a wide spectrum of interpretations, viewpoints, and
recollections of one event.
Halbwachs takes it one step further and differentiates between two types of
memory: “historical memory” and “autobiographical memory.” Historical memory is, as
Alison Landsberg terms it much later (and as I will discuss in detail shortly), a
“prosthetic” memory, or one that we do not experience first hand but have experienced
nonetheless. For instance, even though I was not alive in 1969 for Woodstock, stories
from relatives who were there, special anniversary edition magazines, DVDs and CDs,
and The History Channel specials allow me to form my own experience of this event.
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For Halbwachs, I am essentially “remembering” an historical event even though I did not
experience it first hand. My understanding of and reaction to Woodstock characterizes
“historical memory”—these are memories I have of events that I have experienced from a
distance.
Autobiographical memory is the counterpart of historical memory.

With

autobiographical memory, I recall events that happened to me, that I lived through, and
that I am able to provide an “eye witness” account of. Autobiographical memories do not
have to be of national importance, but they do need to be important to the individual. In
my mind, I will always celebrate March 12, the day I was accepted to graduate school. I
am able to share my excitement about that event with other graduate students, even if
they were accepted in February or some other time because the event itself is similar. In
the introduction to Halbwachs’ On Collective Memory, Lewis A. Coser compares
autobiographical memory to attending a college reunion: even though the attendees all
hold degrees from the same university, the individual college experience will be
dramatically different from one alumni to the next (24). In this sense, autobiographical
memories are personal; they are moments in one’s life that are important to the individual
for some reason or another.

On the surface, they may not be important to the

construction of a nation’s history, but digital archives are shifting the tide by favoring
autobiographical memory over historical fact. In this chapter, I show how the aims of all
three archives are angled towards autobiographical memory rather than mere history.
The productive nature of these archives is what shifts the focus away from
consumerist memory, documented most notably by Marita Sturken in Tourists of
Memory. Sturken contends that national events, like September 11 and the Oklahoma
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City Bombings, prompted a response via consumerism.

In order to deal with the

overwhelming grief of these events, people bought kitschy items, such as World Trade
Center snow globes and teddy bears for comfort. The new trend toward digital memory
production points to an interesting shift in the types of memory storage the three digital
archives represent. Although The Wayback Machine is not specifically a site to collect
memories of one specific event, it does have different “channels” devoted to memorials
of September 11 and other tragedies.
Others, too, have considered the ramifications of mass culture and memory,
especially Alison Landsberg.

Her work, Prosthetic Memory, is helpful in thinking

through how remembrance, in general, is formulated via engines of mass consumption.
Landsberg wonders how interactions with mass media influence and shape individuals’
relationships to historical events, especially ones they did not live through. She defines
prosthetic memory as, “the interface between a person and a historical narrative about the
past, at an experiential site such as a movie theater or museum. […] The resulting
prosthetic memory has the ability to shape that person’s subjectivity and politics” (2). In
the epilogue of her book, Landsberg recognizes that she has not considered the
consequences of digital archives on memory, and the three sites I look at here benefit
from and pose many new questions to Landsberg’s theory. If Landsberg suggests that
prosthetic memories enable people to have true experiences of events in which they did
not actually participate, then I am particularly interested in defining what ‘counts’ as real
experience. The difference I am interested in here is how new sites of memory ask users
to write the memories themselves by combining mass media and memory in one location.
Can we write prosthetic memories, even if we did not experience the actual event? Since
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these digital archives are open to all contributions, should there be limitations or
boundaries on what “counts” as true experience? More directly, even though I was not in
New York City when the planes collided into the World Trade Center towers, did I
“experience” the event on television? On a more localized scale, as a result of increased
security measures because of 9/11, my trips to the airport are now more labor-intensive.
Are these aftershocks of 9/11 actual moments of experience, signifying the only pure
“experience” I have had of the events?
Landsberg’s characterization of “prosthetic memory” follows Halbwachs’ interest
in memory from a distance.

In considering what “counts” as actual experience,

Halbwachs states that,
During my life, my national society has been theater for a number of events that I
say I ‘remember,’ events that I know about only from newspapers or the testimony
of those directly involved. These events occupy a place in the memory of the
nation, but I myself did not witness them. In recalling them, I must rely entirely
upon the memory of others, a memory that comes, not as corroborator or completer
of my own, but as the very source of what I wish to repeat. I often know such
events no better nor in any other manner than I know historical events that occurred
before I was born. I carry a baggage load of historical remembrances that I can
increase through conversation and reading. But it remains a borrowed memory, not
my own (The Collective 51).
The digital archives force us to reconsider the stretches of memory. Because the digital
archives themselves mediate the actual experience of the events by allowing users to
upload videos, pictures, and other forms of media to bring people closer to the actual
event, the boundaries of “historical memory,” “autobiographical memory,” and
“prosthetic memory” must be restructured.

When speaking of historical memory,

Halbwachs states that, “I can imagine them, but I cannot remember them” (52).
However, the static photographs and historical accounts of his time vary differently from
the digital archive with which we deal today. In particular, if prosthetic memory enables
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us to bring the event “into our living room,” or at least onto our screens, then I argue that
we are experiencing the event as our own. Through the technology, we are persuaded to
write our own memory even though we experienced the event from a distance. We can
write both an autobiographical memory and a prosthetic memory within the extended arm
of the digital archive.
However utopian I have made these archives sound, media obsolescence also
becomes a critical idea to consider, especially since the archives are relying on the
stability of code. Rather than housing memories and keepsakes in permanent locations
under ideal conditions and the watchful eyes of museum curators, these digital archives
rely on the continued interest of unknown archivists. Worse still, the archives risk being
forgotten, as they are at the mercy of badly written code as N. Katherine Hayles
recognizes in her essay “Traumas of Code”: “Nothing is more difficult than to decipher
code someone else has written and insufficiently documented” (137). Because the digital
archives are code by nature, they will always be subjected to the torments of bad code
sourcing, various Internet protocols, and server stability. These digital archives, too, are
relying on backwards compatibility, the process that allows newer media devices to read
or project older versions of software or other saved material. For instance, Blu-ray
players are able to play most standard DVDs; even though the Blu-ray technology is
more advanced than the average DVD, the device is able to read both types of discs and
Blu-ray owners are not required to repurchase the movies they already own.
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the storage and server space the archives
currently occupy will be the type we use even five years in the future.
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The issue of media obsolesce foregrounds another distinction—the type of content
that is actually contained within the archives. The content of these digital archives is a
bit different than what you would find in a closed memory museum or memorial. Each
digital archive houses a great many types of sources, but they all have one common
element—all of the source materials are digital files. What becomes tricky is when we
consider the originality of the items themselves. For example, how might the content
“appropriate” or, to use Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin’s term, “remediate” a previous
medium since it is reinventing, reinterpreting, and technologically updating older media
for use in fresh contexts?

Remediation, a term that was influenced by Marshall

McLuhan’s statement “one media’s content is always another media’s,” absorbs previous
media while at the same time being presented in a new form (Understanding 8,
Remediation 53). As a result, digital content walks a fine line between “original” and
“remediated.”
To differentiate between the various types of digital content, G. Mahesh and
Rekha Mittal define three terms that are useful here when exploring texts in the archives:
born-digital, turned-digital, and gained-digital. Mahesh and Mittal’s work contributes to
the debates on copyright issues concerning digital work, and the three classifications of
the types of texts encountered in digital archives. These terms will be used to analyze
certain elements of each archive in order to determine if the point of creation affects the
viability and aims of the individual archives.
Born-digital refers to “the content is created in digital form with the purpose and
understanding that the content is primarily meant for storage and use in digital form”
(Mahesh and Mittal 677). Born-digital texts originated in digital forms and are not
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reproduced outside of their space on the Internet. The three open memory archives I look
at are mainly composed of born-digital content, but this does not mean that they are
immune from deterioration like other materials stored in closed memory archives. In fact,
Walt Crawford contends in his article “Stick Around: Notes on Long-Term Digital
Content Retention” that the digital archiving process itself is similar to closed memory
archives, but the long-term storage of born-digital material is where issues arise (64). For
instance, Crawford argues that copying born-digital material onto microfilms or printing
out the archives for long-term storage actually negates the classification of born-digital.
In terms of storage, born-digital material must stay digitized—it must not be printed or
copied and stored in alternative locations. The problem then becomes ensuring that the
material is properly migrated from one technology to the next, and guaranteeing that the
digitally archived will be accessible in the future. With printed material, we do not have
to worry about accessibility in the same ways—we can still read handwritten letters from
the Civil War without worrying whether our current technology will support the “file”
(Crawford 65). Moreover, Crawford recommends migrating digital archives every five
years to ensure their accessibility and compatibility with current technologies (65).
Continual migration is not a flawless option though, since it takes money, a full staff and
continued interest—more resources than digital archives typically have.
The second type of material found in digital archives is called turned-digital,
referring to all content that has been converted into a digital format, and retains its
original shape and form. The Wayback Machine has a substantial amount of turneddigital material since they have partnered with digital book projects like Project
Gutenberg. E-books are a classic example of turned-digital content because they were
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originally printed texts but have been scanned and/or made available for digital
consumption. The digital book itself functions and appears nearly identical to its printed
counterpart.

Other examples of turned-digital texts include academic journals,

magazines, and newspapers that are available in both print and electronic forms without
any changes in content.
The final term, gained-digital, is less a matter of how the content is created, and
more an issue of how the material is distributed and made available through a lending
institution, such as a university library.

Mahesh and Mittal describe gained-digital

content as that which: “might have been born-digital or turned-digital at some source but
the library is not associated with the creation of content. The library only acts as a
facilitator to access the already available content” (678).

Here, claiming a text as

“gained-digital material” are simply the means by which it is accessible and distributed,
not the process by which it is created. All three archives provide gained-digital material.
In fact, I suggest that one of the goals of the digital archives is to make accessible
material and information that was not possible prior to their existence. The September 11
Digital Archive and The Soweto ’76 Archive both strive to present the voices from a
wide variety of experiences. Before the digital archives, expressing such memories in
public forums was complicated, and thus the archives can be called gained-digital
because they provide a space where people can distribute and access one-of-a-kind
stories.
In what follows, I describe all three archives and explore their collections by
viewing specific examples. By looking closely at the new forms of “making memory” I
show that digital archiving is shifting memory away from consumerist tendencies and
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into strong spaces of production. I also have the following specific questions for each
archive I address as the chapter progresses.

Because The Wayback Machine is

essentially “hoarding” all the sites they can collect, how does this massive collection
affect the meaning of “archive”? Anyone who has visited The Wayback Machine is
immediately drawn into its bank of “oldies-but-goodies,” outdated versions of familiar
Web sites like Yahoo or eBay. Does this desire to look back align with what Svetlana
Boym calls “nostalgia”? For The September 11 Archive, does collective memory alter
the ways we write memory? Finally, because The Soweto ’76 Archive will be used as a
supplement to the actual museum in Soweto, will there be a disconnect between
availability to the digital archive and memory production? How might visiting the two
different memory spaces prompt different responses? Do the aims of the digital archive
parallel the actions of the post-Apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission?
The Wayback Machine
The Wayback Machine is the Internet’s own time-traveling device. The purpose
of this archive is to collect and make accessible all of the pages that have existed on the
Internet. Page updates or system upgrades often surprise us when we open our browsers
and find our well-traveled pages changed, redesigned, or inaccessible. If we think about
memory and digital archives as simply as possible, it can be related to the clichéd
reminder to “back-up” our work. If our computer crashes, and we have not created a
duplicate copy, our work is gone.

Even though social bookmarking systems like

delicious.com and Twitter are places to share sites of interest via links, they are not
immune from the saved sites being deleted on the other end. This is the trouble with
born-digital material: we do not have a guaranteed solution to keeping it around.
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Fortunately, ‘keeping it around’ is the main goal of The Wayback Machine. They
strive to archive all versions of every item that has ever appeared on the Web. Each
version is sorted by date and when you search for a site, you are directed to a screen with
a table listing all archived versions by date (figure 3.1).1 To illustrate with a bit more
detail, at archive.org, the layout is nothing fancy (figure 3.2). The website is categorized
by type of materials it stores: Web, Moving Images, Live Music Archive, Software,
Audio, and Texts. Each category indicates how many files it currently hosts (the Web is
significantly higher than the others at over 150 billion pages) and users can follow the
site via RSS feed, signified by the button on the upper right side of the screen. For each
featured category there is a “Curator’s Choice,” a daily selection of interesting or topical
archived material. Also on the homepage, there are places for recent comments and
questions within the user forums of the site. Each category allows users to search within
the specific file type, which is helpful considering the sheer vastness of collected
material.
Just above the orange RSS feed button is a link that simply states “upload.”
When clicked, users are taken to a registration screen that must be completed in order to
contribute any material to the archives. After agreeing to the legalese, users receive an
“Internet Archive Virtual Library Card” which provides access to the archives and also
allows users to post material and comments. As an indication of how many subscribers
there are, when I signed up in June 2010, I received the 928,936th “library card.”
Digital archiving takes into consideration two questions: what do we choose to
store and what do we choose to leave out? With digital archives, we have a choice to

1

All figures can be found in the appendix at the end of this dissertation
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remember (by requesting our favorite sites be crawled) or to forget (some sites aren’t
worth the time to return to). There is one significant drawback, however. The restoration
and “reactivation” of, say, my old blog does not guarantee that all the old posts will be
available nor does it grant me my administrative duties to change its appearance,
moderate comments, or add new posts. Each version of the website must be crawled and
archived separately (thus, the table of dates and links). Our biological memory functions
a bit differently—sometimes we repress ideas because we want to, and other times we
cannot control the forgetting that is brought on by disease, injury, or age. If a memory is
locked in our biological memory, it is significantly more difficult to recall an event or
someone’s name. Frequently, biological recollection occurs merely by chance. As we
begin to think more critically about how memory will be transformed in the digital age,
we must also remember to think about how quickly ideas can be “forgotten” and deleted.
If The Wayback Machine promises users “universal access to human knowledge,” what
is included in this universality must be questioned, too.
Compared with traditional archeology, I can see how data retrieval from five
years ago does not seem as delicate – or even as relevant – as, say, uncovering our
evolutionary history via archeological digs.

But this is the exciting aspect of The

Wayback Machine—we are archiving events as they occur, not in retrospect. Even more
interesting is that The Wayback Machine is a way to protect the past as it is happening.
Since we do not know what will be important data to hold onto, and because The
Wayback Machine is actively creating massive archives of all Web sites as they appear,
this archive is expanding the possibility for future research in a way we might not even
know yet.
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Because The Wayback Machine desires to hold onto everything, this might be the
first digitally diagnosed case of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. While “hoarding” has
recently become grossly intriguing because of reality television shows, digital hoarding is
popular for a different reason. It is exciting to think that everything we have seen on the
Internet can be viewed again, that we have a place to return to, and that our memory will
be saved for us. There are, however, many skeptics of digital preservation. Digital
doomsayers like Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger cringe at the idea of saving everything and
suggest that we purge our hard drives on a regular basis. However, it is critical to rethink
digital archives from the present moment precisely because we are producing at the same
time that we are consuming its content. The Wayback Machine places researchers and
archivists at a privileged standpoint because we are all able to contribute to, sort out, and
organize the newly added material while simultaneously identifying and saving older
sites. This collaborative form of open memory suggests new forms of researching and
remembering because the archive will always be a new space for new voices.
The downside of such massive collections is organization and ease of locating the
desire information. If we cannot locate material quickly and regularly, then it might as
well be forgotten. One of the issues with open memory digital archives is not how much
we can store, but the structures we must develop in order to process and use the
information efficiently. In the first issue of the journal Memory Studies, Paul Connerton
suggested “Seven Types of Forgetting” in his article of the same name. The seven types
all describe forgetting as a purposeful action occurring as a result of the individual, as
opposed to involuntary forgetting as a result of a disorder or brain injury. Connerton
contends that while we usually view memory as a triumph, forgetting is most often a type
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of failure: forgetting where we placed our keys, forgetting we have a committee meeting,
forgetting to grab milk on multiple trips to the grocery store. He argues that no matter
what kind of forgetting occurs, they all have one similar feature: “they imply an
obligation on my part to remember something and my failure to discharge that
obligation” (59). Subsequently, digital memory shifts the obligation away from the user
into the system itself—the failure of forgetting is no longer mine, but is instead a lapse of
technological memory. But aren’t we the ones who actually place our memories in
digital systems like The Wayback Machine? Who’s to blame then? Characterized by its
functionality, external memory’s most striking property is not merely its ability to
supplement biological memory, but that it “remembers” events exactly as they occurred
and retains knowledge without the fear of our brain failing us, or forgetting.
But how do we characterize all those Web sites that are “oldies-but-goodies,” like
the first Yahoo page or early versions of Amazon? Viewing these sites reminds visitors
of a time when they, too, were as new to the Internet as the Web sites themselves. When
viewing early versions of popular Web sites, we are transported to a different time, a
different place. Looking at Yahoo’s homepage from 1996 and comparing it with recent
versions, not only is the layout different, but so too are the advertisements, the images,
and the option to personalize content (figures 3.3-3.8). When viewing the 1996 Yahoo, I
think: “remember when this was fantastic?”

Might The Wayback Machine be

reinventing nostalgia alongside digital memory? In The Future of Nostalgia, Svetlana
Boym states:
At first glance, nostalgia is a longing for a place, but actually it is a yearning for a
different time—the time of our childhood, the slower rhythms of our dreams. In a
broader sense, nostalgia is rebellion against the modern idea of time, the time of
history and progress. The nostalgic desires to obliterate history and turn it into
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private or collective mythology, to revisit time like space, refusing to surrender to the
irreversibility of time that plagues the human condition (xv).
The allure of The Wayback Machine is to see the progress of technological
development—that is why visitors are drawn to the 1996 Yahoo homepage.

We

understand that technology has progressed well beyond 1996, but we yearn to remember
and see ‘what it was like then.’ We can visit 2010 Yahoo anytime, but we rebel against
modern time by reminiscing within the constructs of the digital archive. The Wayback
Machine also creates nostalgic desire by encouraging visitors to contribute to its
collection.

Your favorite site from 1998 is missing? Request it!

Nostalgia, here,

becomes individualized within the collective.
More specifically, Boym argues that nostalgic recollections do not reveal any
signs of decay, and “it has to be freshly painted in its ‘original image’ and remain
eternally young” (49). A visit to Yahoo today only provides access to the current site;
The Wayback Machine invites visitors reminisce about the ‘original image’ of the older
version. When Boym states, “the past for the restorative nostalgic is a value for the
present; the past is not a duration but a perfect snapshot,” she is saying that nostalgia
captures the past perfectly as it was (49). We can view Yahoo anytime, but we must visit
The Wayback Machine to see earlier snapshots of a time past.
While The Wayback Machine seeks to capture moments as they occur, in the next
two sections, I examine the archives inspired by events of national importance. One the
surface, these sites may seem “historical” by nature, but I argue that they are favoring
autobiographical and prosthetic memory over any single version of history.
The September 11 Digital Archive
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Like the other archives I look at in this chapter, The September 11 Digital
Archive is designed to generate user content with the intent of “saving the histories of
September 11, 2001” (The September). At the top of the home page there are six tabs
from which visitors can choose: browse, research, contribute, special collections, 9/11
faqs, and 9/11 links (figure 3.9). Under the tabs a description of the site notes its purpose
as “using electronic media to collect, preserve, and present the history of September 11,
2001 and its aftermath” (The September). The archive was established as a means to help
historians collect information via contemporary technologies, allowing them to
investigate events from new perspectives and from people who typically would not have
an opportunity to contribute to shaping historical narratives.

Although the archive

“officially” stopped its collection efforts in 2004, visitors to the archive are still
encouraged to add their memories to the database. Moreover, The September 11 Digital
Archive “has partnered with the Library of Congress, which in September 2003 accepted
the Archive into its permanent collections – an event that both ensured the Archive’s
long-term preservation and marked the Library’s first major digital acquisition” (The
September).
By clicking on the “browse” tab, users are taken to another screen that
differentiates between the type of files, ranging from stories to e-mails, digital animations
and audio. There is even a “forum” dedicated to Mark D. Phillips’ famous “Satan in the
Smoke” image, a photograph in which some claim an image of Satan can be seen in the
dark plumes of smoke rising from the burning towers (figure 3.10). A quick look through
the different files exposes a broad reaction to the events; some note their hatred towards
the attackers, others replay what they were doing when the attacks occurred, while others
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are still skeptical of the media’s reporting of the events in general. Overall, the archives
represent the gamut of feelings, reactions, and confusion inflicted on Americans after the
attacks.
Many of the stories follow similar patterns: there are several poems describing
what amateur poets called “Tuesday Mourning”; there are many high school and college
students detailing how their daily routines on September 11 were altered and the bonds
they formed with random passer-bys watching the news reports together; there are several
parents noting the birth of their children, doomed with the national tragedy as their
birthday; and hundreds of native New Yorkers describing their narrow escapes while
their friends, family, and co-workers were not as fortunate. The images in the archive
can also be categorized: many capture the World Trade Center Towers in the years before
the attacks; there are dozens of pictures of the towers in smoke and the rescue efforts
(figures 3.11-3.14); several photos showcase visitors to NYC playfully manipulating the
vanishing point to show how much “taller” they are than the towers (figures 3.15-3.16);
and others are tributes to loved ones who died in the attacks. There is, however, a
noticeable lack of stories and images from either Pennsylvania or the Pentagon,
suggesting there were many more people directly affected in New York City (figures
3.17-3.18). Reading through the stories in the archive, there is an overall feeling of
distress—almost a decade later, and I, too, still feel the confusion and the unrest I felt just
watching the destruction on television. Because events like September 11 were televised,
the broadcast itself expands the notion of first-hand experience; even though the majority
of the country was not directly affected by the plane crashes, as a nation we are still
struggling through the aftermath of the event. The 24/7 media coverage of 9/11 along
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with sites such as The September 11 Digital Archive bring the event much closer to
everyone. In what follows, I use a couple examples of stories and images from the
archive to illustrate that prosthetic memory and autobiographical memory are valid
means of experience.
September 11 brought out patriotism, almost excessively so, in the months that
followed the attacks, as this segment of one story illustrates:
Our family business is wholesale novelty, carnival and party supplies. We could
not believe the amount of phone calls we received for patriotic merchandise since
September 11. We have always carried American Flags and other items, but the
response to show patriotism was overwhelming, here in St. Louis. We supplied
the Baseball Cardinals with 50,000 American Flags that were given out at an
evening game. Subsequently, other teams called our store asking for flags as well.
Unfortunately we were out of stock and frantically looking for vendors who had
them in stock! (Dawson).
Even in St. Louis, quite a distance from the sites of any of the plane crashes, the demand
for American flags increased drastically following 9/11. That people rallied in cities
across the nation clearly suggests the experience of writing memory is not limited to the
specific sites of impact. By extending the reach of “experience,” the possibility to write
memory also expands.

The story above illustrates one specific memory of Sharyl

Dawson; although she was not physically present at any of the sites, she transferred the
prosthetic memory of the attacks from the media’s portrayal into the autobiographical
memory of distributing flags locally and around the country.

As a result of

“experiencing” 9/11 on television or through other media, Dawson utilized the prosthetic
memory in order to write her own autobiographical memory. The event was no longer
someone else’s version of history—Dawson rewrote the event for herself, reacted by
distributing American flags, and shared her memory of 9/11 in the archive. Dawson’s
memory should not be disregarded because she was in St. Louis. On the contrary, her
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autobiographical memory of the flag distribution demonstrates that the experience of
writing memory and technemonics extends beyond the spatial limitations of the attack
sites.
Similar to Dawson’s memory is an image of an installation in Texas, the
photograph capturing only a fraction of a field on which hundreds of small flags are
pointing out of the grass (figure 3.19). Jesus Velasquez describes the photograph as “A
park in Lubbock, Texas on September 11 2004 to honor the Men and Women who gave
their lives on September 11 2001.” Velasquez does not detail what he means by “gave
their lives”—we do not know if the flags represent people on the planes, the rescue
efforts, and/or people inside the World Trade Center or Pentagon or if each flag
represents a specific number of deaths (e.g., one flag equals ten deaths). Lubbock, Texas,
like St. Louis, is quite a distance from the actual location of the attacks, but the physical
space does not disqualify Velasquez from writing his own memory. In the image, the
rows of American flags symbolize the transferring of the prosthetic memory into a
tangible autobiographical one. I am assuming that Velasquez was not an eyewitness to
the plane crashes, but he was present at this specific memorial dedicated to September 11
on the three-year anniversary. Velasquez’s photograph represents his autobiographical
memory of 9/11 drawn from the nationally publicized prosthetic memory.
The two previous examples exemplify the desire to contribute to a national
moment by transforming distanced experience into personalized memory. In Tourists of
Memory, Marita Sturken argues that by reconstructing the context of events, America’s
response to national tragedy is often a rhetorical act. By persuading outsiders of our
strength even in moments of weakness, “the figure of the innocent victim is contradictory
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in American culture because of its implication of weakness, and this often necessitates
the rewriting of victims in contexts like 9/11 into narratives of heroism” (Sturken 8).
Further, Sturken suggests that Americans have the desire to be “tourists of history: a form
of tourism that has as its goal a cathartic ‘experience’ of history” (9). Neither Dawson
nor Velasquez were present at the sites of the attacks, but they were present at their
localized memorial celebrations. Dawson’s story and Velasquez’s photograph illustrate
what Sturken calls authentic and inauthentic memories. She states that by visiting sites of
trauma, visitors gain a “trace of authenticity by extension” (11). These “sites of trauma”
for Dawson and Velasquez are extensions of the actual sites of trauma, but according to
Sturken they are inauthentic because of the distance. “The complexity of contemporary
media events calls into question the simple equation of physical proximity to a trauma
precisely because the media disperses and circulates highly charged images” (Sturken
30). With the digital archives, one’s physical proximity to an event no longer takes
precedence over the ability to produce a valid memory. Instead, the production of
memory becomes a matter of cultural proximity, or how individuals reclaim events for
themselves among and within the louder voices of the media.
By writing memory and contributing to The September 11 Digital Archive,
Dawson and Velasquez have “authenticated” their experiences by bringing the site of
trauma out of the media and transplanting it much closer to their own homes. Whether
their experiences are deemed authentic or not, what qualifies Dawson and Velasquez as
tourists is, in fact, their distance. “Tourism is about travel that wants to imagine itself as
innocent,” Sturken notes (13). Tourists stand at a distance; they stand outside culture
(Sturken 13). Dawson and Velasquez were certainly distanced from the actual events of
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9/11 and were far from the clean-up, the dirt, and the congestion that followed. However,
I contest Sturken’s claim that viewing the trauma from a distance is a viewpoint “that
demands no responsibility” (13).

On the contrary, Dawson and Velasquez took

responsibility for their own memory of the event by rewriting grief in their own localized
way. Even though the grief of losing a family member in the attacks certainly outweighs
the pride of distributing flags at a baseball game, they are both separate experiences of
the same event. By contributing to the archives, both Dawson and Velasquez have
produced memories responding to the call to understand events of national importance.
Their contributions, among the thousands of others, are an attempt to “make sense of
one’s response” to 9/11 regardless of their actual distance (Sturken 30).
The Soweto ’76 Archive
The final archive I examine is The Soweto ’76 Archive created to supplement the
“closed memory” Hector Pieterson Memorial and Museum in Soweto, South Africa
(figure 3.20). The Maryland Institute for Technology in the Humanities (MITH) and the
Hector Pieterson Memorial and Museum (HPMM) have created The Soweto ’76 3D
Immersive Archive, allowing visitors to experience what they have named a “digital
cultural heritage trail.”

This Archive is a virtual re-creation of several significant

locations during the student uprising in June 1976. Although the digital archive is still
being developed, the live demo enables users to read and share their own memories or
simply gain a better understanding of the South African Apartheid by “visiting” the sites.
Better still, The Soweto ’76 Archive gives people access to history in a new way—rather
than reading about the important locations and events of the Apartheid, The Soweto ’76
Archive brings the experience to the screen by linking related video, text, and memories
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in one interactive interface. The interactive features make The Soweto ’76 Archive
unique—visitors can add their own personal Apartheid experiences to this site, creating a
truly multimodal museum.

This archive is unlike the other two I have examined.

Visitors actually “see” and “walk through” important locations, like Robben Island, while
at the same time contributing to its very structure. The combination of spectatorship and
contribution makes The Soweto ’76 Archive a new way of learning about history while
simultaneously writing national memory.
A visit to The Soweto ’76 Archive is similar to visiting an expansive closed
museum. Visitors can walk through and between buildings while reading descriptions of
events related to each location. This archive has been designed in collaboration with the
HPMM to collect a better understanding of the events of the Soweto student uprising. To
briefly recap the uprising, the National Party government mandated that all classes be
conducted in a mix of Afrikaans and English (Pohlandt-McCormick, Ch. 2). Since the
schools were segregated at the time, Black students rejected the idea of being educated in
the language of their oppressors (Pohlandt-McCormick, Ch. 2). The rejection of this
language requirement grew and on June 16, 1976, the resistance culminated in a large
student protest (Pohlandt-McCormick, Ch. 2). Even though the protest was designed to
be peaceful, police opened fire on unarmed students. The death toll is still undetermined,
although reports claim that any where from twenty-three to over 200 people were fatally
wounded as a result of police violence (Hunter-Gault). The HPMM is dedicated to the
students who resisted the government, and even the name of the museum itself signifies
the horrific iconic image of the uprising—the dying teenager, Hector Pieterson, being
carried in the arms of another student while Pieterson’s crying sister follows closely.
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Although the events in Soweto note only one event during Apartheid, its
developing digital archive suggests that any current representation of the uprising has not
been presented completely. The combination of the brick-and-mortar museum with the
digital archive provides people, particularly students who participated in the uprising, a
space in which to share their recollections. These new perspectives expand the written
experience of the Apartheid in a way that was not possible outside of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.
The South African Apartheid separated groups of individuals based upon their
race, an act that both related and separated the country’s citizens.

Although that

segregation insinuates a ‘shared meaning,’ individuals were solely identified through
their lack—my race is connecting me to a specific group, while at the same time
separating me from another because I lack that color. If identity during Apartheid
suggested lack, then a post-Apartheid South African identity encouraged citizens to
identify through sameness rather than difference.

Post-Apartheid, The Truth and

Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established to collect the wide range of
experiences of the newly “healed” nation. The TRC hoped that the space would foster
recognition and forgiveness; it was a space that was open to any South African wishing to
speak about his or her Apartheid experience, however painful. If the TRC provided a
space to express one’s experience during Apartheid, then The Soweto ’76 Archive
functions similarly, although on a much smaller scale. However, issues of accessibility
complicate the aims of the TRC and The Soweto ‘76 Archive. While the TRC was a
massive undertaking with transcripts filling thousands of pages, there are people who did
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not speak out because of pain or fear. Moreover, as large as the TRC was, its enormity
also represents the eerie silence of the thousands who died during Apartheid.
Both the TRC and The Soweto ’76 Archive are founded on the basis that people
have the desire to share their stories of suffering. The TRC was attempting to unify a
nation through pain, although forcing all to verbalize such pain may not have provided
much healing after the Apartheid. Consequently, when the pain of the Apartheid was
reified through written or spoken language, it became the object for someone else’s
perception. As a result, an individual’s subjective experience of the Apartheid was then
joined with other Apartheid experiences. With this ‘nationwide’ collection of Apartheid
experiences, the TRC attempted to reconcile a nation by moving from the simple telling
of stories into an active forgiveness. However, the trouble with the TRC is not that it
actually existed, but that it was relating everyone through the sameness of pain. By
allowing individuals to tell their eyewitness Apartheid experiences, the TRC transformed
these narratives into an act of public (and same) forgiveness. All those who participated
in the TRC related to one another because they experienced some sort of similar pain, but
in the end, this communal pain conquered individuality by recognizing everyone only
through the sameness of pain. The TRC illustrates gathering the personal accounts of
Apartheid experiences, all the while fusing them together as a collective South African
experience.
That The Soweto ’76 Archive is being developed three decades after the events
prompts a few questions. First, the time between the event itself and the official launch
of the archive has been significant; the developers of the site cannot be certain that time
has not hindered individual perception of the event. Secondly, like the TRC, if The
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Soweto ’76 Archive is bringing people together under the auspices of pain, then does the
archive become a space of “sameness” through segregation just like the uprising itself?
Finally, it is not clear how MITH will make the archive easily accessible or how they will
“advertise” the site to Soweto “survivors,” possibly compromising the project before it
officially begins.
To help answer some of these questions, I turn to Margaret Anne Clarke’s essay
“The Online Brazilian Museu da Pessoa” in which she examines the historical and
memorial impact of Brazil’s national archive of personal stories. Even though Clarke’s
example is different from The Soweto ’76 Archive and certainly its goals are much more
social than the TRC, the Museu da Pessoa (which translates as Museum of the Person)
has tackled some similar problems like those I raised above.

According to Karen

Worchman, the founder and director of Museu da Pessoa, the purpose of the archive is
“to record, collect, organize and archive the life stories and personal histories of the
nation’s citizens into a public databank and resource” (Clarke 151). The desire to make
life stories and personal histories searchable marks a new level of Brazilian history, what
Clarke calls a “history from below” (152).

This bottoms-up approach to archiving

endorses “peer-to-peer” memory sharing by handing over the reigns to everyone rather
than a select few. By considering peer-to-peer memory, my reservation about the purity
of memory might not be as detrimental, especially since there is no memory or history
that is privileged over another. With digital archives, memory actually takes precedence
over history. Events of personal significance are more valuable than one, factual account
of historical importance. MITH and The Soweto ’76 Archive are attempting to trump
history (as it is currently written) by favoring personal memory, even three decades out.

116
Like Brazil whose citizens were “once marginalized and fragmented by the teleological
one-way narrative of ‘modernity’ and progress,” new digital archives allow the voice-less
to “open up through the interrelation of multiple memories, narrations and trajectories
within space” (Clarke 164). Regardless of the time that has passed between the uprising,
the end of Apartheid, and the creation of this digital archive, this new and important form
of “cultural democratic practice” has been designed to capture the stories from those
“who have been excluded from the channels of economic and political access” (Clarke
153).
Conclusion: Technemonic Networks
While it might be a gross oversimplification, if The Soweto ’76 Archive follows
the popular trend of the Museu da Pessoa and other Web based memes, then contribution
to the archive will thrive. Clarke recognizes this trend when she notes: “The creation of
networks of memory within social contexts of the present is ultimately to enable
individuals and communities to pursue goals in the spheres of democratic participation,
cultural affairs, civic activism, and community-based initiatives” (160). Elsewhere, too,
the transformation into active citizenry has been noted. In No Caption Needed, Robert
Hariman and John Louis Lucaites maintain that, “If citizenship is to be an actual mode of
participation rather than a merely legal construct, then it has to be articulated in a manner
that encourages emotional identification with other civic actors” (17). The emotional
identification is the intrinsic desire to become part of a collective by producing and
collaborating in memory making. By enabling new access routes to the way an event is
remembered, especially to groups whose accounts have been neglected, the digital
archive represents an important step towards altruistic computing and collectivities. The
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practice of writing and sharing technemonics is a moment of transformation, one that is
moving away from privileged accounts of history and towards experiential moments of
memory.
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Chapter 4
Memory Manipulation
On Monday, April 27, 2009, the President’s plane, Air Force One, made a
surprise visit to the airspace above downtown Manhattan. To many, this fly-by was
startlingly similar to the images of 9/11. Even the President’s plane (which President
Obama was not on at the time) was a little too close for comfort. In an attempt to “get
some fresh glamour shots of the plane,” The White House secretly ordered Air Force One
to fly near the Statue of Liberty (Sataline et al). What the White House did not consider
were the ramifications of “reenacting” the plane crashes that preceded this photo-op by
nearly eight years. There are several reports of New Yorkers running out of nearby
buildings, believing that the fly-over was another terrorist attack—and this time they
were going to be ready for whatever chaos lie ahead. Instead, it was a misjudged and
poorly conceived plan to spruce up the current images of Air Force One. The most
interesting part of this story, however, is not the fact that the plane’s flight so closely
resembled the 9/11 attacks, but rather the reactions from the public. Glancing through
any of the reporting of the botched photo-op indicates outrage from the American public,
but there is one constantly repeated comment in the online forums that sticks out among
the others: “Haven’t they heard of Photoshop?”
The demand for faked photography is intriguing—while photojournalists are
responsible for supplying visual truth to the accompanying text, the public’s desire for a
manipulated photo points to an interesting shift in our acceptance of what’s “real” and
what’s not. Rather than invoking a painful memory, the public’s demand for a digitally
composed photo also suggests that the integrity of the formation of memory on all levels
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– prosthetic, historical, and autobiographical – is at stake.

If the public willingly

demands forged photographic proof because the pain of the memory is still too raw, then
the ethics of visual representation might slip a little further into the sidelines.

If

manipulated photographs are designed to represent accurate, eye-witness accounts of
events, then the possibility exists for the faked photos to become prosthetic memories for
anyone who views the images. In this chapter, I question the moment of manipulation: if
the photograph was manipulated with the intention to strengthen the evidentiary chain,
then can the prosthetic memory be “real”? Is the memory, too, manipulated?
With the ubiquity of technological tools, I wish to probe even further by asking:
with all the technology we have to assist our memory, is it even possible to remember
anything correctly?

Externalized memory devices, utilized for their stability, are

certainly fantastic resources for storing all sorts of memories—documents, videos,
pictures, and audio files. The flip side, however, is whether these devices can actually
help us remember events in the way that they actually occurred.

In other words,

externalized memory is not a question of whether technologies are “ruining” our
memory, but instead it becomes a question of how technologies are making us remember
differently.

In The Invention of Memory, Israel Rosenfield argues that memory is

constantly prone to re-making (76); regardless of how stable external devices keep our
memories, when we return to them we will often re-make the event because of new bias.
This new bias might result from one of Daniel Schacter’s seven sins of memory, which
each suggests that memory is constantly fallible because of time and continual
experiences (139). Typically, when we hear “manipulated memory,” it brings to mind
that there is an outside agent influencing the memory making process. For instance, a
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manipulated photo created by a photo editor or a photographer might form our memory
of an event incorrectly because it does not represent what actually happened. However,
Schater and Rosenfield’s arguments each prompt me to consider if memory manipulation
might also be ‘in the eye of the beholder’ since our perception of the event shifts as time
passes.
Following this idea, I examine two specific vectors of memory manipulation:
external photo manipulation and internal cognitive manipulation. I have selected these
two paths because they each highlight different tactics and possibilities for making
memory.

Moreover, techne also resurfaces in some interesting ways here.

While

photography is used to capture a real event, photo manipulation steps around what
naturally occurred to present an unnatural depiction. As a result, photo manipulation and
techne are an intriguing pair. Photography is problematic from the start simply because
of its spatial limitations—no photographer can ever escape the limitations of framing.
Although photos are snapped to savor the natural environment in which an event took
place, the photo will always omit something. I suggest that this unavoidable framing
harkens back to the physis/techne dichotomy: while trying to keep the scene as natural as
possible to preserve its actuality (physis), a photo cannot escape the fact that it lies
outside of the natural by its very existence. The photographed scene has the potential to
become something other that what it actually is—the photographer is impeding on the
natural environment by snapping one specific, albeit artificial, shot (techne). In relation
to internal cognitive manipulation, I revisit techne in relation to expert knowledge. We
believe we are in control of our own memories—I experienced the event, and so I
remember it in the way ‘I say it happened.’ Unfortunately, there have been numerous

121
studies in psychology that prove that our memories are prone to manipulation on several
levels. These studies, which I detail later in this chapter, are exciting for relating techne
and memory because they prove that expert knowledge (the ‘it happened the way I say
so’ attitude) is less reliable than we tend to believe.

Not only do we remake the

memories throughout time, but certain studies have also proved that others can actually
implant memories by suggestive methods or by asking leading questions.

Making

memory, in this case, again reroutes the natural way we think about our personal
memory—we cannot be as confident in our memories because they are constantly prone
to recreation.
In order to explore the idea that external memory makes us remember differently,
I look at several examples of cognitive research that question if purposely manipulated
photographs influence the ways individuals remember events incorrectly, and whether
individuals can manipulate personal memory by unconsciously allowing other events to
reshape the original memory.

Remembering differently and incorrectly is what

Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons name “the illusion of memory”—even though we
are convinced that our memory has correctly stored an event or we are certain that we
could correctly identify a perpetrator in a line-up, our memories are often influenced by
the ways our brains “re-make” and manipulate the memories we believed to be correct
(45). Therefore, I trace two paths paved by manipulated memory: external manipulation
created by a photo editor and also internally distorted memories resulting from one of
Schater’s “sins” of memory (e.g., transience or misattribution). These two paths will help
answer the following questions: What can photos do to memory? Can photographs
become prosthetic memories?

What is the tension between photography as a
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representation of a real event and the symbolic allusion of memory as “photographs” or
“snapshots” of event in our lives?
Memory, I argue, is a persuasive construct—it is not a concrete structure, as we
tend to think it is, but rather it is extremely fluid and easily subjected to re-creation by the
slightest suggestive details. Rhetorically, these suggestive details indicate that there are
several alternative means to create memory, which might result in the ideal persuasive
perspective (possibly even the ‘wrong’ or ‘false’ perspective) of a given event. If we
want something to be remembered differently, several studies imply that manipulating
and making new memories is easier than we believe. The double-edged sword lies in the
technology itself—the technology that stabilizes and saves our memories (increased and
easy storage) is developing as quickly as the programs that can be used to alter our
memories (cheap and accessible manipulation software). At the same time that we store
our photographs on sites like Flickr, other sites like Microsoft’s Photo Tourist or
PhotoSynth borrow user content from Flickr to create 3D renderings of places. The
uploaded photos have the possibility to become one small part of a larger, collaborative
perspective. The convenience of Photoshop and other editing tools make it easier to crop
exes out of family portraits and even include new spouses in their place. On the NBC sitcom The Office, Michael Scott (played by actor Steve Carell) caused chaos and destroyed
his relationship when he substituted his head in the place of his new girlfriend’s exhusband. Her husband and children had been on a ski trip, but Michael altered that photo
(which he turned into his Christmas card) so he was on the “family vacation” instead (“A
Benihana Christmas”). While this television episode humorously explores the ease with
which new technologies can create new memories, it illustrates my point precisely. At
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the same time that storage capacity increases and keeping thousands of photographs on
our computers, iPods, and phones is the norm, new memories are quickly created with the
same advanced technologies that enable personal memory storage. Put simply, the more
storage we have, the more possibilities there are to control, alter, rearrange, and create
memories with new tools. These new tools expand the role of rhetorical memory because
most users have various capabilities to shape the persuasive intent of an image merely by
cropping, adding text, or changing the color schemes. Small moves like these can
significantly change the persuasiveness of the image, impacting personal memory along
with it. In this first section, I examine visual rhetoric and the expertly crafted iconic
photograph in order to introduce the idea that imagery is a means of stabilizing memory.
The iconic photograph is designed to appeal to a large audience by becoming the single
memory of an event. Later, I explore how these iconic photographs, and our memories
along with it, can be altered to remember an historical event quite differently.
Visually Rhetorical: Persuasive Images and Controlled Remembrance
For rhetoricians, any visual element accompanying a persuasive argument is
critical—photographs are often used to verify the statements of historical events and
stand in as a witness for the many who were not there first-hand. We view pictures to
supplement the stories, to prove that something actually occurred.

When we view

pictures of our parents when they were dating, or old images of our grandfathers dressed
in military uniforms, these visuals suggest that the stories they have told us over the years
are real, and we can place a bit more weight on their truth based on this pictorial
evidence. In any case, visual representation is intended to persuade us of its reality—that
something occurred in the way it has been told. Photographs are able to bolster reports of
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worldwide events so well because they are inherently persuasive. The persuasive aspect
of photographs appeals to the same pathos of spoken rhetoric. For Robert Hariman and
John Louis Lucaites, the iconic photograph’s hold on the public psyche is carefully
designed to produce an orthodox reaction. “A rhetorical moment was indeed emotional
but only because emotions are rhetorical,” argue Hariman and Lucaites, “and the
persuasive breakthrough achieved by the photo was an example of a polity being brought
to its senses by its capacity for feeling” (163). The stable reception of iconic photographs
is one thing; the likelihood of that memory becoming manipulated, however, is another
beast altogether.
Visual rhetoric scholars Hariman and Lucaites’ book No Caption Needed explores
the rhetorical nature of iconic photographs, their capacity for widespread persuasiveness,
and their ability to create stabilized memories and affective responses in mass audiences.
No Caption Needed is a great place to begin looking at the rhetorical influences of
photographs from the perspectives of both the photographer and individual memory,
especially because iconic photographs maintain their place in mainstream consciousness
by forming a singular, albeit universal, memory of a nationally important event. Unlike a
political speech whose message can easily be misconstrued, the images Hariman and
Lucaties discuss are iconic because they spark fixed, visceral responses in their audience.
Hariman and Lucaties state that, “the iconic image’s combination of mainstream
recognition, wide circulation, and emotional impact is a proven formula for reproducing a
society’s social order” (9). I suggest that “social order” can alternatively be read as
“controlled remembrance.” By creating a single, visual representation to stand in for an
event, the mass audience is instructed to remember the event in that one particular way.
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Prosthetic memories created by iconic photographs reinforce a controlled rhetorical
response. For Hariman and Lucaties, “Iconic photographs acquire rhetorical potential by
representing events according to the conventions of those visual arts and persuasive
practices familiar to a public audience” (30).

Unlike shock artists such as Andres

Serrano, whose photograph “Piss Christ” caused controversy in the art world and drew
heavy criticism from government leaders, an iconic photograph does not challenge the
limits of what we individually consider artistic (Hansen). On the contrary, “whether
posing next to a scenic vista in the American West or staging a statue toppling in Iraq, the
[iconic] image is composed to persuade” its audience to remember the event through the
single image (Hariman and Lucaties 33).
Outside of its predominant reception as the stand-alone memory, there is no
alternative purpose for the iconic photograph. The iconic photograph is not designed to
challenge our experience of the event, but rather it is created to become our prosthetic
experience of the occasion. For instance, very few witnessed the Challenger explosion
first hand, but the majority of Americans experienced the event via mediated extensions
like news photos or on television. Now, the iconic image of the twisted plumes of smoke
represent the space shuttle disaster; thus each reproduction of that image is intended to
reinforce the empathetic feelings perpetuated by the iconic photograph.

These

perpetuated feelings are what Hariman and Lucaties call “twice-behaved” behavior: an
“absolute dependence on mechanical reproduction that provides photography with its
deepest connection to live performance” (31-2).
Interestingly, however, the repetition of iconic photographs does not make them
immune from memory distortion. We often think we create immovable “flash-bulb
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memories” of significant events, but even these seemingly stable memories can be
influenced by the “sins” of memory. As a term first used by psychologists Roger Brown
and James Kulik in 1977, flash-bulb memories are “extremely vivid, long-lasting
memories for unexpected, emotionally laden, and consequential events” (Talarico and
Rubin 455). Moreover, cognitive psychologists John Neil Bohannon, Sami Gratz, and
Victoria Symons Cross have found that these seemingly ‘untouchable’ mental images are
just as prone to manipulation over time because we often discuss and seek out
information about consequential events more actively, thus inadvertently re-shaping the
original memory (1028). This type of individualized manipulation is very interesting,
especially because it suggests that although an iconic image is created to become the
memory of an event, our own brains create new memories of the event that we didn’t
even experience first hand. As a result, the prosthetic memory that we internalized from
the original photograph – a memory that we only experienced from that photo – is not the
only memory of the event we might have.

Rather, our own biases and personal

experiences will later cloud our perception of the photo, thus making new memories—a
cognitive blend of prosthetic and autobiographical influences.
In what follows, I look at several examples of photo manipulation in order to
explore digital technologies and memory. By examining the blend of photography and
digital technologies, I argue that memory becomes much more fragile and prone to
inaccuracies and misinformation. I look at several studies that explore the impact of
photo manipulation on creating distorted memories (autobiographical and otherwise). I
also argue that my interpretation of techne as a form of control, as a creative force, and as
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expert knowledge all become more relevant and intricate with the introduction of
digitally manipulated photographs and internally altered memories.
Photo Manipulation: Photojournalism
Techne and photo manipulation are in an interesting couple: while both use
artistic means to overcome nature, there are limitations to both. Altering images presents
an unnatural viewpoint—an event did not happen in the way it is presented in the
photograph. A manipulated photo resists the natural presentation of an event, and favors
an unnatural representation of what occurred. Since manipulation alters the natural
qualities of an image, then the line between actuality and potentiality also becomes a bit
finer and more difficult to straddle. In what follows, I explore memory and photo
manipulation. Initially, I argue that photo manipulation is similar to the techniques of the
Sophists who repeatedly tricked their audiences by making weak arguments appear
stronger by carefully employing deceit. I then continue by exploring the role of “truth”
among the Greeks while also turning to Heidegger for some insight. If, as Heidegger
noted in The Essence of Truth, that truth for the Greeks meant “unhiddenness,” then the
manipulated images are certainly hiding elements of the truth via alterations. Finally, I
turn to Plato’s Theaetetus to examine the connection between knowledge and perception,
and link this idea to the creation of false memories by viewing altered photographs.
With photo manipulation, there is a definitive point of departure between fact and
fiction. Unfortunately, the only one who truly knows the difference is the producer or
editor of the image, and not the intended audience. Manipulated photos are not easily
spotted, and it often takes a careful eye and the magnification power of computer aided
drawing tools, such as Photoshop, to pinpoint the infraction. The difficulty of sighting a
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manipulated photo is why there have been so few well-documented cases of manipulated
news photos.

In April 2003, the Los Angeles Times’ photojournalist Brian Walski

digitally combined some of his photos from Iraq by selecting certain elements from two
different photos to create a false composite (Kitalong 43). That photo, which ran in
several papers across the country including the LA Times and the Hartford Courant,
ended up becoming a disgrace to the profession, resulting in Walski’s firing (Kitalong
43). Instances like the discovery of Walski’s manipulation might have some correlation
to the 2005 Consumer Reports WebWatch national poll revealing that “30% of Internet
users said they have little or no trust in news sites to use pictures that had not been
altered” (Ritchin 31, emphasis mine). And if general trends in Internet news readership
have only increased from the time of that poll, then a similar study today might yield
even less trust in images.
These numbers are startling for a few reasons. First, photojournalism offers
“proof” to readers—the images should maintain a level of continuity between what is
written and what is shown. Second, the trust in images is waning, causing a rift in
effectiveness of journalistic proof, which is not entirely dissimilar to the discovery of
plagiarism cases of reporters, including The New York Times’ Jason Blair and Zachery
Kouwe (“Times Reporter”; “Time Business Reporter”). Furthermore, objectivity and
accuracy for both reporters and photojournalists is critical to the sanctity of the
profession. As photography reporter Frank Van Riper noted, “news photographs are the
equivalent of direct quotations and therefore sacrosanct” (qtd. in Kitalong 45, emphasis
in original). The Associated Press, too, has warned its photojournalists about photo
tampering: “The content of a photograph will NEVER be changed or manipulated in any
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way” (qtd. in Brugioni 5). Although these professional boundaries have been set, many
newsrooms still take liberties to edit out what is “journalistically irrelevant,” removing a
Diet Coke can, for instance, to “clean up” a shot (Brugioni 8). If photojournalism’s task
is capturing and reporting the reality of events, then these blurred ethical standards of
reporting become trickier to ignore. If the audience displays a growing distrust in the
visual and written proof of professional reporting, then certainly the ethical boundaries of
the press are at stake. Even within the journalism community, doubts swarm about the
promise of photojournalism’s future: “The next great photographers—if there are to be
any—will have to find a way to reclaim photography’s special link to reality” (qtd. in
Richtin 185). What’s even more important is the rhetorical nature of these images—the
photos are not doctored to “soften the blow” of disturbing images, but rather they are
manipulated to increase affective appeal in the audience.
Let me briefly return to Brian Walski’s case to illustrate. Walski combined two
different photographs, borrowing essential elements from each to create a more widely
appealing, and ultimately more persuasive, image. In the composite image, Walski
grafted a British soldier onto the background of a separate photo of seated Iraqi civilians
(Richtin 35). Even though some argue that Walski’s alteration is quite similar to any
photojournalist who snaps a series of staged photographs, what is at stake is the creation
of a false event. If photographers alter the coloration and layout of images specifically
for the manipulation of emotional appeals, then the intended use of the original photo is
altered, too. The final photo represents an event that never occurred, or at least it did not
occur in the way it is presented visually. By viewing the altered image, the audience is
reacting to the manipulated event, and not the actual one. As a result, I am interested in
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the intersection of the manipulated image and the (newly created) intentional use that the
viewer receives from viewing the manipulated image. When dealing with manipulated
images, where do the ethical boundaries of actuality end and potentiality start? Does
creating memories out of altered images distort the intended use? Should the images, and
those who alter them, live up to specific codes of ethics with particular attention to the
formation of memory?

Furthermore, if prosthetic memories can also become

autobiographical memory (as discussed in the previous chapter), what happens when
these false memories are internalized? Do these fake memories become organic even
when they are based on false grounds?
Before I continue, let me take a moment to explain exactly what types of
photographic manipulation I am interested in. For my purposes here, photo manipulation
can be placed in two camps: aesthetic and photojournalism. The aesthetic type of photo
manipulation involves using technologies to rearrange, add, subtract, and otherwise
change the look of the piece to increase pleasure or even disrupt the reception of the
image. I am not interested in aesthetic manipulation in this chapter. I am, however, very
much intrigued by photojournalism’s use of manipulation; in particular, the ways that
photos are used to provide additional “proof” of an event. When news organizations use
photos as evidence, they are entering into an ethical obligation with their audience: we
(the news organization) are presenting these facts to you (the public) as a responsible and
legal representation of the event. Visual media theorist W.J.T. Mitchell suggests that
images of earlier historical events were more easily staged because viewers did not have
access to a broad range of images against which to crosscheck their validity (43). Video
clips of an Italian cement factory “passed” as images of Chernobyl because no one knew
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what Chernobyl should have looked like (Mitchell 40). I argue that these slippages are
no longer as easy, since more widely accessible means of taking pictures has led directly
to the increase in available “proof.” There are several Web sites that invite users to
contribute personal photos of recent vacations to their large databases. Microsoft’s
project Photo Tourism asks users to upload personal photos of exotic or tourist locales.
Photo Tourism then compiles the images to create a 3D rendering of the location. In
other words, if an event like Chernobyl were to occur today, sites like Photo Tourism can
provide visual details of a specific location compiled directly from amateurs’ photos.
Fake photos might be easier to create, but they are also becoming more difficult to pass
off as the real deal.
When an event occurs and there is documentation (or provenance, in the art
world) to “prove” its existence, we go along with the story.

Unless it is proven

otherwise, the event becomes a part of our personal or national histories. However, we
usually do not realize that we have been duped until long after the fact. Stories like “The
Balloon Boy Hoax” in 2009, for example, when a reality TV obsessed family used their
children to rouse the media into believing their youngest son was whisked away in a
homemade air balloon. Fortunately, the young Falcon Heene was not harmed—and it
was later discovered that he never made it into the balloon after all. During one (of the
many) television interviews, Falcon stated that his parents “did that for the show” causing
the Heene’s elaborate plan of Reality TV fame to come crashing down (“6-Year-Old”).
But before Falcon ‘spoiled the story,’ anyone watching the news that day
remembers images of the jiffy-pop shaped balloon causing the media frenzy.

The

difference between actuality (Falcon was never in the balloon) and intended perception
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(the Heene’s wanted the public to believe their son was ‘carried away’ by the airborne
vehicle) is similar to the tension I wish to look at in this section. Now, while the balloon
boy story was proven false rather quickly, this chapter interrogates the instances of
manipulation that have greatly impacted the views of certain historical events, like
Tiananmen Square, very prominently. On the grand scale, photographs of Stalin’s armies
or pictures of UFO sightings, or the company Abraham Lincoln kept have been doctored
to heighten solidarity or strike fear in order to be remembered in a certain way. Because
we rely on images – and often those taken by journalists we should trust – the notion of
photo manipulation becomes a bit thornier with the ease of photoshopping and
enhancement.2
More regularly, we use our cell phone or other digital cameras to snap a quick
picture of someone famous, a humorous billboard, or a random passerby doing something
oddly amusing. These images bolster the stories when we retell them later on. By
viewing the pictures, our friends and family don’t dismiss the story, but render it
believable instead.

Photographic proof has often been a source of evidence,

strengthening our claims by providing a layer of visual truth. A widely publicized
example has been the exposé of Sabrina “Thumbs-Up” Harman.

Photographs SPC

Harman took as evidence that the Army had lied about a death of an inmate at Abu
Ghraib were alternatively used against her as “proof” of tampering with evidence. On the
one hand, the Army stated that by unzipping the body bag and moving bags of ice to take
2

Even though I will not spend time discussing the ethics of digital enhancement in terms of beauty
magazines, it is worth acknowledging its effects on the public in general. The influence of such images
creates a strong memory in the minds of young females (and more increasingly young males) that they
must live up to a specific image in order to be taken seriously or even considered worthwhile. While I am
not disregarding the importance of gender disparities of image formation because of technological tools, I
will not be discussing that here and I save that conversation for others.
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photographs of the dead body, Harman was tampering with the evidence of the inmate’s
death. On the other hand, Harman argued that she took the photos to prove that the
inmate was actually murdered, but the Army was passing it off as an accidental death.
In a letter to her partner, Kelly, Harman stated, “Yes, they do beat the prisoners
up and I’ve written this to you before. I just don’t think it’s right and never have. That’s
why I take the pictures – to prove the story I tell people. No one would ever believe the
shit that goes on” (Morris, emphasis mine). Harman’s photographs indicate that while
she knows her memory of the event is correct, relating that to others might prove
difficult, even impossible.

The photographs of the dead body – her shareable,

photographic proof – clearly eradicate any doubt of her claim that the inmate had not died
of a heart attack as the Army had claimed, noted by the massive amount of blood in his
nose and other physical signs of abuse (Morris). By taking the pictures, Harman was
creating evidence of an event that she knew would be difficult, even impossible, to prove
without photographs. Not only did Harman take the photos because she did not want to
forget the horrific events, her allegations that she was falsely convicted rested in her
photographic evidence.
The case of “Thumbs-Up” Harman illustrates two ideas: that photos are relied on
to stand witness for absent audiences but they can also be misleading, misguided, and
inaccurate. W.J.T. Mitchell argues that for many, photographic proof is nearly identical
to scientific objectivity: “The photographic procedure, like these scientific procedures,
seems to provide a guaranteed way of overcoming subjectivity and getting at the real
truth” (28). The photograph should be the end-all, be-all object of supporting evidence;
but with the availability of inexpensive and free manipulation software, photographs are
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becoming less reliable because of the possibility of alterations. Digital photographs can
be altered in order to bolster the claims of an argument; in Brian Walski’s case, neither
photograph was provocative enough on its own but the strong composite was widely
published across the country.
Dino A. Brugioni, one of the founders of the Central Intelligence Agency’s
photographic interpretation center, names four different types of photo manipulation
which he argues are equally unethical: removing details, inserting details, photomontage,
and false captioning. Removing details purposefully crops parts of the image to draw
attention to a specific focal point. The omitted details would have distracted the audience
or are deemed irrelevant by the photo editor. The second type, inserting details, is
exactly the opposite: the photo editor enhances the photograph by inserting images,
multiplying audiences, or adding small but significant features that were absent in the
original scene. When a photo editor merges two different photographs, it is called a
photomontage. A photomontage might take the top of one photo and place it on the
bottom of another, or the photo might be a composite of two or more photos with the
intent to create a new scene, like the Walski case. Lastly, false captioning is the incorrect
labeling of a photo, leading the audience to believe that what they are viewing is actually
something else. For instance, one of the more well-known cases of false captioning is
Robert Capa’s “Death of a Loyalist Soldier,” whose validity has been widely debated.
Some argue that Capa’s “Death” either did not take place at the location that he claims
and others argue that the soldier was merely slipping as the photograph was being taken,
then falsely labeled to incite empathy (Mitchell 40).
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When news organizations take the liberty to distort the image through any of
these four tactics, they are altering the persuasiveness of the text in such a way that brings
the readers along on a journey that might not have been intended by the original picture.
That is to say, the manipulated photo stands in for the actual event, creating a new
memory – a false memory – of the occasion.

I am not discrediting all forms of

photojournalism—there are many more examples of untouched photos than manipulated
ones. Photojournalism provides readers with a level of accuracy that text is not always
able to accomplish. However, when altered images are used to be persuasive pieces in
themselves or along with accompanying text, then their rhetorical boundaries become
confused and even unethical. The images become unethical because they no longer
represent the truth, and are encouraging their audience to remember a situation in a way
that did not actually occur.

These events are then documented and remembered

incorrectly by the masses that trust the images, thus creating a moment of disconnect
between the actual event, the manipulated representation, and the formation of prosthetic
memories.
Sophistic Images
By employing one of the four types of photo manipulation, editors and
photographers are increasing the rhetorical nature of the image itself. Essentially, they
are making the weaker image much stronger by repositioning our gaze towards the most
persuasive aspect of the image. Editors might crop the edges, enlarge the overall size, or
change the coloring to emphasize specific affective appeals. Two well-documented cases
of photo manipulation can help explain this idea. On the cover of its February 1982
issue, National Geographic presented an image of the Egyptian pyramids, but “abridged
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the space between one pyramid and another” (Rosler 39). As a result of this image, many
questioned if the abridgement duped the believing public into thinking that the pyramids
were closer together (Rosler 39).

For some this adjustment was simply bringing

additional, necessary information into a smaller frame, but other readers became
immediately distrustful of the magazine’s photographers because of the artistic freedom
they used to augment the image (Rosler 41). The cover was not large enough to contain
both pyramids and appear visually enticing; to increase the cover’s rhetorical appeals, the
editors moved the pyramids closer to one another. The resulting image is more exciting
because it situates the pyramids by emphasizing their enormity.

In actuality, the

pyramids are that large, but they are not in the close vicinity as the manipulated photo
presents them. National Geographic strengthened the image by altering the weaker
image into one more visually convincing.
Another example, also on a magazine cover, is the infamous mug shot of former
football star O.J. Simpson. Two magazines – Newsweek and Time – featured Simpson’s
mug shot on the covers of their June 27, 1994 issues with one glaring difference: the tone
of his skin color (Clayssen 74). On the Newsweek cover, Simpson’s mug shot was
printed without any manipulation, but a quick glance at the Time cover indicated that one
of the photos was altered. On the Time cover, Simpson’s skin tone was noticeably darker
and many suggested that Time altered the image to make Simpson “look diabolical” and
incite racial bias against him (Clayssen 74). By darkening his skin tone, the Time cover
hoped to draw on some of their readership’s possible prejudices and provoke a certain
reaction (of fear, perhaps) in their audience.
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The instances of manipulated cover photos points to an interesting connection to
ancient rhetoric: the Sophists. Just as the Sophists made weaker arguments appear
stronger, the cover photos accomplished the same task by altering the original, but
rhetorically weak, image. Sometimes when I think of the Sophists, a clichéd phrase
comes to mind: “by any means necessary.” Many rhetoricians, myself included, often
describe the Sophists as tricksters, people who utilized deceitful tactics in order to appeal
to their paying customers. These tactics were not often kosher, since the Sophists would
merely learn about their customer, and imitate or “flatter” them to gain trust. We can see
a resurfacing of ‘Sophists’ in today’s culture—Sophists are people who have moderately
advanced knowledge about many topics because they know where and how to find and
apply it. Unlike someone who has techne, a Sophist does not master one subject but
rather dabbles in several. Rather than hanging a shingle and advertising one quality skill,
Sophists can match the needs of their customers via flattery or “dinner party knowledge”:
just enough knowledge to appear well-informed, but actually only enough to make it
through a superficial conversation. A Sophist is customer conscious—they ask, “How
can I better serve my clients?”

The paying educational customer was a new idea

introduced by the Sophists, a notion that is not at all foreign to anyone swimming in
thousands of dollars of financial aid debt today. While it is unfortunate to hear our
students moan when they “feel that they deserved a better grade” simply because “they
paid for the class” (or, more annoyingly, that “the customer is always right”), can we
learn anything about customer care from the Sophists? I have often thought “sophistic
rhetoric” to be a redundant term—if we are dazzling someone with our rhetoric, are we
not ‘tricking’ him or her into something they did not previously believe?
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The Sophists were skilled in the art of deceit, a skill quite different from rhetoric
in general. The difference lies in the way someone is manipulated into believing one side
or another. The Sophists would learn about their “clients” in order to provide the best
service possible—the Sophists would imitate their clients by learning about their interests
and motivations. In Plutarch’s “How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend,” for example, we
encounter the ideas of flattery, imitation, and responsibility. Plutarch notes that a flatterer
is someone who acts like a friend, but with selfish, reciprocal intentions—a flatterer is a
“counterfeit copy of ourselves” (4). If Sophists utilize flattering discourse to appeal to
their customers, then the element of pure persuasion is tainted from the start. Like the
magazine covers, the images were manipulated to present a more flattering, appealing,
and persuasive final version that might rake in more customers. The Sophists only
present what their audience wants to hear, not the messages that are necessary to evoke
truth.

The National Geographic cover would still have looked appealing with one

pyramid, but bringing a second one closer only added excitement to the issue’s theme.
Whether emphasizing exciting and timely facts or manipulating a photo to increase its
persuasiveness, all types of alteration are intended to shift the audience’s original
interpretation towards a new perspective.
At stake, then, are the larger consequences of rhetoric. In “Encomium of Helen,”
Gorgias argues that, “Speech is a powerful lord, which by means of the finest and most
invisible body effects the divinest works: it can stop fear and banish grief and create joy
and nurture pity” (52). Just as the flatterer can play up to anyone, discourse can do the
same. Discourse, flattery, and the Sophists are tricksters one in the same: “The effect of
speech upon the condition of the soul is comparable to the power of drugs over the nature
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of bodies. For just as different drugs dispel different secretions from the body, and some
bring an end to disease and others to life, others make the hearers bold, and some drug
bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion” (“Gorgias” 53).
So far, this logic still aligns Sophistry and rhetoric, but the two depart rather
quickly from here. There is additional motivation for the Sophists—money. Most people
find rapport with others who are similar in one way or another, and the Sophists made
this natural relation their advantage. For Socrates, Sophistry was as uncouth as one could
get; rather than exploring philosophical truths for the sake of pure understanding, the
Sophists were driven by money and ensuring client satisfaction.

Even though the

Sophists claimed they were in the same business as the “true rhetoricians,” and while
Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle’s hostility has been the main source of information about
the Sophists, still many scholars of antiquity refuse to accept their teachings as valid
forms of rhetorical instruction (Kerferd 4). Rather, Socrates and others dismissed their
foray into for-profit education as a means of deceiving anyone by any means necessary.
Socrates taught in order to share knowledge with others, and he would never imagine
charging for philosophical inquiry because it was natural to question and understand the
outside world. The Sophists, on the other hand, recognized that they could attract more
customers simply by widening their reach—if they promised to know a little about
everything, then their services would certainly become attractive to more customers. To
accomplish this task, the Sophists transformed weaker arguments into much stronger ones
by embellishing and manipulating their customers through pleasure.

The pyramids

looked more pleasurable because there were two large structures on the cover instead of
one (or even two separated by their actual distance). Darkening Simpson’s skin tone,
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while not pleasurable, certainly was an attempt to strike a reaction in Time’s paying
customers by communicating a strong, albeit racist, message. As the Visitor states in
Plato’s Sophist, “One part of the wage-earning type approaches people by being
agreeable, uses only pleasure as its bait, and earns only its room and board. I think we’d
all call it flattery, or expertise in pleasing people” (222e7-223a1). If pleasure is the goal
of the Sophists, and there is not one specific route to achieve pleasure in all audiences,
then Sophistry cannot be a techne. This logic, however, has prompted many before me to
disqualify rhetoric as a techne, too. To explain, since rhetoric proceeds by persuading
people via pleasure, then there cannot be one straightforward method of rhetorical
persuasion. However, techne can be messy (T2) as long as it aims towards the end
function. In other words, if rhetoric aims at persuasion through pleasure, then it can be
considered a techne.
But what does all this mean for photo manipulation? I have suggested that
altering photos is similar to the Sophists’ technique of making weaker arguments appear
stronger, but is this manipulation considered a techne? Photo manipulation is one form
of techne simply because it reroutes the boundaries of the natural object in order to
present an artificial construct. While photography cannot escape the limits of the frame,
we can avoid the temptation to crop people out of a shot, enlarge or edit the image to
create a more stimulating and persuasive end result. The content of the photograph is
where we can see techne coming into play. When I snap a photo, the content of the photo
cannot change itself into something more persuasive. In order to make a weaker image
stronger (let’s say my friend blinked in one of the photos), I can later retouch and
manipulate that image to make it more persuasive (that we were all attentive and had our
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eyes open). An outside agent must manipulate the content of the photograph—it cannot
manipulate itself. Photo manipulation, in this sense, can be considered a techne because
of the necessary outside agent altering the content.
Hiding in the Shadows: Photo Manipulation and Unhiddenness
When I perceive my favorite piece of art, I am drawn to it for several reasons.
Even if my number one choice happens to be someone else’s, too, the details we each
find pleasure in will likely be different. I might attend to a certain color palate while
another might notice the narrative of the scene itself. There will always be conflicting
interpretations of the same work, and any attempt to verbalize the visual will likely cause
confusion. But what causes these differences of interpretation are not in the artwork
itself; rather, interpretation becomes a matter of individual experiences forming one’s
perception. In this next section, I suggest that photo manipulation leads to a “hidden” or
untruthful presentation of a given event because it purposely disguises and deceives its
audience. Even though the audience is often kept in the dark about the actual image, it
does not negate the fact that the manipulated image is passed off as the real deal. In The
Essence of Truth, Heidegger examines one of the most recognized philosophical
dialogues, Plato’s cave allegory. For Heidegger, the importance of the cave allegory lies
in what it means to know truth and how one acquires knowledge of the truth itself. The
shackled prisoners in Plato’s cave know the shadows reflected on the wall not as
shadows, but view them as reality since they have never seen anything else (Republic
VII.514a-b4). Their perception of what is real is informed only by what they have seen
projected on the wall in front of them. However, when one of the prisoners is unshackled
and is able to roam away from the cave, he is in disbelief at the world around him. The
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cave is the only “reality” he has known, and his new experiences outside the cave appear
faulty and unbelievable (Republic VII.516a-b). After some adjustment, the freed prisoner
realizes that what he has experienced as reality has always only been a false
representation, a shadow, and that his new perception of the outside world is actually the
truth. For Heidegger, this new way of perceiving is the major divide; while truth is
revealed through unhiddenness (i.e., being unshackled and “seeing” for the first time), the
un-true is hidden by the shadows.
For Heidegger, complete truth is more than what we know to be “true.” Truth
must be revealed through complete transparency. The cave dwellers thought the shadows
were true, and they were proven wrong only after the unshackled man discovered
otherwise. The shackled cave dwellers, for instance, believed the shadows as truth.
Since they had nothing else with which to compare the shadows, there was no need to
conceptualize that the projections were anything but reality itself. The actual truth was
hidden—they could not access any other form of truth because they were physically
unable to move.

When the unshackled prisoner realized that people moving about

outside of the cave created the shadows, he then linked their movements to the shadows.
The correspondence between the outside world and the mere shadows in the cave is
truth—an understanding of the reality beyond the cave (Heidegger 2).
When Heidegger argues that, “truth as correctness is grounded in truth as
unhiddenness,” this statement becomes a critical moment for understanding manipulation
and memory (26). Because photo manipulation has the possibility to significantly alter
memory, then the means of producing that manipulated photo lies in some sort of
hiddenness. By taking the form of one of the four types of photo manipulation described
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above, hiddenness leads to a misrepresented truth. Walski’s case, for one, hid the fact
that there were two images used to create the final montage, and the end result was a false
representation passed along as truth.

When an audience (unknowingly) views a

manipulated image, the nature of photojournalism allows the photo to be perceived as
truth. Memory, then, can become skewed merely by the implication that the photo
represents truth.
The audience does not recognize, however, that the truth is actually hidden by
manipulation, thus leading to false memory creation.

In a series of experiments,

researchers questioned whether manipulated photos of well-known events could alter
existing memories.

In the article “Changing History: Doctored Photographs Affect

Memory for Past Public Events,” Dario Sacchi et al purposely alter the iconic image of
Tiananmen Square. In the actual photograph, one man is facing down four tanks in the
middle of an empty street. To alter the image, the research team added large crowds on
both sides of the tanks, creating a more populated atmosphere than the original event.
The creation of the second image was intended to test the level of memory
reconstruction—how do visual alterations affect the way we remember an event
incorrectly?

To characterize the photo alteration’s possible affect on memory, the

researchers coined the term “post-event misinformation”: the process that “can lead
people to recall events differently from the way they actually occurred, or even to recall
wholly false events that never occurred” (Sacchi et al 1066). By showing the participants
the altered image, the researchers hypothesized that it would result in a “sourcemonitoring error,” a memory error that links actual events with an incorrect false
representation (Sacchi et al 1066). In this situation the subjects remembered viewing
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iconic images of Tiananmen Square, but wrongly identified the additional crowds as a
part of the original photo.
These results point to the complexity of manipulated photographs on the creation
of memory. By selecting an iconic photograph for their experiment, one that is extremely
recognizable worldwide, the research team was purposely toying with the likelihood of
memory manipulation. The photograph was edited only slightly, but the entire rhetorical
appeal of the image changed by inserting large crowds witnessing the event. Even
though the iconic image was mass-produced, the inserted crowds symbolized that the
single-man protest had become a spectacle. As a result an altered photo “may have a
stronger effect than merely influencing our opinion; by tampering with our malleable
memory, they may ultimately change the way we recall history” (Sacchi et al 1021).
The suggestion that manipulated photos not only change our personal memory but
also influence the ways we recall history is a significant shift in how we view prosthetic
and autobiographical memory. Because we have the ability to create memories of events
at which we were not present, we make that memory based on the experience at a
distance. This memory then becomes part of our collection—the stockpile of memories
we have saved over our lifetime. This collection, however, functions differently than we
might imagine. Rather than a file cabinet full of neatly sorted and easily accessible
memories, the collection serves as a repository that can be searched, compiled, and even
made into new memories.

There is no doubt that many people have viewed the

Tiananmen Square photograph, but our attention is usually directed toward the ‘main
event’—the protester. By focusing on the protester rather than on the periphery details
(e.g., whether or not there were crowds lining the streets), the subjects in the study could
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reasonably endorse the altered photograph. The idea of a crowd watching an important
event is not unusual at all—many important, and memorable, scenes occur in front of a
large audience.

Based on similar past experiences, our memories are prone to

manipulation because they combine similar or repeated events with built-in expectations.
By blending the expectation of a crowd with the actuality of the single-man protest, the
brain concluded that the altered photograph was a likely possibility.
Returning back to the cave allegory, the known reality (the original Tiananmen
Square photo) and the newly introduced one (the photo with additional crowds) highlight
the tension between our memories, our knowledge, and the possibility of their
manipulation.

While some might say that the still-shackled prisoners were not

“manipulated” in the way I am using the term, I argue that “manipulation” is indeed
similar to the ways we are duped when looking at false images. If we view only the false
image (like the National Geographic cover or Walski’s photo), then we do not know
otherwise. Like the cave dwellers, we cannot distinguish between what’s real and what’s
simply a projected image or manipulated photograph. The Tiananmen Square experiment
shows that viewing another image that closely resembles the original, but is manipulated
ever so slightly, can cause changes in seemingly embedded memories.
Theaetetus: Perception into Knowledge
Until this point, I have argued that memory can be manipulated by viewing an
altered image.

Manipulation occurs because the brain finds the image possible—it

connects related memories in order to verify the likelihood of the current photo. If,
however, truth is discovered through knowledge and understanding, then photographs run
the risk of distorting the truth, hiding it from the audience.

As Heidegger argues,
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unhiddenness – pure transparency – is truth. But how do we acquire the knowledge in
order to understand truth?

In Theaetetus, Socrates examines the relation between

knowledge and perception by questioning if they complement or hinder each other. Since
it is impossible to define anything through its own definition (e.g., “a man who does not
know what knowledge is will not understand ‘knowledge of shoes’ either”), Socrates asks
whether we can understand a thing if we do not know already what that object is
(Theaetetus 147.b4-5). How, then, can we understand anything if we do not have some
sort of previous knowledge? To begin, Socrates asserts that knowledge is perception and
we only perceive what we actually know. Rather quickly, this logic becomes muddled
when Socrates introduces memory: when we are trying to remember an object, do we not
know what the object is at the time we are trying to recall it? Can we know and notknow simultaneously? For Socrates, the moment in question is the lag time between
recognition and naming (Derrida would later call this “différance”): “If a man has once
come to know a certain thing, and continues to preserve the memory of it, is it possible
that, at the moment when he remembers it, he doesn’t know this thing that he is
remembering” (Theaetetus 163.d1-6)? In other words, in the moment we perceive an
object, there is a small gap before we are able to identify it. The gap might mean that we
truly do not know what it is, but that would mean that we know nothing because there is
always a slight delay in perception and identification. This is troubling for Socrates
because it hints towards the idea that all knowledge must be presupposed somewhere—
how would we acquire the knowledge of something without actually knowing it? As a
result, Socrates concludes that, “perception and knowledge could never be the same
thing” (Theaetetus 186.e9-10).
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Even though Socrates asserts that perception and knowledge are not the same, he
notes the heightened possibility of false judgment: “in the case of things we do not know
and have never perceived, there is no possibility of error or false judgment” (Theaetetus
194.b1-2). If we do not have knowledge of the object, how can we be certain that the
thing we perceive is true?
Knowledge is agreed upon and shared perception—if I rename my computer a
“typing machine,” it will quickly become confused with other antiquated technologies.
Instead, to be recognized as a computer, the name for the machine I am using has been
determined by consensus, not by my own perception and naming process.

False

judgment, then, is something different than “a misapplication of thought to perception;
because if this were so, we could never be in error so long as we remained within our
thoughts themselves” (Theaetetus 196.c4-7). Even if I call decide to call this computer a
typing machine, not many people would ever agree with me and start calling their PCs
the same. However, false judgment is different from an imbalanced interpretation. Even
if I decide, “So what, I like ‘typing machine’ so that’s what I’ll call it,” my proclamation
will be correct to me only because that is how I have perceived and named this device.
‘Typing machine’ is no different than ‘PC’ or ‘MacBook’ if and only if that is my
personal perception. In this case, my personal perception cannot be a false judgment
because that is my perception of the object. On the contrary, it is unlikely that ‘typing
machine’ will bring to mind ‘MacBook’ for anyone else. Because it is neither recognized
nor perceived by that name by the majority, calling my computer a ‘typing machine’
becomes a false judgment.
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Manipulated photographs might be considered false judgments only if we can
identify that they are incorrect. If we view a photo that we do not know is altered in any
way, there is no verification process to show us that there is another reality (the true,
untouched image) somewhere else. False judgment can only happen if we recognize
another option; it cannot occur if we are introduced only to one route. In the next section,
I look at some rather interesting studies that have been conducted on the premise of false
judgment—personal memories. While we expect that our autobiographical memory is
accurate, these studies indicate that it is far from perfect, and is actually rather susceptible
to misinformation, alteration, and even implantation. What happens, then, if we lose
control over our own “expert knowledge” of our personal experiences? How can we trust
our own memories knowing that they can be so easily tricked? As a result, the notion of
rhetorical memory becomes twisted, too—our autobiographical memories can even
‘persuade’ one another to be recalled differently.
Memory Manipulation: Cognitive Misattribution
Because memory is a highly persuasive and malleable construct, it can be
distorted and skewed quite easily. Like rhetoric, memory is not always trusted; in fact,
the studies that I explore in this section suggest that memory is much less reliable than we
think. I argue that rhetorical memory – memory that we employ with the intent to
persuade – needs to be reconsidered in light of its cognitive malleability. Over the years,
rhetorical scholars have debated the meaning of “rhetoric”—is rhetoric merely the
“available means of persuasion” as Aristotle argued, or is it more specific? Some might
even label rhetoric as pure manipulation, as noted above by the distrust of Sophistry and
more recently by the many evening news talking heads claiming any political movement
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that garners some type of support is “mere rhetoric.” Such “mere rhetoric” is often
sloughed aside because popular pundits note that it is only a ploy of powerful politicians
to sway us to their side. And while this might be true to a certain extent, those of us in
rhetoric studies must understand how true rhetoric keeps its audience in the loop. Rather
than persuasive activities being squandered away as mind-numbing ‘mere’ rhetoric, I
argue that recent studies in psychology on memory offer some interesting commentary on
how easily autobiographical memory can be persuaded.
Memory Re-creation
One of the most interesting and important studies of memory creation is one
familiar to anyone who has taken an introductory psychology course, and it illustrates the
malleability of memory and the heightened possibility that our brains unconsciously fill
in missing links. The basic structure of the DRM Paradigm (named after the original
creators of the test Deese/Roediger/McDermott and pronounced “dream”) is a list of
“semantically related words, such as sour, candy, sugar, bitter, good, taste” which each
participant is required to learn and keep in her memory for a short time (Hicks and Marsh
375). A bit later, when the participants are asked to recall as many words from the list,
most will respond by naming some of the items on the list, but many will also add a
“missing link” word even though it did not appear in the original string of words (Hicks
and Marsh 375). For the list of words above, Jason Hicks and Richard Marsh identified
“sweet” as the critical lure—the non-presented, albeit related, word that most participants
claimed to be one of the original words. This study, replicated dozens of times with
various word combinations, highlights the likelihood that our memory changes and adds
to our original perceptions over time. As proven by the DRM Paradigm, even though we
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believe we are recalling the correct information, our memory incorporates related ideas or
words, filling-in-the-blanks to round out the event. Even though “sweet” was not one of
the words, most participants recall it due to its relation to the other words. The DRM
Paradigm is critical to understanding that memory is constantly made within our own
minds, and that stable memories are almost impossible.

Although information

technologies promote stability, viewing or hearing other accounts of the event can
manipulate our memory long afterwards. Studies like the DRM Paradigm indicate that
we are constantly prone to the creation of false memory—even when we think we
remember an event one way, our unconscious is likely to link it to other seemingly
related events and it becomes remembered differently.
False memory creation is a result of content borrowing from other events, as
noted in the article “Compelling Untruths: Content Borrowing and Vivid False
Memories.” Content borrowing, or phantom recollection, is defined as a process “in
which details from presented items are errantly borrowed to corroborate the occurrence of
the false memory item” (Lampinen et al 954). The incorrect insertion of the word “sweet”
when trying to recall the original list occurs because there has been some previous
relation between “sweet” and the other words on the list, such as “candy” or “sour.” The
connection between “sweet” and “sour” or “sweet” and “candy” is based on conceptual
familiarity, “a biased search for episodic memory for details that would corroborate the
feeling of familiarity” (Lampinen et al 955). To further illustrate exactly how content
borrowing works, Lampinen et al provide another example:
Imagine a participant is listening to the DRM list for the critical lure doctor. The
list includes the word physician. Imagine that upon hearing the word physician,
the participant is reminded that he or she has an appointment in the coming week.
On a later recognition memory test [a test where participants indicate if the word
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was on the ‘old’ list or is a ‘new’ one], the participant is presented with the word
doctor. Because the word is semantically related to a large number of presented
items (i.e., the entire DRM list for doctor), the word will likely seem highly
familiar to the participant. The participant may then search his memory for
content that is consistent with having previously encountered the word doctor.
This memory search may lead the participant to retrieve a memory for having
thought of the upcoming appointment. The participant may then conclude, ‘Yes, I
remember hearing the word doctor because I remember thinking that I have a
doctor’s appointment coming up.’(955).
The relation between “physician” and the critical lure “doctor” was created because the
participant thought about her upcoming doctor’s appointment. The two words were
related via a familiar connection—the appointment and the semantic similarity between
physician and doctor.
To look at another example, the Microsoft search engine Bing has created an
entire ad campaign based on the failure of conceptual familiarity. The television ads for
Bing humorously portray people searching the Internet with broad key words that yield
scattered, and oftentimes unrelated, results. In one commercial, for instance, a wife asks
her husband if he has booked their tickets to Hawaii yet, to which his response is a series
of related, but off-topic, words: “Hawaii. Hawaii 5-0. Book ’em Dano” (“Bing Search
Overload”). Microsoft names the problem with other search engines “search overload”
and I suggest this is similar to the process of “content borrowing” demonstrated by the
DRM Paradigm.

Bing promotes clear and simplified searching that abandons the

unnecessary items we usually encounter when using search words like “Hawaii + plane
tickets.” The commercial illustrates that searching for certain combinations on search
engines other than Bing will result in a collection of links that may be somewhat related,
but were not related to your original intentions. Just like the DRM Paradigm’s “content
borrowing,” the Bing commercial’s “search overload” skews the original search by
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adding excess material. Lampinen et al argue that a similar “overload” occurs during
content borrowing: “this search process sometimes yields details that were associated
with actual studied items, but the participant may incorrectly attribute these details to the
critical lure, resulting in an errant binding of the features” (955). Just as “sweet” was
unconsciously related to “sour” in the DRM Paradigm study, “Hawaii + plane tickets”
was incorrectly linked to the television show “Hawaii 5-0” in the Bing ad.
The results from the DRM Paradigm studies indicate that we create our own false
memories. False memories are a troubling idea, especially since we believe we are in
control of our own minds.

Moreover, false memories are particularly prevalent in

eyewitness testimony, causing many juries to wrongly convict someone based on
incorrect evidence. Several studies have shown that eyewitness testimony is often tainted
by interactions with others, reading about the event, or content borrowing from previous
experiences. These previous experiences are not limited to the eyewitness’ own past, but
can be borrowed from television shows or movies in which a similar crime occurred.
Content borrowing from prosthetic memory (i.e., memories created from mass media
representations) are highly problematic. For example, let’s say that I am in a bank while
it is being robbed. I have provided a statement for the police, and later I am called back
to identify the perpetrator. However, since the robbery I have viewed an episode of Law
& Order that involves a bank robbery, and I have also watched a local news report of the
crime. The time lapse, however small, between my own experience during the bank
robbery and a televised portrayal of the crime might cause me to misidentify the actual
robber because I have unintentionally picked up details from others and added to or
substituted them for my own.
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Unintentional identification, or unconscious transference, is what Daniel Schacter
names the “sin of misattribution.” One of the more famous instances of misattribution
occurred in 1995 during the FBI’s search for the Oklahoma City Bomber. In the original
search, the agents were looking for two suspects (John Doe 1 and John Doe 2) based on
information that the two suspects had rented a van from Elliott’s Body Shop (Schacter
91). The description of John Doe 1 matched Timothy McVeigh, who was later sentenced
to death for the bombing. The description of John Doe 2, however, was not related to the
bombings at all. In fact, the mechanic who described the two suspects to the FBI
misattributed another pair who rented a van similar to the one McVeigh rented, but
visited the shop on the following day (Schater 91). The two men were identified as Army
Sergeant Michael Hertig, whose description was similar to McVeigh’s, and Private Todd
Bunting, who was characterized as John Doe 2 (Schater 91). Although they had no
connection to the bombings whatsoever, the mechanic “had correctly recalled Bunting’s
features, depicted in the infamous picture of John Doe 2 circulated nationwide, but had
misattributed them to the wrong episode a day earlier” (Schacter 91-2). Two vans, two
different days, one confused memory.

The mechanic unconsciously transferred

information from one event into his memory of the other.
Misattribution is a common problem with false memory, and it occurs so frequently
that police interrogators and attorneys must be instructed about how to handle witnesses.
More specifically, Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons identify one of “the illusions
of confidence” as the unknowing morale boost professionals give to an eyewitness that
directly leads to their persuasiveness on the witness stand (110).

The illusion of

confidence is bolstered, for instance, when a detective offers positive feedback after

154
identifying a criminal in a line-up. The more positive feedback the witness receives, the
more persuasive his testimony will appear in court, and it is more likely that a jury will
believe a confident witness over one that is insecure. Unfortunately, several studies have
shown that such positive reinforcement often leads the witness into remembering the
event differently, causing an innocent person to be wrongly convicted. The moment of
eyewitness identification and positive feedback is what James Lampinen and Jennifer
Scott et al name “the post-identification feedback effect”: “a kind of memory distortion in
which the feedback alters participants’ memory reports for their prior confidence,
witnessing conditions and decision-making strategies” (“Good You Identified” 1039). In
1999, former Attorney General Janet Reno created a task force of law enforcement
professionals with the intention to prevent the feedback effect and ensure fair and
unbiased testimony.

In their findings, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law

Enforcement, one of the most important goals is to “improve the criminal justice system’s
ability to evaluate the strength and accuracy of eyewitness testimony” (Reno 4). The
guide provides law enforcement officials practical tips about how to handle witnesses
from the first 911 phone call, to their first interview at the scene, and even during lineups. Because positive feedback has been proven to interfere with the witnesses’ ability to
remember the event correctly, the guide also discourages law enforcement from using
any form of feedback.
To illustrate the illusion of confidence more clearly, I turn to an example from the
recent text, The Invisible Gorilla. In July 1984, twenty-two year old Jennifer Thompson
was raped near her college campus (Chabris and Simons 109). During the sexual assault,
Thompson made sure to memorize details of her attacker—clothing, race, height, and
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facial hair (Chabris and Simons 110). Thompson was so certain that her memory was
correct and the detectives continually reinforced her testimony with praise (Chabris and
Simons 110). The more praise she received, the more confident and persuasive her
account of the attack became.

Since the attack occurred before DNA testing was

available, the jury returned a guilty verdict based primarily on Thompson’s confident
testimony (Chabris and Simons 110). Ten years after the original trial, DNA testing
actually exonerated the accused man, Ronald Cotton (Chabris and Simons 111). Even
though Thompson was absolutely certain that her memory of her attacker was correct, it
was later discovered that the repeated positive reinforcement she received during the
follow-up interviews and line-up identification actually created a false memory from
which she gained excessive confidence. Thompson’s memory had failed her, but her
confidence was persuasive enough to convince the jury to convict the wrong man.
Not only does positive reinforcement shore up confidence in false memories, but
other studies have also proved that false memories can actually be implanted in our own
minds with the aid of tools such as Photoshop. In the article “A Picture is Worth a
Thousand Lies,” Kimberley Wade et al exposed twenty subjects to manipulated photos in
which the subjects themselves were placed. Wade and the other researchers asked the
subjects to provide several childhood photos from “moderately significant events” (e.g.,
birthday parties or family holidays) (598). The research team then scanned, cropped, and
digitally inserted one of the photos into another image, creating a composite image of the
subject on a hot air balloon ride as a child (Wade et al 598). After creating the composite
photographs, the research team interviewed the subjects three times over a span of several
weeks (Wade et al 597). During each interview, “subjects thought about a photograph
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showing them on a hot air balloon ride and tried to recall the event by using guidedimagery exercises” (Wade et al 597). In contrast with narrative induced false memory
(i.e., making up a story in which the subject was a participant in the action), the
manipulated photograph proved to increase the subjects’ memory of the event because it
was ‘hard evidence’ that they experienced the hot air balloon ride. Moreover, the results
strongly indicate that, “photographs may require less constructive processing than do
narratives to cultivate a false memory” (Wade et al 602). These results suggest that
photographic evidence, even manipulated photographs, tend to be more reliable and
increase the possibilities of false memory creation via suggestibility. Interestingly, even
though the photo was doctored and the subject never participated in a hot air balloon ride,
“the subjects often said something like, ‘Well, it’s a photograph, so it must have
happened’ when looking at the hot air balloon photo” (Wade et al 602). As a result, the
research team identified three possibilities for memory creation. First, the photo was
largely accepted as “authoritative evidence,” noted in common “it’s a photo, so it must be
true” responses.

Second, “it is also possible that the seeming authenticity of the

photograph prompted the subjects to search their memory for event-consistent
information” (Wade et al 602). The doctored photograph “planted the seed” of a false
memory, and over the course of the three interviews, each subject searched their
memories in order to create a false memory of the event they realized they had
‘forgotten’ (Wade et al 602). Finally, the researchers argue that “photographs do not
require less constructive processing, so much as subjects are less likely to resist the
accuracy of the photograph” (Wade et al 602). This study has shown that a doctored
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photo will greatly increase the likelihood that anyone can be persuaded to create false
memories about themselves.
Furthermore, because the photograph was significantly more persuasive than the
narrative alone, I argue that the combination of digital technologies (e.g., Photoshop),
memory, and techne collide in an interesting way. The photograph took the place of the
individual’s authority over their own memory—even though the subjects did not
experience the hot air balloon ride, the photograph indicated that they had. Rather than
trusting their expert knowledge of their own pasts, the photograph superseded most
subjects’ doubts by creating a false memory of the event. With this experiment, techne
and memory intersect because we tend to believe that we have control over our
memory—how could we forget a hot air balloon ride? Typically “people tend to think of
photographs as frozen moments in time, place faith in them, and see them as reliable
representations of the past” (Wade et al 598). What is most fascinating about these
results is since neither the photograph nor the false memory was reliable, the subjects’
memories were manipulated by their own doing. The memory manipulation occurred in
the individual—with some slight prompting from the photograph, they created their own
memory of the event that never occurred. Although photographs are snapped to capture
memorable events, the manipulated photos in this experiment indicate that memorable
events can be mentally created through cognitively associated events. Similar to memory
misattribution, these individually created manipulated memories were the result of the
subjects’ attempts to remember an event that did not occur. Led to believe that they
participated in a hot air balloon ride, the subjects searched their memories for any
similarly attributable events. If they remembered spotting a hot air balloon in the air once
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or if they have heard stories of others adventures, then these false indicators sparked the
relation between pictorial evidence and personal memory creation.
Other studies, too, have shown that memory distortion is a result of personalized reconstructions of events. In one analogy, remembering is likened to “the activity of a
paleontologist, who reconstructs the skeleton of a dinosaur ‘out of a few bone chips’”
(Mazzoni 21). By looking at the doctored hot air balloon photograph, the subjects
believed that they actually participated in the event. Although they did not recall the
event before viewing the photograph, the image was one ‘bone chip’ that aided in the
reconstruction of the full skeleton. The one piece was enough to visually construct the
whole, even on false premises. Through relation and misattribution, the subjects created
the memory based on previous experiences and the (false) fact that they were
photographed in the balloon. In a process that Giuliana Mazzoni calls “imagination
inflation,” the human brain combines and reconstructs “experiences from pieces of
retained information combined with knowledge, beliefs, suggestions, and the information
provided by situational cues” (25-27). The result of imagination inflation is an increase
in created memory—the brain actually “remembers” more that it stores because it is
constantly making new memories according to situational necessity (Mazzoni 25). With
the hot air balloon experiment, the subjects created the memory of being in the balloon
because the photograph was “evidence” that they had been there and had merely
“forgotten” the experience.

Over the three interviews, the subjects likely created

connections from other related memories to the main ‘bone chip’ in order to excavate a
recollection of the fake event. Even in the presence of a photograph, “a memory is never
the faithful reproduction of the original event, because in addition to the fragments of the

159
original event, it includes also parts of the individual’s pre-existing knowledge. […]
From this perspective, memory errors are the rule, rather than the exception” (Mazzoni
21).
Another effect of memory re-creation is noticed when flashbulb memories are
tested. Flashbulb memories (FBMs) have a “‘live’ quality that is almost perceptual.
Indeed, it is very much like a photograph that takes immediate mental ‘pictures’ during
extraordinary or emotional situations” (Greenberg 365). FBMs are mental images of
national events experienced prosthetically (such as 9/11 or the Challenger disaster) or
even personal events like the birth of a child or the death of a parent. Typically, the
events that cause FBMs are rare and emotional—we remember these situations because
they are entirely out of the ordinary and occur very few times in one’s lifetime. In “The
Effects of Affect and Input Source on Flashbulb Memories,” John Neil Bohannon III,
Sami Gratz, and Victoria Symons Cross identify two ways FBMs are constructed and the
related effects these gathering mechanisms have on the retention and formation of later
memory. In the first situation, people who hear the news from another person “usually
hear the bare bones of the fact itself (e.g. ‘Princess Diana is dead!’), and thus remember
the typical, self-related flashbulb features relating to their personal discoveries”
(Bohannon et al 1023). When hearing information from others, it is likely that people
will remember other sensory events, such as what they were eating or watching, in
connection with receiving the news.

In the second case, people who gather their

information primarily from media outlets “are quickly informed of the facts about the
event itself. (e.g. ‘At 11:58 this morning the shuttle, Challenger carrying five men and
two women, exploded 70 seconds after lift-off from Cape Kennedy’)” (Bohannon et al
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1023). Those who are informed by the media are less likely to remember sensory details,
but are more likely to recall information about the event itself. Whether the individual
remembers personal details or factual information, the likelihood of the FBM undergoing
some change is high because “people who were shocked by horrendous news should be
both more likely to repeat their ‘stories’ and seek out more information about the events”
(Bohannon et al 1028). Like other types of memory, FBMs are reconstructed; however,
even though FBMs are “snapshots” of rare moments, some argue that FBMs (particularly
ones of national events) are more likely to change as a result of constant media attention.
As a result of people seeking out information and re-telling their experiences, FBMs are
very malleable and are at risk of becoming misattributed to other details we pick up from
others.
We believe that our memories of FBMs will remain concrete; no matter how
much time passes, we say to ourselves, “I will always remember exactly what I was
doing when X happened.” Consistent with other forms of memory, however, FBMs are
equally as prone to reconstruction. To test this idea, several studies have been conducted
immediately following extreme events. Creating an experiment to judge FBM accuracy
is difficult: researchers cannot plan extreme events in advance, nor can the studies be
conducted retroactively. To study FBM, memory researchers find volunteers (usually
from undergraduate psychology courses) immediately following the event.

These

volunteers are asked to describe situational moments such as how they learned of the
event, what else had they done that day, etc. To determine if the volunteers’ recollections
have changed, researchers question them at various intervals (e.g., one week, twenty
days, two months) after the initial interview. For instance, former President Bush came
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under heavy criticism when he incorrectly recalled seeing the first plane hit the World
Trade Center tower. One of memorable images from that day was President Bush
learning about the news from one of his aid’s whispering in his ear. President Bush, like
most others that day, did not see footage of the first plane until much later in the day.
Moreover, President Bush was not informed about the attacks until after the second plane
hit, which made his recollection of the first plane’s collision fodder for the 9/11 skeptics.
In later interviews and press conferences, several journalists noticed inconsistencies in his
memory of the event: in one account he noted that his chief of staff, Andy Card, informed
him of the attacks, but in another he stated that senior advisor Karl Rove had delivered
the news (Greenberg 363-4). The events of September 11 are a good representation of an
event that causes FBMs, and many were surprised that the President could not accurately
or consistently recall what happened. After heavy scrutiny from the press, memory
experts declared that President Bush’s slip-ups were typical human error. As exhibited
across the DRM Paradigm, misattribution, and false memory creation, this instance of a
rehashed FBM is not uncanny. As Greenberg notes, “we might expect that [President
Bush] would be better off than the average university undergraduate—however, like so
many others, he appears to be suffering from a near-textbook case of false recall” (368).

Remaking Memory: Conclusion
With all the studies pointing to the possibilities of remaking memory, I wonder
what effects these have on new interpretations of the canon of memory itself. If the
canon of memory was designed to be the mechanism ready for debate and argumentation,
then how reliable is it if recent studies have indicated that biological memory is actually
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very flexible? Memory, I argue, might be the point of invention rather than the point of
storage that we have believed it to be for millennia.

Digital archives and photo

manipulation are just two examples of the creative instincts of contemporary memory.
Memory is no longer just a trope of storage capacity, but rather it is aligning itself with
techne more powerfully by questioning the limits of expert knowledge while becoming a
productive structure capable of influencing and creating other memories. Contemporary
memory is drastically different than is has been defined in the past, and we will benefit
from examining the new forms of this canon on rhetoric studies today.
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Chapter 5
Reply All: Networks, Memory, Forgetting
When I began preparing to write my dissertation, I received some sage advice
from a committee member about the dual blessing and curse of writing on digital
technologies: while a certain example might be ‘cutting edge’ and exciting at the time of
writing, by the time the publication hits the press, that fashionable gadget will be out of
style. That concern has resonated throughout these pages, especially when I had to find
new examples for the now defunct Google Wave, update terms from PDA to Blackberry
to Smartphones, and even consider new(er) forms of computing—Apple’s tablet, iPad.
In the short span of two years, technology that seemed fresh and exciting is now
antiquated and laughable.

These changes, however, bring me to the point in this

dissertation where I must forecast the future of memory studies. My goal throughout this
dissertation has been to answer two questions: Does the tension between interactive
technologies and rhetoric re-shape the nature and relevance of the canon of memory? Do
interactive technologies affect the ways we remember and persuade? Here, I introduce
one final question: what can we do with digital memory that changes the ways we
practice rhetoric?
In this final chapter, I look at the shift from systems of rhetorical memory in
antiquity to those of contemporary memory networks. Ancient memory networks were
personalized—one orator would create one effective memory system to store, locate, and
recall details. Today there is one memory network (which I will explain shortly), and it
must be accessible and searchable by many. There is one critical distinction between the
two systems that will drive this chapter: the type of system that is created to maintain
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memory and promote what information architect Peter Morville calls “findability.”
Morville defines findability in three ways: “a. the quality of being locatable or navigable;
b. the degree to which a particular object is easy to discover or locate; c. the degree to
which a system or environment supports navigation and retrieval” (4). In what follows, I
suggest that contemporary memory networks both benefit and falter from a wide user
base. On the one hand, the growing number of users allows people to create their own
memory spaces within the larger system. On the other hand, the downfall is that at the
same time users input material to be stored or shared, the network itself also creates and
outputs new information about the recently uploaded data. By participating in what
communication theorist Mark Andrejevic calls the digital enclosure, “the creation of an
interactive realm wherein every action and transaction generates information about
itself,” uploaded digital memories both retain information about personally relevant
events while at the same time adding to the existing body of knowledge by creating new
information in which others will participate (2).
The critical issue with contemporary memory is quickly becoming how our
memories are recollected. If we do not “tag” our pictures on Flickr, others will be unable
to find them through search words alone. With digital memory, we must be as aware of
the programs we create to organize and access our stored material as we are with the
content we place in external systems. Therefore, control of the networks (even small,
personalized networks like bookmarking systems) becomes critical to our understanding
of how memory functions.

More and more, digital memory is replacing natural,

biological memory. As a result, by relinquishing control of our biological systems to the
techno-neurological swarm, we must introduce some form of control apparatus or system
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in order to retain access to our own memories. Even if our biological memory can at
times seem inaccessible, with thoughts buried so deeply in our unconscious that we do
not know they exist, we have the capability to overcome the limits of biological
mechanisms through digital organizational systems and control units. This sense of
control over nature (we can store and remember much more with digital tools) suggests
that techne becomes a means to controlling what is natural and biological by shifting
control away from internal, personally controlled systems into external, poly-techne
memory networks. This chapter focuses on specific questions of digital protocol and
network theory to conceptualize how techne can be the future of digital memory. More
specifically, I hone in on one of my definitions of techne – as a force that renegotiates
sources of power – and how the shift from biological to digital memory is rapidly
becoming a means of participating in a controlled memory environment.
I divide this final chapter into three sections: optimization, responsibility, and
digital collaborative pedagogy. Each section looks at the stakes and possibilities for the
future of memory studies from a different perspective. First, optimization examines the
creation of and participation in a network—how can we participate effectively in order to
better capitalize on the memory system? I look at Search Engine Optimization as a
model of what I call “digitally preferred memory,” the process by which popular
memories receive the most attention while smaller events and alternative perspectives
become stifled. Next, I question what it means to be a responsible memory maker. In the
article “Essjay’s Ethos,” James Brown, Jr. questions “originality” and the blurred
boundaries of “mine” and “yours” on the Web. I will use this discussion to interrogate
responsible memory in the sense that shared memories, once uploaded, are no longer
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individual memories, but can contribute to the formation of prosthetic memories for an
unknown audience. Finally, I take a look at what collaborative pedagogy might look like
by employing the ideas of memory collectivities, hive mind thinking, and classroom
participation in a growing knowledge-base.

I update Kenneth Bruffee’s classic

definitions of “collaborative pedagogy” by inserting some new approaches via memory
making activities.
Optimus Prime: Search Engine Optimization and Digitally Preferred Memory
The shift from internalized, mnemonic devices into externalized, collaborative
memory collectives prompts me to question the change in how we use and construct
memory networks. Whether internal or external, memory is useless if it cannot be
recollected. Internalized, mnemonic devices were designed for one person to remember
some specifics in preparation for an upcoming speech. Aside from that one person, no
one else was privy to the intricate details of the individualized ‘storehouse.’ Each
storehouse was a unique method of visual and spatial clues to aid recollection. Internal
memory allows for tricks that don’t make sense to anyone else. Such tricks are why
mnemonic devices are so effective—mnemonic devices are like little ‘inside jokes’ that
trigger memories. On the contrary, externalized, collaborative memory collectives must
be accessible by an infinite number of people. Each person can contribute to the memory
collective, but there are ‘digital social rules,’ or what I am calling e-tiquette, which must
be followed.

Examples of e-tiquette include proper and relevant tagging (e.g.,

dissertation, writing, grad_school) or using hashmarks to indicate topics (e.g.,
#dissertation). The effectiveness and importance of e-tiquette rests in “findability.” If no
one can find the saved material, then the memory is prone to digital erasure. Because
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digital collectives are bound by e-tiquette, external memory cannot be personalized like
internal memory. Rather than mnemonic devices that succeed in light of difference,
memory collectives thrive on findability and similarity.
One of the most interesting ways I see techne lending a hand with contemporary
memory is by looking into the connections between search engine optimization and
memory preference. Search engine optimization (SEO) is the process by which the
probability of keyword searches is analyzed to detect and promote the probability of
certain search results receiving the higher percentage of popularity (Morville 112).
Marketing and advertising strategists use SEO as a tool to increase product placement
and drive consumers toward their goods. However, using SEO not as a marketing
strategy, but rather as a memory strategy might become problematic for rhetoric studies
writ large. In particular, SEO will favor privileged or preferred perspectives on certain
events—some memories will receive the majority of hits, while other memories will be
buried among the unpopular and unrelated search results. Among those that suffer from
the buried results will be the rhetoricians. If access to a wide variety of persuasive
resources, means, and pathways is one of the upsides of digitally networked memory,
then the downfall rests in the same system. While SEO is necessary to sort through the
sheer quantity of information, it comes with a steep cost for rhetorical practices.
The unpleasant side-effect of SEO is what I call “digitally preferred memory.”
Digitally preferred memory is the process whereby popular search results receive the
most attention and the least interesting (or least funded) will be forgotten about. The
process of digitally preferred memory is actually a self-fulfilling prophecy: the higher the
search ranking, the greater likelihood of hits. Personally speaking, rarely do I search
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beyond the sixth or seventh (or tenth, on a really good day) page of Google results. I
recognize this as a fault of my own—I know there are thousands, perhaps millions, of
additional results that I skip in order to save some time, but the truth is, the results that
are ignored might be beneficial. I tend to stick to the top results—not only on Google,
but also on journal and library databases. I refine my search terms to lower the number
of results, both trying to limit the number of items I have to sift through but also with the
hopes of finding one, perfect gem. These gems, if I ever find them, are no accident—
they are carefully calculated to appear via specially crafted (even suggested) search
terms. If I do not see the article or book I think is right, I can choose pre-selected
Boolean search term groupings (e.g., dissertation AND procrastination). The control
over the results that I believe I have is a mirage—my magical grouping of search terms is
not unique. SEO is based on the combination of selected search terms and the probability
of their relation to a specific text. Stochastic techne (T2), then, helps steer researchers
around the limitations of search terms—different terms can lead to the same ends. For
example, let’s say I search for “dissertation AND procrastination” or “writing AND grad
school.” The same article, while located with different terms, could likely be among the
results. If, however, I changed the search terms even slightly to “writing AND effective
techniques,” I will broaden the search because I am not limiting the type of writing, but I
am also running the risk of not locating the one ‘gem’ I hope to find. Although there may
be millions of results from a simple key word search, the vast majorities of those hits are
never attended to and become digitally forgotten.
What does digital forgetting look like? Becoming digitally forgotten is not a
result of anti-participatory, Luddite behavior; instead, being digitally forgotten is the
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result of being left behind on what Wired magazine editor-in-chief Chris Anderson
characterizes with the term “the long tail.” Anderson uses the long tail as an optimistic
business model—it is beneficial to offer more products to fewer people than it is to have
fewer products available to everyone. Statistically speaking, the long tail represents the
probability of a select few popular “hits” receiving the most attention while the remainder
are forgotten about. The long tail is derived from the image of these results: the most
popular and frequent hits have very high points on the y-axis of a graph and the numerous
other results trail out in a thin line across the x-axis. The results along the x-axis look
like “a long tail”—think of a rat’s skinny, long tail. Digital forgetting occurs because the
majority of information is lost among the long tail results, thus a select few popular ideas
remain at the helm of digital memory. The higher the search ranking, the more
preferential treatment the result will receive. Unfortunately, the opposite holds true,
too—because there are so many results tucked away in the long tail, there are only a
selected handful of results that receive regular attention for any given search term
combination.
Being forgotten in the long tail arouses some interesting concerns with digital
rhetorical memory, in particular the availability and accessibility of the means of
persuasion.

SEO not only increases the likelihood of certain links appearing more

prominently in a search, but because these favored results have been paid for, less
important (and arguably less funded) hits will never receive as much attention as their
optimized counterparts. For memory, SEO has the capability to force certain memories
into the long tail. Smaller events, or even alternative perspectives, could be suffocated by
popular search terms or corporate sponsorship of a single track of memory. Take, for
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example, online shopping trend suggestions like Amazon or iTunes recommendations.
These recommendation-bots are some of the most popular examples (and sometimes the
most off-putting because of their precision) of SEO and the digital enclosure. The more
popular an item becomes, the more likely it is to appear in one of the first pages of
suggested search results, leaving the least popular links to be lost and forgotten among
the results. Our participation in the digital enclosure happens automatically whenever we
send an e-mail, purchase an item on Amazon, or place money in our mutual funds. The
information we are providing is collected in order to “serve us better”—or, at least, to
increase our desire to purchase a tailor-made (optimized) suggestion based on the trail of
digital information we leave behind. All of our digital communication is tracked, sorted,
and compiled to automatically offer ‘premium’ choices based on our preferences. The
digital enclosure works by the user providing information in order to receive (without
asking) more information about herself. There is one catch—as Andrejevic points out,
the digital enclosure is asymmetrical. As users, we provide the content but we do not
have access to exactly what content is being collected or, for that matter, how the
information is being put to use (41).
But another, more symmetrical, way to consider digital enclosures and memory
collectives is via folksonomies. A folksonomy is a digital system that allows users to
sort, identify, and group similar items in order to facilitate findability. There are several
well-known examples and many collaborative websites, such as Delicious or Flickr, that
use a well-known folksonomy—tagging. On the social bookmarking site Delicious, users
have the option of adding a “tag,” a short (often one word) description of the article’s
topic. Delicious often provides “suggested tags”—frequently used words in the article
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itself or other popular tags used by members who have saved the same article. Delicious
users can also embed “tag clouds” in their blogs or personal web pages. Tag clouds are a
collection of word tags that represent frequency and popularity of a topic by the size of
the word itself—the larger the font, the more popular the topic. Contributing to a tag
cloud or other tagging system is not an isolated process, and participants must select
popular, even generalized, reference tags in order for the saved links to be connected to
those similarly tagged.

In the article “‘Folksonomy’ and the Restructuring of Writing

Space,” Jodie Nicotra notes that in order to locate related tags, as well as have our saved
links recognized by others, we must use the popular tags rather than ones personally
meaningful to us. For instance, Nicotra states that Delicious might suggest the tag
“marathon” for an article about training for a race (W272). Using the tag “marathon”
will automatically link it to others searching for articles about marathons or running
(W272). If, however, I tag it with “26.2 mile run,” then the likelihood of someone using
that obscure tag decreases, and the memory is not as accessible as it could be with a
popular tag like “marathon” (W272). How might memory studies falter because of
standardized participation, like using popular, recommended tags? Our memories must
be stored in a very specific fashion in order to be recalled, linked to, or recommended
later. If I use “26.2 mile run” rather than “marathon,” then the memory runs the risk of
being forgotten and left in the long tail. However, abiding e-tiquette by selecting popular
tags over less useful ones increases the possibility of retrieval while also fortifying the
continued recollection of properly classified digital memories.
As a result, folksonomies are significant to memory studies for a few reasons.
First, Nicotra indicates that a folksonomy, “moves away from traditional hierarchies and
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classification systems” (W260). Rather than relying on SEO or corporatized sponsored
results, a folksonomy is a collectively organized system that has been compiled entirely
by the users’ identification tags.

By “disrupting the idea of single authorship,” a

folksonomy shows “how multiple, collective subjectivities ‘write,’ enabling possibilities
for configurations and systems to emerge as a result of activity of the so-called hive mind
that could not have been anticipated or conceived of by an individual author working
alone” (Nicotra W260). Next, because a folksonomy can only occur by purposeful,
collaborative effort (think of the “marathon” v. “26.2 mile run” example), these
collections reshape the ways we think about writing, too: “‘writing” […] certainly has an
expansive, performative aspect—not only is it ‘shared,’ as in produced by multiple users,
but it is conceived of as the building of a space rather than the production of a text
(Nicotra W263).

Finally, all objects must contain properties or characteristics that

promote findability. Nicotra rightly argues that, “if your ideas of what the site is about
don’t match up to others’ ideas, it is essentially useless, a rhetorical failure (W266,
emphasis mine). A rhetorical memory failure is nearly identical—if a site never receives
attention and is lost in the long tail, it is a rhetorical memory failure because of the
doubtful probability of being recollected.
Rhetoricians have long questioned the responsibility of their profession, and it is
critical consider how these new digital means of persuasion inform and shape the future
of rhetorical memory studies. In the next section, I question what happens with our
voluntary and involuntary contributions to the digital enclosure. If optimization suggests
that a selected group of memories will receive all the attention, then should the memory
makers themselves uphold certain forms of responsibility?
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Yours, Mine, Ours: Responsible Memory
In his 2009 Society for Literature, Science and the Arts talk, multi-media artist
Casey Alt described all writing composed and shared on social media sites, like Twitter,
as “responses answering to no one” (1). We post updates and thoughts to social media
platforms because we want people to listen or, more likely, because we want to tell
people something. No matter how mundane our Facebook status update is, the point is to
share some information to an audience from our personalized, privileged perspective.
Our profiles indicate that we have hundreds of “friends,” but are these virtual connections
actually reading what we have to say? Have they blocked our posts? Does everyone
check Facebook or their Google Readers as much as I do? I don’t wish to start this
section sounding like I have a digital fetish, but these are important questions to ask
regardless if we check for updates once a week or once a minute. For anyone who
participates in these mediums, Alt’s suggestion is a frightening realization. In fact, the
assumed audience we think we have might not actually be listening or, worse still, might
not be there at all. What is the purpose of a status update if no one is reading it? For
rhetoricians, the suggestion of an assumed or non-existent audience stirs up some
additional concerns about responsible persuasion. With an assumed audience, the entire
rhetorical situation becomes confused—what kinds of rhetoricians are we if we don’t
even know if we have an audience to persuade? If a rhetorician speaks and no audience
hears the talk, is it still persuasion? In order to be responsible contemporary rhetoricians,
must we take into account the possibility of a non-existent audience?
Alt proceeded by taking his suggestion one step further: what if Tweets are not
simply answering to no one, but those status updates could actually increase the
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“possibility for response without responsibility” (1, emphasis mine). Here I find some
interesting connections between a non-existent audience, the responsibility of response,
and contemporary memory. Even though we cannot be certain if anyone is listening,
social media is kindled by a compulsion to write, to update, or to post just in case
someone is wondering. With digital memory, we upload, share, post, or mail any number
of items, fully intending to return to these stored memories later. But really, how often
do we revisit our saved memories?

(Or, if you’re like me, how many forgotten

passwords lock you out from your memory storage locations?) With digital memory, the
more we save, the more infrequently we will return to them if only because the sheer
quantity deters us from spending quality time with the past. To recall digital memories,
we usually have to consciously search it out via search terms or by looking in a specific
folder. If our search terms are spelled incorrectly or are ineffective, then we cannot
locate specific information. In order for digital memory to function effectively, an
organizational system must become equally important as the memories themselves.
Whereas biological memory is prone to happenstance (like Proust’s madeleine arousing
thoughts of a past long forgotten), if we do not participate in a digital memory network,
then the possibility of recall is dramatically reduced. Or to say it another way, if we
cannot organize and systematize our digital memories, it becomes unlikely that anyone
will recall the memories.
But alongside the anxiety about whether our memories will be remembered or
whether an audience exists, interactive technologies and social media have yet to witness
a slump in participation. Even in the face of recent publications forecasting the demise of
our intellect, much less our ability to do anything, books like The Shallows, Distracted,
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and The Dumbest Generation all preach technophobia against increased participation in
social and interactive media.

Between April 2009 and August 2010, for instance,

Facebook more than doubled its active accounts—from 200 million to over 500 million
and counting (“Facebook | Statistics”). Twitter accounts have not only become the space
for personal updates and links to interesting articles, but Bloomberg Businessweek
magazine has noted the rise in “social media managers,” individuals who are hired by a
company to design and maintain a digital presence with frequent Tweets or Facebook
updates about “secret sales” for their followers or notices about when seasonal items are
ending (e.g., “Only 1 week left of Sam Adams Summer Ale—buy now!”) (Gillette).
Increased participation across all social media indicates a few important points. For one,
this increased participation highlights a shift in our personal communication—from face
to face (f2f) into digital. Of course we still interact with people f2f on a regular basis, but
this shift towards digital interpersonal communication had been forecasted long ago and
is becoming more commonly acceptable and preferred, among corporations and
consumers alike. And while digital interpersonal communication still does not sit well
with everyone, companies are actually encouraging their customers with incentives for
using less expensive services, like automated machines and e-bills. For example, in order
to scoot around some of the new federal banking regulations, Bank of America has
announced that they will begin charging $8.95 per month for certain in-person
transactions that cannot be accomplished through an ATM (“B of A to Roll”). Bank of
America’s favoring digital over f2f transactions is one small factor indicating the switch
to active participation in a larger, networked consumer base. Additionally, it is becoming
more likely for someone to participate in some form of social media (i.e., someone might
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have a Facebook page but does not use Twitter), thus any social participation equals an
interaction with, contribution to, and consumption of the collaborative digital network.
Oftentimes, this participation is involuntary, and we end up generating more information
than we consume (a by-product of Andrejevic’s “digital enclosure”). If we take a good
look at the productive possibilities from all these digital outlets, it is becoming more
unlikely that we are responding to no one, as Alt suggested, but we might instead be
responding to everyone—without even knowing to whom we are replying or what our
responses actually say. This unknown message coupled with an unknown audience only
increases Alt’s concern about responsible response. How does this massive “reply-all”
affect the ways we persuade, remember, and create memories for not only ourselves, but
everyone else, too? As a result of the increasing utilization of cloud storage, collective
knowledge bases, and social media spaces, the responsibility of memory is no longer
individual responsibility.
Take, for instance, the rise in “amateur journalism”—individuals who are not
employed by any professional news organization but still report on breaking news stories.
The cable news channel CNN frequently promotes its user-centered news gathering
feature called “iReport,” described on the website as, “the way people like you report the
news” (CNN iReport). iReport is not the only outlet of its kind, and most local news
stations, news papers, and magazines are increasing the call for first-hand videos and
accounts of major events.

On the iReport homepage, there is a section named

“Assignment Desk.” By clicking on any of the popular, pre-selected news topics, users
can contribute their videos, stories, and opinions to the collection of user-generated
content. iReport might sound similar to the archives I discussed in chapter three, but
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there is a difference—iReport is not dealing with memory (at least not immediately) but
instead asks for perspectives as the events are occuring. iReport, then, is something of a
present-history collective—historical perspectives being cultivated from typically nonprivleged viewpoints and collected with little time passing between event and reporting.
Outlets like iReport not only invite ‘amateurs’ to contribute to popular news stories, but
they also provide varied perspectives often unavailable from the newsroom alone. For
example, if I wish to learn more about Hurricane Earl, I might be click on the approprate
iReport link where I can find users’ images, stories, and comments. As opposed to
sending one journalist to cover the story, CNN has hundreds of reporters—contributing
for free.
Even though the concept of iReport is along the same lines of other usergenerated content sites like Wikipedia, there is one major set-back, indicated by the
following “warning” that pops-up on each page: “The stories in this section are not
edited, fact-checked or screened before they post” (CNN iReport). Unlike Wikipedia
who employs staffers to sweep false material, iReport has a considerable gap between
“vetted” stories, and ones yet to be verified. A quick look indicates that there have been
481,408 iReports submitted as of today (September 4, 2010), but only 31,037 of those
have been verified. Interestingly, iReports does not “pull down” or “discontinue” the
non-vetted reports, but only alerts users that it might not be entirely trustworthy. If
iReports does not ‘take responsibility’ for users’ posts and yet still makes these available
to everyone, then at what point does user contribution lead to irresponsiblity?
The future of memory studies must consider the growing likelihood that everyone
will experience more events prosthetically.

Sites like iReport encourage varied
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perspectives while at the same time providing a space for people to share their eyewitness
accounts. As someone who does not live on the Eastern Coast, I visited iReport to see
some snap shots of Hurricane Earl. There are hundreds of photos—large waves, sunsets,
views of the storm approaching.

Simply by flipping through the iReport photos, I

experienced the hurricane prosthetically. In fact, I even (gasp!) viewed and (double
gasp!) found the ‘non-vetted’ images more interesting. Even though the unfiltered photos
were more interesting, because iReport invites stories from everyone, there are bound to
be unclear, misguided, and untruthful representations of events. Moreover, CNN does
not remove the stories after the event has passed, transforming the present-history making
site into a digital archive of sorts. The possibility of unsound user contributions making
their way into small versions of digital archives makes me wonder about the future of
responsible memory. Although I do not have any solutions at this point – after all, this
entire chapter is one large speculation for the prospects of memory studies – but in this
section I pose some questions: Who’s responsible for the memory? Do we even need to
be concerned with responsibility? How can the ethics of digital memories be considered
if their use is determined afterwards?
In the essay “Essjay’s Ethos: Rethinking Textual Origins and Intellectual
Property,” James J. Brown Jr. investigates the limits of an “originary” text through the
lens of Wikipedia. Like iReport, Wikipedia thrives on user-contributed content. Unlike
iReport, Wikipedia maintains its ‘credibility’ because it requires that updates are based
on outside sources (which are linked to at the bottom of each page) and not professional
or personal expert knowledge. Like techne, just because I say I have a skill does not
mean that is useable—I cannot talk a big game without being able to prove my skill set
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repeatedly. Wikipedia ensures that so-called “expert knowledge” does not trump triedand-true material. For iReport, “expert” knowledge is the main force behind the quantity
of content and the success of the site. The difference between the two sites is that iReport
relies on personal perspective while Wikipedia strives to be a composite of “pre-vetted”
information.

Brown argues that the Web in general, and Wikipedia in particular,

“exposes the difficulties of intellectual property by making it difficult to determine where
‘my’ text ends and where ‘your’ text begins” (W239). For memory studies, determining
what’s “yours” and what’s “mine” should be easy—after all, my memories will certainly
be different from yours. This is not the case anymore, and sites like iReport point to an
interesting shift in how we construct “my” memory from the collection “your” memories.
The result of participating in one collective memory network lies in the
responsibility of contributions as well as responsible organizational methods for
information. Once participants fully understand the consequences of their passive and
active contributions to the memory network, then we might gain a better understanding of
how contemporary memory creation functions. The contribution of knowledge is not the
main problem here; instead I am concerned with what happens afterward—are these
contributions relied on as the digitally preferred memory of the event, or are they
forgotten within the long tail? Responsible memory is not only content, but it is also
ensuring accessibility, whether that means describing a site with predictable search terms
or using favorable word tags.
Perhaps an alternative perspective on digital memory could be a blend of memory
and invention. As research in the humanities as well as social and neurological science
has suggested, if memories are heavily prone to re-creation, then memories actually
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become the productive site of invention. When we begin to question the originality –
much less the origin – of a memory, that quest becomes quickly tangled. Instead of
thinking of memory as either “mine” or “yours,” digital spaces encourage the production
of collective spaces: “we” shape and invent “our” spaces together.
Digital Collaborative Pedagogy
In this final section, I suggest that collective practices are beneficial for classroom
productivity, and offer some thoughts about digital collaborative pedagogy. The
networked classroom expands well beyond the course Wiki page, beyond the Facebook
friend requests from students, even beyond the (failed) attempts of using Twitter during
lectures. The digital classroom uses memory to make writing spaces available not only in
a variety of settings (think: cloud computing), but more towards the consumption and
production of texts, both for classroom use and as contributions to future knowledge
collectivities. One of the interesting ways to think about this shift occurs right inside our
classrooms—our students use social media and there is a distinct desire from the students
to incorporate these technologies into our pedagogical practices. Rather than relying on
rigid platforms like Blackboard, the classroom has become a flexible, multimodal space
in which all participants can produce and consume knowledge. As it has been named
elsewhere, our students are becoming “prosumers,” a fusion of producer and consumer,
and this combination can translate into some exciting upgrades for college writing
curriculum.
Here, I offer some ideas about the possibilities of updating Kenneth Bruffee’s
notion of collaborative pedagogy based primarily on his text Collaborative Learning:
Higher Education, Interdependence, and the Authority of Knowledge.

Bruffee’s
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pedagogy is designed around one basic idea, knowledgeable peers, and he uses these
formations as the basis for the construction of knowledge for the students, from the
students. Bruffee defines collaborative learning as “a consensus among the members of a
community of knowledgeable peers—something people construct by talking together and
reaching agreement” (3). As the instructor, it becomes critical to learn the language of
the peers—how can we become knowledgeable peers with our students of different
educational backgrounds, levels, and interests than our own? As a writing teacher, I
prefer to rely on the students’ ability to create knowledge among themselves.

For

instance, before any in-class peer-review activity begins, I encourage my students to
reflect on the most difficult part of the writing assignment: Did the introduction cause
you pain? Were the transitions especially tricky? What about researching—could you
locate sources?

When they read one of their peer’s papers, the students use these

reflections in order to respond effectively as experts—even though they are only
reviewing drafts, they have all experienced the assignment individually and now together.
By initially examining the difficulties of the assignment, each student recognizes himself
or herself as a writer. Although some problems are indeed more significant than others,
the collective experience of writing separately plays into Bruffee’s concept of
collaboration. Bruffee states that, “when [teachers] have successfully organized students
to learn with one another instead of isolating themselves or competing against one
another,” the importance of support groups function not only as knowledgeable peer
groups, but also as a path to forming knowledge collectively (7). The instructor must not
isolate the individual in the classroom, but transform the classroom into a hybrid space of
teaching and learning, consumption and production, authority and decentralization.
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As another example, I have created a “database” or “cloud” system assignment
for my advanced Technical Writing course. The database/cloud assignment requires
students to utilize a flexible, sharable platform, like a Wiki or a Google Doc, and input
their developing research each week. At the end of the semester, each team will have a
large database of research questions, contact information, and other important materials.
This system becomes the main source of information for their final project proposal and
also serves as the “knowledge reference center” for the entire group. Returning briefly to
Jodie Nicotra, she suggests that, “In terms of the Web, prosumption has less to do with
economic consumption than with acts of creative and rhetorical production” (W273). By
contributing to a space of collective knowledge, the students are participating in
collaborative activity, leading towards informed writing based primarily upon knowledge
deemed credible by their peers.
In the end, this shift towards a prosumer classroom is the first step for a new
model of digital collaborative pedagogy. Contemporary memory benefits from these
collective spaces not only because the students are contributing to a knowledge base, but
at the same time they are also learning what it means to be responsible memory makers.
As the old cliché goes, you only get out of something what you are willing put to put into
it. For collaborative memory systems, the quality of information students contribute to
their databases is tied directly to the quality of their final product—if they use shoddy
sources just to complete the assignment and get it off their backs, then it shows in the
end. As responsible memory makers, learning to control how much and what kind of
information is accessible becomes equally important to the quantity of digitally available
means.
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Future, Present, Past: Where Do We Go from Here?
Neurologist and author Oliver Sacks notes that neurology’s favorite word is
“deficit,” largely because neurological research always involves the loss of something –
loss of memory, loss of speech, loss of identity (3). The field of rhetoric has been dealing
memory deficiency—as a discipline, rhetoric seems to have forgotten about memory.
But mourning the loss of memory is not productive, nor is it representative of what I have
suggested throughout my dissertation. My focus in this dissertation has not been on the
loss of memory on the individual level, but the evolution of memory as a participatory
system. Alongside digital adaptation, our memory has undergone a transition from a
biological storehouse to a technological network. However, this shift ignores one of the
most interesting factors of contemporary memory research—do these new tools of
remembrance help or hinder the long-term status of the memories we make? I have
argued that two specific memory situations – digital archives and memory manipulation –
indicate a significant increase in the production of memory making activities. In relation
to digital memory, the memories we upload are not bound to some ethical or moral
standard.

In relation to techne, the digital memory is value-neutral—its use is not

determined completely in advance, but only afterwards by future (and often unknown)
users. Because digital memory is value-neutral, it only reinforces the suggestion that the
future of memory studies become more concerned with responsible contributions to the
networked swarm. If we ignore the call for ethical memory making, it is not far-fetched
to suggest that the effectiveness of rhetorical memory could become clouded with
uncertainty, tainted by unethical contributions, and forgotten again. As a rhetorician, I
am keenly aware of the importance of memory for various rhetorical practices. In order
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to maintain a superior quality of memory studies, the field of rhetoric all must contribute
to the techne influenced, memory-task at hand—actively participating in the creation of
digital memories, gaining control over those memory contributions by taking
responsibility for their content, and ensuring the proper use of others’ memories.
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Appendix

Figure 3.1: The Wayback Machine, Search Results, amazon.com

Figure 3.2: archive.org homepage
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Figure 3.3: Yahoo! on December 20, 1996

Figure 3.4: Yahoo! on June 15, 2010
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Figure 3.5: eBay on October 22, 2002

Figure 3.6: eBay on June 16, 2010
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Figure 3.7: Amazon on October 13, 1999

Figure 3.8: Amazon on June 16, 2010
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Figure 3.9: The September 11 Digital Archive Homepage

Figure 3.10: Satan in the Smoke (Phillips)
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Figure 3.11: “In seat 3B on American Airlines 313 at LaGuardia Airport, NY” (Jacobson)

Figure 3.12: “Riegel Apt.” (Edwards)
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Figure 3.13: “just prior to the plane impact with the South tower” (Cremin)

Figure 3.14: “From the terrace of my highrise apartment in Union City, NJ” (Brown)

Figure 3.15: “April 2001 i misse u 2 girls u stil in my heart” (Calvário Florindo)

192

Figure 3.16: “Bee_Towers” (Tran)

Figure 3.17: “Flight 93 Crash Site” (Pacelli)

Figure 3.18: “Pentagon 2” (Graney)
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Figure 3.19: “Lubbock, Texas” (Velasquez)

Figure 3.20: The Soweto ’76 Live Demo Homepage
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My dissertation answers two questions: Does the tension between interactive
technologies and rhetoric re-shape the nature and relevance of the canon of memory? Do
interactive technologies affect the ways we remember and persuade? I argue that my
interpretation of techne suggests possibilities for the creation and production of new types
of memory in combination with digital media. To interrogate this connection, I suggest
three interpretations of the Greek concept, techne: as a process that is inherently
productive; as a force that renegotiates contemporary sources of social power; and as a
skill that balances expert knowledge with instrumentality. I explore the creative
possibilities of "making memory" in several examples such as digital archives, photo
manipulation, and digital collaborative pedagogy.
In Chapter One, I begin by reviewing how memory has been employed since its
characterization as one of the five canons. Starting with Plato’s “Phaedrus” and ending
with Merlin Donald’s Origins of the Modern Mind and Collin Gifford Brooke’s Lingua
Fracta, my thorough treatment of memory illustrates that even though memory has
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persisted through the centuries, it has not been properly adapted as a foundation of
rhetoric for use in connection with information technologies.
Chapter Two is a critical exploration of techne as well as an argument that states
how techne and memory should be thought of as complimentary forces. New
technologies afford users the possibilities to create and replicate memories, thus
understanding techne as a characteristic of digital memory is critical for contemporary
rhetorical practices.
Chapter Three is an exploration of three digital archives: The Wayback Machine,
The 9/11 Digital Archive, and The Soweto ’76 Archive. By looking at digital archives, I
argue that visitors are encouraged to participate in memory making, indicating a shift
from consumerist trends of memory towards productive memorial spaces. I use the term
“technemonic” to suggest the devices, spaces, or tokens (digital or otherwise) that we
make or collect to remember a particular event.
In chapter four, I argue that memory is a persuasive construct—it is not a concrete
structure, as we tend to think it is, but rather it is extremely fluid and easily subjected to
recreation by the slightest suggestive details. I examine two specific vectors of memory
manipulation: external photo manipulation and internal cognitive manipulation.
Chapter Five questions the implications of technologies used through the process
of techne to change the canon of memory. This final chapter will discuss how
technologies have always affected memory and why those influences are critical to
contemporary rhetoric studies. In particular, Chapter Five will deal with the new sources
and boundaries of control individuals have (or do not have) over their digital memories.
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